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1. INTRODUCTION 
From the independence of Brazil in 1822 down to the independence 
of the African colonies in 1975, successive Portuguese govemments became 
engaged in maintaining, enlarging, developing and, ultimately, in defending 
an empire in África. The literature on the Portuguese African empire is 
largely concemed with discussing the economic and political motives behind 
imperial policy ^ Thus, the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the 
empire for the metropolitan economy —or, for that matter, the colonial 
economies— has not received much attention. This paper attempts to 
provide some of the evidence necessary to conduct such an evaluation ^ . 
Alas, the available data is insuffícient for a full evaluation of the costs 
and benefits of the Portuguese African empire throughout the period 
considered here and this exercise will be incomplete '. But for two periods, 
namely, from 1885-1914 and 1948-1975, diere is enough statistical 
* An earlier versión of this article was presented at the Economic History Workshop, 
Harvard University, February 1997 and at the Encontró da Asocia^áo Portuguesa de Historia 
Económica e Social, Universidade dos Azores, October 1997. I wish to thank the useful 
comments from participants. I would also like to thank Patrick O'Brien for extensive revisión 
of earlier versions of the text and Valentim Alexandre for valuable help with historical 
precisión. Part of this work was done while I was Luso-American Foundation Visiting 
Professor at Brown University. 
' See Hammond (1966 and 1969) and Clarence-Smith (1985) for two opposite thesis 
regarding the nature of Portuguese imperialism. See also Cápela (1975), Papagano (1980) 
and Marques (1994). According to Valentim Alexandre (1979) and (1993), the expansión 
of the Portuguese African empire was due to the same kind of factors that facilitated the 
other European empires in África, namely, better transports, the development of medicine 
and of military techniques, as well as the need to increase the control of the territories. 
For an account of the military activities of the Portuguese in África, see Pélissier (1994), 
(1997a) and (1997b). 
^ Two exceptions may be noted, for the twentieth century, namely. Castro (1980) and 
Green (1969). 
' Also for lack of data, 1 do not present an explicit model for the evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of the African empire. 
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information to suggest that the single largest effect of the colonial empire 
on the Portuguese economy may be detected through an analysis of the 
balance of payments of Portugal and her empire with the rest of the world. 
The contribution of colonial revenues in financing Portugal's balance on 
current account dwarfed any other effects the empire had upon the 
Portuguese economy. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Portugal was the largest 
slave trader on the Adantic and the share expanded down to the late 1820's. 
Apart from wax, ivory and gold, litde else was sold on world markets by 
the Portuguese colonies in the years that preceded the abolition of the 
Atlantic slave trade''. Revenues from slave trade also accounted for an 
overwhelming share of the colonial budgets '. Yet this trade was to be 
curtailed by the British sea power. The abolition of slave trade in Portuguese 
África was fírst settled in principie with the British govemment in 1810, 
when Portugal agreed not to trade in slaves outside its own empire. In 
January 1815, during the Vienna Congress, Portugal signed a treaty with 
Britain which included a provisión for the abolition of slave trade from 
the Portuguese colonies of África to the north of Equator. In 1817, Britain 
obtained the right to inspect Portuguese ships and the Portuguese claims 
to territories and bases in África were recognised by the British 
goveriunent *. Nevertheless, it was only in December 1836 that Portugal 
unilaterally moved to abolish the slave trade from all of the Portuguese 
possessions (but not within the empire). Even so, the British govemment 
still insisted on the right to inspect the Portuguese ships ''. 
The dominance of slavery in the African outbound trade was by no 
means specifíc to the Portuguese colonies *. Yet, the reconstitution of trade 
from other colonies was easier. The growth of commodity trade was 
accompanied by an important shift in the way that trade was managed, 
in particular by the British, namely, the shift from sail to steam shipping .^ 
Portuguese traders had to adapt to British competition in the trade between 
África and Europe and failed. The comparison with Britain suggests that 
the difficulty for the Portuguese resided in their inability to develop steam 
•* See Liesegang (1986), Miller (1986) and Curto (1992) for Portuguese Africa's slave 
and commodity trades in this period. See also Richardson (1989). 
' See Cápela (1979, pp. 85-86). 
' See Smith (1970, p. 80). 
' See Cápela (1979, pp. 202-24). For a review of the discussion of the abolition of 
the slave trade by Portugal, see Marques (1994) and Alexandre (1994). 
' See Haight (1967, pp. 100-2), Inikori (1986) and Law (1995). 
' See Lynn (1981) and (1989). 
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shipping and to cater for an industrial market that demandad such raw 
materials as palm oil and palm kemels *°. In África, as well as at home, 
Portuguese traders faced strong competition from British industry and 
finance. 
Given Portugal's military weakness in Eiirope, it was only through 
diplomacy that Portugal could keep and expand its African empire and 
for that an alliance with Britain was important, particulariy when and where 
the interests of other colonial empires were at stake. The British govemment 
was not always keen to have direct adininistrative control and Portuguese 
administration with its African backup could useful. Thus when the Foreign 
Office in London looked into the Portuguese occupation of the Congo 
basin, it noted that «a bad tenant was better than an empty house, and 
it was better to let Portugal in at once than for Britain to wake one moming 
and find that France had occupied the disputed territory» '^ 
Portugal attended the Berlin Conference, in 1884-1885, and secured 
administrative control over the north bank of the river Congo after assuring 
the other powers that it was committed to free trade in the área. This 
was a diplomatic achievement but very little flowed from it, by way of 
economic gains, not least in terms of fiscal revenue to cover the 
administrative costs involved. This was precisely what occurred after similar 
diplomatic victories that secured north Angola, in 1855, Bolama, then 
capital of Portuguese Guinea, in 1870, and the Delagoa Bay, in 1875. 
By 1889-1890, times were about to change and the Portuguese ambitions 
in África were restrained by other powers. 
In 1890, the Britísh govemment sent an ultimátum to Lisbon to stop 
Portuguese military expeditíons aimed at securing the territories in south 
central África. The outcry that then emerged in Portugal has blurred the 
fact that the setdement of the borders of the Portuguese colonies in the 
following years was pretty favourable for Portugal. The colony of 
Mozambique was cut short of the lands bordering Lake Nyassa, but the 
important kingdom of Gaza in the south was included, in 1895. Angola 
was not allowed to stretch to the región of Barotze, in the south, but 
the Lunda, a large área comprising almost one fourth of its present day 
borders (and which was not claimed in 1887) was added to the colony 
also in 1895 ^ .^ 
'" SeeBowman(1987). 
" Axelson (1967, p. 58). 
'^  See, among others, Axelson (1967). See also Smith (1970), Caetano (1971) and 
Nowell (1982). 
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The actual map of 1895 may have been less favourable fot Portuguese 
interests than Portugal's virtual map of 1887. But the territory left still 
proved to be of significant economic interest. When the frontiers were 
all but defíned and Portugal's claims in África intemationally secured, the 
govemment in Lisbon became free to switch its Afiican poHcy from a 
relatively free trade and liberal phase into the new «colonial system» which 
aimed to maximise revenues from trade. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with 
the period from the Conference of Berlin, in 1885, when the Portuguese 
govemment became free to implement colonial policies that would lead 
to large eamings in foreign currency for the metrópolis. This benign 
outcome was temporarily reversed during the 1920's. Then, new rules were 
implemented over the following decade which allowed Portugal to obtain 
mercantiüst profíts from its colonies once more. From the early 1960's, 
the colonies in the Portuguese economy decreased, while their negativa 
weight in the metropolitan govemment budgets increased, due to the costly 
wars of independence. It was in this context of rising fiscal costs that the 
empire carne to an end. Section 3 analyses the second phase of Portugal's 
Afiican colonisation. A summary of the conclusions is given in section 4. 
2. THE REVIVAL OF EMPIRE, 1885-1930 
At the time of the Berlin Conference, in 1885, Portugal's African 
colonies had an entirely small weight in the Portuguese economy and their 
role was not increasing in any discemible way. For example colonial trade 
still represented a tiny proportion of Portugal's trade and there were no 
other significant economic relationships with the Empire. Portugal exported 
little capital and few emigrants to África. Furthermore, in the 1880's, the 
colonies were not a fiscal burden to central govemment. Their share in 
total expenditure was small and the colonial budget déficits look 
insignificant. Thus it seems hard to find any general and purely economic 
interest behind the attempts to secure Portugal's political claims in África. 
Yet the interest that successive govemments had shown in the Angola coast 
compared to the Guinea coast suggests that there were some economic 
priorities behind African policies. For example, the statistics for the 1870's 
show that Angola, with a population of half a million and exports of one 
billion réis, seemed set to became a more profitable colony than Guinea, 
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with a population of five thousand and exports of less than 300 million 
reis '^ . 
But in 1892 a protective tariff was introduced which led to a signifícant 
increase in trade between Portugal and África. That increase was particularly 
marked for Portugal's exports to África and for African exports to third 
countries, shipped through Portugal as re-exports. In fact, by 1905-14, 
when the weight of African imports in Portugal's total imports was not 
much different from what it had been half a century before, African markets 
already accounted for 15 per cent of total Portuguese exports (see table 
1). By then Portugal's África trade took a larger share than any other single 
country and Portugal ranked second to Britain in terms of the share of 
exports directed to non—European destinations (table 2). In the 1890's, 
the valué of re-exports from Portugal was comparatively larger than it was 
for Great Britain and France (table 3). 
The major effect flowing from the new tariff was that revenues in foreign 
currency derived from exports from the colonies were retained in Portugal 
because they passed through Lisbon and attracted just ten per cent of 
the duties they would have paid if they had been sold outside the new 
«colonial system». These revenues gradually assumed an important role 
in Portugal's balance of payments. In 1893, Bartos Gomes, former minister 
of the colonies, told members of the Sociedade de Geografía de Lisboa 
about the «increasing importance, for the Portuguese economy, of the 
foreign curtency coming from Angola» ^^. Given that emigrant remittances 
from Brazil, previously the major source of finance of the Portuguese 
balance of payments, suffered a severa contraction between 1888 and 1900, 
the change in the colonial tariff could not have come at a better time. 
The major other facet of the economic relationships between Portugal 
and her colonies and for which there is data for a long period, is the 
share of expenditure by the metropolitan govemment on the colonies. Table 
4 displays the average valúes for the share of colonial expenditure for the 
period after 1852, as well as the share of oudays on the military in total 
colonial expenditures. Distinctions between metropolitan and colonial 
accounts are not completely clear and a precise account of the financial 
cost of the colonies to the Portuguese govemment is hard to establish 
accurately. Such expenditures were not concentrated within a single 
ministry and they could be incorrectly registered. For example, it was a 
" See Clarence-Smith (1985, p. 74). 
'" Quoted in Alexandre (1979, p.63). See a similar opinión expressed in 1899 by the 
then minister of the Navy and colonies, quoted in Lains (1995, p. 130). 
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TABLEl 
Portugal: trade with the colonies 
(as % of total foreign trade) 
1840-49 
1850-59 
1860-69 
1870-79 
1880-89 
1890-99 
1900-09 
1905-14 
1920 
1930-39 
1940-49 
1950-59 
1960-69 
1970-74 
Imports 
African Colonies 
0,5 
1.9 
2.5 
2,4 
2,0 
2,4 
2,9 
3,3 
3,8 
10,2 
13,2 
14,0 
14,1 
11,7 
Other Colonies 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,2 
0,4 
Exports 
frican Colonies 
1,0 
2,4 
3,1 
3,7 
2,9 
10,8 
15,3 
15,1 
14,1 
11,9 
19,5 
25,1 
24,1 
17,8 
Other Colonies 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,2 
0,6 
0,6 
0,3 
0,2 
Note: Data for 1842, 1843, 1848, 1851, 1855, 1856, 1861, 1865-1914, 1920 and 
1930-1974. 
SouKCES: 1842-1914: Lains (1992, p. 127); 1920: Castro (1979, p. 229); 1930-1974: 
Ferreira (1994, ubles 1-3) and (1996). 
TABLE2 
Portugal 
Denmatk 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
U.K. 
European exports by 
Europe 
59,8 
97,6 
98,0 
80,8 
86,9 
69.8 
65,8 
70,6 
35,2 
main áreas, 
(per cent) 
N. America . 
3,0 
1,4 
0,0 
8,5 
5,2 
7.4 
13.3 
6.5 
11,6 
S. America 
18,7 
0,4 
0.1 
4.3 
1,3 
6,9 
11,6 
18,2 
12,6 
1913 
Asia 
2,2 
0,3 
0,0 
1,9 
2,6 
3.5 
4,4 
1.4 
24,5 
África 
16,3 
0.2 
2,0 
1,4 
2,7 
12,3 
4,3 
3,2 
7,4 
Oceania 
0.0 
0,1 
0,0 
3,0 
1,0 
0,1 
0.4 
0,1 
8,6 
SOURCE: Bairoch (1974, p. 573) 
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TABLE3 
The importance of reexports, 1861-1913 
1861-70 
1871-80 
1881-90 
1891-90 
1901-13 
Portugal 
9,4% 
9,7% 
11,6% 
21,3% 
21,1% 
U.K. 
n,2% 
15,5% 
15,9% 
13,6% 
13,9% 
Frunce 
3,2% 
1,2% 
1,2% 
1,4% 
1,4% 
SouRCES: Lains (1992, p. 186), Imlah (1958, 
p. 170) and Levy-Leboyer (1073, p. 86). 
Note: reexports/(reexports-l-imports). 
common practice to assign the funding of certain expenditures on Portugal 
to the colonies on the premise that colonias should bring benefits to the 
metrópolis. Such sources of error were, however, minor. 
Expenditures on the colonies were below 5% of annual total 
expenditures for most of the 120 years considered in table 4. When 
expenditures rose above that mark that was due to military operations 
that occurred in the early 1890's, during World War I and again during 
the wars of independence (1961-1974). On average for 1851-1914, 
Portugal's central govemment's ejqienditure on the colonies carne to 3.1% 
and below the corresponding ratio of 6% for France ^'. Furthermore, 
colonial govemments also raised their own taxes. The information regarding 
local budgets is scarce and refers to planned, not actual, revenues and 
expenditures and relates only to Angola (see table 5). Nevertheless 
we may conjecture that Angola's budgetary déficit added not more 
than one percentage point to Portugal's metropolitan expenditure, between 
1853-1910 *^. Even if the déficits of Guinea and Mozambique are 
taken into account, the share of total expenditure on the empire in the 
Portuguese budget most certainly fell below that of France over the period 
1850-1910. 
" See Crouzet and Dormois, this issue. 
" This proportion is probably overestimated and it has been estimated that the total 
actual déficit for 1853-1907 was only 56 per cent of the déficit of the planned budgets. 
See Macedo (1910, pp. 33-35 and 52-54). 
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TABLE4 
Government expenditure 
(billíon reís) 
1852-60 
1861-70 
1871-80 
1881-90 
1891-900 
1901-10 
1911-20 
1921-30 
1931-40 
1941-50 
1951-60 
1961-70 
1971-76 
Total 
11,22 
14,86 
22,61 
31,63 
44,74 
57,42 
147,1 
1399,5 
2591,0 
3790,5 
7747,3 
20682,1 
66854,6 
Colonies 
Total Investment Military 
0,01 
0,34 
0,36 
1,23 
2,56 
2,78 
11,5 
62,5 
29,4 
186,7 
498,2 
5387,9 
10001,7 
na 
na 
na 
1,37 
1,56 
2,53 
1,9 
51.5 
3,5 
111,8 
181,5 
633,4 
1442,1 
na 
na 
na 
0,00 
0,51 
0,19 
8,6 
1,5 
0,4 
45,7 
256,0 
4621,5 
9038,9 
Inv/Tot 
na 
na 
na 
91,0% 
58,1% 
64,1% 
32,9% 
61,4% 
10,2% 
27,7% 
28,7% 
12,5% 
13,6% 
Mil/Tot 
na 
na 
na 
0,0% 
14,7% 
5,1% 
48,3% 
8,2% 
1,0% 
21,3% 
56,2% 
84,9% 
85,1% 
OtheríTot 
na 
na 
na 
9,0% 
27,3% 
30,7% 
18,7% 
30,4% 
88,8% 
51,0% 
15,0% 
2,6% 
1,3% 
Colantes/ 
Total 
0,1% 
2,2% 
1,6% 
3,7% 
5,8% 
4,8% 
1,1% 
4,1% 
1,2% 
3,7% 
6,0% 
26,1% 
18,0% 
SOURCES: 1851-1914: Mata (1993, tables 10, 14 and 39); 1915-1980: Ferreira and Pedra 
(1988,AnnexI). 
Note: Total expenditure is taken from Mata (1993, table 39). 
TABLE5 
Angola: colonial budget 
(millton reís) 
1819 
1822 
1824-25 
1829-32 
1843 
1853-59 
1860-69 
1870-79 
1880-89 
1890-99 
1900-09 
1910-14 
Revenue 
175,2 
152,1 
164,3 
148,5 
132,7 
241,2 
247,0 
419,2 
570,7 
1295,3 
1842,5 
2191,4 
Expend. 
141,8 
183,4 
179,6 
143,3 
208,4 
266,6 
352,6 
433,3 
750,5 
1462,2 
2476,7 
3888,7 
Déficits 
33,4 
-31,3 
-15,3 
5,2 
-15,1 
-25,4 
-105,6 
-14,2 
-179,8 
-166,9 
-634,1 
-1091,3 
SOURCE: 1819-1910: Macedo (1910, pp. 45 
and 47-48); 1911-1914 Pélissier (1997a, p. 228). 
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Although the increase in exports from Portugal to África was rapid, 
it was in the re-export trade of colonial produce to third countries that 
the true changas brought about by the 1892 tariff can be observed. This 
rapid increase of colonial re-exports had a large effect on Portugal's balance 
of payments and, ultimately, on her rate of industrial and economic growth. 
In 1891, the Portuguese govemment had faced a severa crisis in meeting 
payments to foreign holders of govemment bonds, due basically to the 
contraction in the valué of emigrant remittances from Brazil. Following 
the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the Republican revolution, Brazil's 
currency depreciated heavily and Portuguese emigrants reduced their 
remittances sent home to Portugal, particularly during the years 1890-1894. 
The resulting shortage of gold and foreign currency led to a debt crisis. 
This crisis had wide political implications although its economic 
consequences were less serious than historians once believed '^. 
The re-export trade from the African colonies through Portugal and 
on to northem Europe and the United States, increased considerably after 
1892 because the colonial tariff of that year imposed strong preferential 
treatment for re-exports carried through Portugal. After 1892, Portuguese 
exports to the African colonies paid between 10% and 20% in tariff duties, 
foreign produce re-exported through Lisbon to the colonies paid 80%, and 
direct exports from foreign countries to the colonies paid the full tariff ^^ . 
The reason why re-exports from África eamed foreign currency for the 
Metrópolis, was that Portugal paid the colonies in domestic currency, and 
retained the foreign currency received from their sale outside the empire. 
Furthermore, direct trade between Portugal and its African territories was 
carried on in domestic ciurrency and consequendy the Portuguese balance 
of trade with the African colonies has to be deducted from the balance 
of trade in foreign currency. 
Table 6 includes my estimates of the revised valúes for average yearly 
re-exports from the African colonies, in comparison to Portugal's balance 
of trade valued in both domestic and foreign currencies ' '. Column (c) 
" See Lains (1995). The debate around the crisis of 1891 has been misleading to 
the extent that the impressive role of colonial re-exports in balancing Portugal's extemal 
payments is largely neglected in the more recent literature. See, though, Cordeiro (1896, 
p. 400), Vieira (1905, p. 473), Salazar (1916, pp. 193-99) and Clarence-Smith (1985, pp. 
86-87). 
" See, for instance, Pautas vigentes [...] (1892). Differential duties had akeady been 
imposed in the 1830's, albeit less successfully and they were abandoned in the 1870's. 
" For details regarding the correction of Portugal's foreign trade statistics see Lains 
(1992, Appendix B). Briefly, outward trade was undervalued, whereas inward trade was 
24} 
PEDRO LAINS 
1 íí 
ai •^ 
I § 
^ 
5i 
"í I 
3 
«s4 
á-
• - l t ~ ~ r ^ < N l ^ ( N l A < N 0 0 ( N O 0 N 
r H 0 0 0 O O \ i r \ I A t ^ < N - H O v - ^ 0 0 
I I irv t—I rr^ ,—( os 
CT^íN•>ro^'-;•-^Tr^^^oqoq<^joq 
»-H -H rt' fsi (N <N «^ tr\ f<\ TT ir\ 
m s O ' ^ r s | 0 0 < N O O O \ i r v - ^ f A O 
^ ' - i f s i í N ' - H p r ^ o Ó ' ^ r ^ v d u S 
rt -H ^ (N 
Tj-rtTi- I o o T r ' - H O ' < r o o o s o I — i < N ' t * > f<^a^oor^o<N I I I rH \o \o iTN r^  
r ' ^ f ' ^ < N v O ^ O < N O ^ O ^ o O ( N a ^ 
• • r ^ o ^ - r ^ ^ o ^ o ^ o o o o ^ • ^ o o ^ < ^ 
O i O ' ^ o o r ^ i r \ O N f N \ o r ^ v O < j \ 
0 N ' - i 0 0 i r \ ' < r \ 0 O ' - i O 0 0 p i A 
-H ^ (N r-^  00 vO 0^ 
O O O í N O V ' - i ' O i r v v O - ^ - ^ O O 
o O ' - i o o o s o o o r ^ r - ~ < N ' — i i r N " - ! 
f ' ^ I A ^ M • ^ r ^ \ 0 ^ ^ 1 ( ^ 4 v O ' - l • « J • 0 0 
I I I I 1 I 
O f < ^ r ^ - H T i - i r \ O v O v O s O O O o O 
v q p O N p i n o O ' - H i o - H o q r í N O 
O T N ' ^ f s I r ' N O O T r s O Q f N O O O O 
r^00'-^•-^|/^Of<^'<^f<^r~;cx3CT\ 
3 
m v o ^ o r ^ r ^ o o o o o N ^ o O ' - " 
0 O 0 0 0 O 0 O 0 0 Q O 0 0 0 O 0 0 O N O \ ( J \ 
I T N O I O O m O I A P l A O 
v o r ~ r ~ - o o o o o s o s o O ' - i 
O O O O O O Q O O O O O O O O S O S O S 
244 
AN ACCOUNT OF THE PORTUGUESE AFRICAN EMPIRE, 188?-1975 
shows that Portugal's total balance of trade converted into domestic 
currency, was in déficit throughout most of the 1865-1913 period; apart 
from the decade 1890-1899 when the mil-reis was undervalued in relation 
to its par valué. Column (d) indícales that from the 1870's, Portugal's 
balance of trade with her African colonies was positive and the surplus 
reduced the total déficit. Since trade with the colonies was carried in 
domestic currency, such transactions should be excluded from the balance 
of trade measured in foreign currency. This balance is shown in table 6 
(column e) and it is naturally less favourable for Portugal than the overall 
balance measured in domestic currency. What is most noteworthy is the 
sharp increase in receipts over outlays in 1895-1899, due to the depreciation 
of the currency, and the worsening thereafter, following the appreciation 
of the currency. Table 6 also shows the valué of colonial re-exports 
(column f) and in column (g) the valué of re-exports is added to the valué 
of the balance of trade in foreign currency. From this last set of data, 
we conclude that for most of the period from 1890, Portugal's balance 
of trade in foreign currency was positive. Finally, table 7 shows that during 
the same period from the early 1890's, re-exports were eaming considerably 
more in foreign currency for the Portuguese economy than emigrant 
remittances. Clarence-Smith concluded that re-exports covered less than 
half of the déficit between 1905 and 1915, and the rest was covered by 
emigrant remittances. But my revisión of the official data gjves a different 
picture, and suggests that either emigrant remittances were substantially 
lower, or that Portugal's balance of payments was largely positive ^. 
Retums fi-om the colonies to the Portuguese economy depended on 
their capacity to produce exportables. In 1901, the principal items exported 
from the empire were cocoa, wild rubber, coffee, oil seeds, fisheries and 
wax and, in 1913, sugar was added to this list (see table 8). These products 
were either produced in plantations run by Europeans using contract labour 
or they were produced by the Africans and brought to the coast to be 
registered correctly. The reason is that the declared valué of exports was converted into 
the Portuguese currency at the par exchange rate, even after 1891, when Portugal left the 
gold standard and the currency was below par for most of the period up to 1914. Imports 
were registered at the raarket exchange rates. 
^ See Clarence-Smith (1985, p. 87). There are no estimates for total remittances and 
the valúes in table 4 are oiüy temptative. The most complete study of the effects of emigrant 
remittances on Portugal's balance of payments after 1891 is still Salazar (1916, chap. 7). 
See also Pereira (1981, pp. 39-44) and Lains (1995, p. 127). Mata (1987) provides an 
estímate for the balance of payments for 1891-1913, and for the earlier period (1865-1890) 
there is another estímate from Rcis (1991). These two series are incompleta and incompatible 
with each other. 
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1878-79 
1888-89 
1890-93 
1896-99 
1900-04 
1907-09 
1910-13 
TABLE7 
Emigrant remittances and 
(billion rets) 
Remittances 
Recorded 
(a) 
2961 
3796 
1078 
1965 
4225 
4126 
3558 
Estimated 
(h) 
5922 
7592 
2156 
3930 
8450 
8252 
7116 
reexports 
(c) 
695 
2201 
5614 
13182 
15563 
13721 
21445 
Reexports 
(d) = (b)/(c) 
8,521 
3,449 
0,384 
0,298 
0,543 
0,601 
0,332 
SOURCE: Lains (1992, p. 178). 
exported. The importance of produce such as rubber, wax and fish, 
decreased in the period 1901-1936 while the export of oil seeds, probably 
another peasant crop, increased. Plantation exports show an inverse trend, 
except for cocoa. In fact, die share of exports of sugar (mainly from 
Mozambique), coffee (mainly from S. Tomé and Angola), cotton and sisal 
(from Angola and Mozambique) and com (from Angola) increased from 
1901 to 1936. 
Exports from Portuguese África doubled between 1901 and 1919 (in 
current pounds sterling), declined during World War I and stabilised 
thereafter, until 1929, to decline again until 1934, in which year the levéis 
of the begiiming of the century were re-established (see table 9) ^^ This 
pattem of export growth was shaped by the growth of intemational markets 
for tropical exports and the economy of the Portuguese colonies probably 
suffered as much as other economies that were also dependent on primary 
exports. 
The commodities which the African colonies exported were 
commodities for which the domestic demand was probably very low. For 
'^ Table 6 also depicts the valué of trade for the Asían colonies (Portuguese India, 
Macau and Timor), which fall out of the scope of the present article. The relative importance 
of those colonies can be gauged by the data on that table. The valué of trade from Portuguese 
India and Timor is relatively small, Macau was a transit port for China as well as Portuguese 
India for imports into India. 
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TABLE8 
Composition of colonical exports, 1901-1936 
Cattle 
Hides 
Wax 
Oil seeds 
OÜs 
Cotton 
Sisal 
Tobacco 
Rubber 
Wood 
Diamonds 
Gold 
Goal 
Fisheries 
Sugar 
Coffee 
Cocea 
Com 
Salt 
Other 
TOTAL 
1901 
13 
69 
511 
913 
34 
9 
0 
0 
3326 
44 
0 
0 
0 
736 
163 
1122 
4180 
90 
73 
974 
12257 
Billion reís 
1913 
93 
222 
660 
3081 
99 
80 
17 
11 
2367 
62 
0 
0 
0 
769 
2331 
1440 
7172 
287 
60 
2091 
20842 
1927 
2622 
7481 
14258 
183046 
11273 
16639 
14810 
833 
1395 
1299 
38498 
4449 
389 
32913 
87749 
67917 
83987 
55341 
4041 
36937 
665877 
1936 
2659 
5694 
14230 
150274 
4893 
33258 
52405 
890 
293 
1549 
83338 
4802 
546 
18382 
75934 
59680 
23686 
57364 
2324 
37001 
629202 
1901 
0,1% 
0,6% 
4,2% 
7,4% 
0,3% 
0,1% 
0,0% 
0,0% 
27,1% 
0,4% 
0,0% 
0,0% 
0,0% 
6,0% 
1,3% 
9,2% 
34,1% 
0,7% 
0,6% 
7,9% 
100,0% 
Per cent 
1913 
0,4% 
1,1% 
3,2% 
14,8% 
0,5% 
0,4% 
0,1% 
0,1% 
11,4% 
0,3% 
0,0% 
0,0% 
0,0% 
3,7% 
11,2% 
6,9% 
34,4% 
1,4% 
0,3% 
10,0% 
100,0% 
2927 
0,4% 
1,1% 
2,1% 
27,5% 
1,7% 
2,5% 
2,2% 
0,1% 
0,2% 
0,2% 
5,8% 
0,7% 
0,1% 
4,9% 
13,2% 
10,2% 
12,6% 
8,3% 
0,6% 
5,5% 
100,0% 
1936 
0,4% 
0,9% 
2,3% 
23,9% 
0,8% 
5,3% 
8,3% 
0,1% 
0,0% 
0,2% 
13,2% 
0,8% 
0,1% 
2,9% 
12,1% 
9,5% 
3,8% 
9,1% 
0,4% 
5,9% 
100,0% 
SOURCE: Salgado (1939: table 12b). 
Note: All territories, except Nyasa Co. and Macau. 
example, African populatíons consumed some negligible amounts of coffee, 
cocoa and cotton. Thus, the growth of exports was made possible by an 
elastic increase in the production and sale of exportables. For example, 
the collection of wild rubber and its transport to the coast, could be carried 
on with litde European supervisión ^^ . Although the major concern of the 
Portuguese authorities was to make sure that such products were channelled 
through the ports under their supervisión, and not diverted through the 
Congo from northem Angola and Zambese from northem Mozambique. 
That had happened earlier in the century with exports of slaves and ivory. 
SeeDuffy(1961, p. 158). 
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TABLE9 
Colonial Trade, 1901-1936 
(000 pounds sterling) 
Exports 
Guinea Cape S. Angola Mozam- India Macan Timor TOTAL Total 
Verde Tome hique África 
1901-10 
1911-20 
1921-JO 
1931-36 
109 
304 
357 
273 
62 
53 
32 
24 
1422 
1239 
615 
285 
1116 
1188 
2029 
2148 
662 
1250 
2603 
1521 
144 
245 
293 
194 
1572 
1643 
1518 
788 
67 
90 
144 
59 
4991 
6013 
7591 
5292 
3365 
4034 
5636 
4251 
Imports 
Guinea Cape S. Angpla Mozam- India Macau Timor TOTAL Total 
Verde Tome hique África 
1901-10 167 173 572 1266 1707 416 1845 59 6004 3868 
1911-20 367 229 733 1149 2528 726 2231 79 8043 5007 
1921-30 387 335 351 2229 3930 1121 2740 113 11206 7232 
1931-36 233 222 165 1506 2973 1111 1840 59 8109 5098 
SOURCE: Salgado (1939: tables 3 and 6). 
Meanwhile, the definition of the borders in the 1890's fostered control 
over supplies of exportables from the Africans. 
Yet, the definition and control of the borders or, for that matter, the 
definition of property rights within the colonies, were by no means sufficient 
to guarantee increases in the supply of exportables from the plantations. 
Labour was a scarce factor in África (probably less than capital but certainly 
more than land). After the abolition of slavery, the production of products 
for export such as coffee or cotton required measures to tie the population 
to the land. The control over African populations was of paramount 
importance for successful colonisation, not only because it helped to provide 
the necessary labour forcé for the plantations, but also because it allowed 
the collection of taxes. 
Control over the African populations became harder after the abolition 
of slavery ^'. The first step towards the abolition of slavery was taken in 
" Slavety was more diffiailt to abolish than slave trade also because it implied a 
compensation to the slave-owners. Yet, the Portuguese legislator, contrarily to the British, 
managed to avoid that expenditure to the govemment. 
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1856 in the district of Ambriz as a response to a dispute with Britain. 
In April 1858, Sá da Bandeira decreed that slavery would be abolished 
over a period of twenty years. He expected the number of slaves would 
decline and thus reduce the cost of indemnity to the Portuguese 
govemment. When that did not happen, the govemment formally ended 
slavery in February 1869, but obliged the ex-slaves to continué working 
for their ex-proprietors for ten years, as «libertos». Between 1874 and 
1876 the «libertos» were freed and slavery was finally abolished in the 
Portuguese colonies, only a few years after slavery had been abolished 
on the test of the Continent and a labour code was published, in 1878, 
which established some protective rights for native workers ^^. During the 
following decade, Portugal was more concemed with territorial claims than 
in securing fiscal revenues from the colonies to cover their administrative 
costs, either in the form of tariffs or in the form of the control of the 
labour forcé. Not until 1899 was a new labour code applied to all African 
natives in the form of a «moral and legal» obligation to work ^'. 
Thus, the 1892 tariff and the 1899 labour code formed landmarks 
for the new colonial regime that Portugal imposed on her Afiican colonies. 
The measures were surely what other European powers had expected 
Portugal to implement when they resisted Portuguese claims during 
negotiations over territory and borders in the 1880's. Perhaps the tariff 
and labour code, which brought important benefits for Portuguese 
colonisation were delayed simply to strengthen the bargaining position of 
the country in the scramble for territory. 
The increased interest of govemment in África emerged in several ways. 
For example, the position of govemador geral of Angola and Mozambique 
obtained a new status that attracted men who managed to impose a tighter 
administrative control over the territories. Yet soon the new govemadores 
gerais demanded more autonomy. Meanwhile, the fiscal cost of the colonies 
increased from the early 1890's, particularly for Angola. Sound public 
finance preoccupied the press and the parliament, upon which govemments 
depended. Yet, it was not until World War I that the share of the colonial 
in metropolitan govemment expenditures increased to 12%, but shortly 
thereafter that share fell again to a level cióse to what it had been in 
the nineteenth century (see table 4 above). Even so, the budgets of the 
colonies became increasingly unbalanced, particularly for Angola, largely 
" See Alexandre (1979, pp. 155-57) and Duffy (1961, p. 151). 
" That obligation was further regulated by the labour cedes of 1926 and 1928, and 
in 1930 it was limited to public works. See Duffy (1961, pp. 318-21). 
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because the military expenditures increased more than three times between 
1883-1887 and 1903-1907 and in 1907 they peaked at 51% of total 
expenditures for that year *^. 
The reason for the increasing burden on the metrópolis was that 
Portugal was heavily engaged in wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea 
during the last three decades before world War I. It was not until the 
mid 1920's, that the Portuguese colonies on the continent of África were 
pacified and controlled by the Portuguese army and its tax collectors. 
The generally favourable position of African colonies in Portugal's 
balance of payments and their relatively low burden on the metropolitan 
budget, gradually carne to an end during the republican regime 
(1910-1926). Four factors contributed to this outcome. Firsdy, the wars 
against native power, in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique increased in 
intensity down to 1926 when the last important conflict was fought in 
the colonies. Secondly, the autonomy granted to the govemadores gerais 
fostered colonial investment, a policy that was backed by Lisbon because 
it was believed that the colonies needed social overhead capital in order 
to make them profítable and less war prone. Thirdly, the shock causad 
by the War to intemational markets was particularly severe for the kind 
of primary products exported by Portugal's colonies. Finally, the way 
Portugal financed the war caused high inflation and disturbances to the 
public finances, in both Portugal and its colonies. 
The 1926 coup d'état that ended the republican regime was followed 
by a period of financial reorganisation, led by the Estado Novo. In the 
colonies, reforms were more difficult to implement because the effects 
of the 1929 depression were severe. Portugal's balance of trade with the 
African colonies went into substantial déficit, first in 1913 and thereafter 
for most of the 1920's. The years from 1929 to 1931 were the three highest 
déficits since the beginning of the century. Exports did not recover, but 
imports were cut almost in half between the peak year of 1929 and 1934. 
By 1936, the Estado Novo could proudly present a small surplus for 
commodity trade with African colonies. At the same time, colonial finances 
moved into balance and remained there for the rest of the period down 
to 1950 ^\ 
^' In 1900-10, the accumulated déficit for Angola's govemo geral (7,100 contos), 
surpassed the accumulated déficit of the previous fíve decades, fitun 1852 to 1899 (5,500 
contos). See Macedo (1910, pp. 54-61). 
" See Duffy (1961, p. 331). 
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3. THE CONSOLIDATION AND DEMISE OF EMPIRE, 1930-1975 
The 1930 Acto Colonial tnarked a new era in the relationship between 
Portugal and her colonies. Basically this act (included in the 1933 
Constitution) aimed to establish a new colonial system, where trade and 
payments between Portugal and her colonies would be in balance. 
Furthermore, the autonomy of the colonial administrations was constrained 
in order that the whole system could be ruled from Lisbon. The strategy 
was not designed to produce revenues in the colonies for the benefit of 
Portugal, but rather a financial equilibrium within the empire. Through 
the médium of exchange controls imposed in 1931, the new system 
channelled foreign currency from colonial exports into the metropolitan 
economy and thereby provided a major source of the means required to 
fínance Portugal's déficits on the current account of the balance of 
payments. Furthermore, the share of the colonies in Portugal's trade 
increased substantially, as the export sector in Portugal responded to 
opportunities opened by protected markets in África and the colonies 
developed raw materials which the Portuguese industty demanded, such 
as textile fibres and industrial oils. 
The functioning of the colonial system bom in 1930 differed from the 
system imposed by the tariff regime of 1892. Under the former regime, 
Portugal secured the foreign currency eamed by African exports by 
controlling re-exports through Lisbon. After 1930, the control was exercised 
over monetary flows. 
Estimated valúes for the empire's trade for 1927-1931 presented in 
table 10 show that the colonies were running slight déficits, both in terms 
of total trade (1061 contos of exports against 1143 contos of imports) 
and for trade with foreign countries alone (812 contos against 987). Table 
11 depicts a similar situation for the years 1932-1936 (the déficit should 
be reduced by applying a factor of 30% to the valué of exports), and 
for 1947-1951 *^. The share taken by foreign countries in exports from 
Portugal's African colonies increased from 1901 to 1927-31, stabilised in 
the period to 1932-1936 and then increased again down to 1947-1951. 
The decline in the valué of exports from 1927-1931 to 1932-1936 was 
more important for sales to foreign countries and the share of colonial 
*^ There is no equivalent revisión for Portuguese foreign trade statistics for the period 
after 1914 as the one presented on table 6 above for the 1842-1914 period. Ribeiro Salgado 
(1936, p. 91) hints that exports from Portugal were undervalued by 50% and exports from 
the colonies by 30%. 
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imports from third countries contracted from 72% to 62%. Yet, the decline 
in total imports was sharper than the decline in exports and the colonies 
probably run a surplus in the early 1930's (if account is taken for the 
under-valuation of exports). Such an outcome flowed from the protectionist 
measures imposed by the Colonial Act of 1930. 
TABLE 10 
Exports to 
Portugal 
Colonies 
3rd Countries 
Total 
Exports to 
Portugal 
Colonies 
3rd Countries 
Total 
Trade within the Empire, 1927-1931 
(cantos) 
Official valúes 
Portugal 
103,6 
812,9 
916,5 
Revísed valúes 
Portugal 
155,4 
1219,4 
1374,8 
Colonies 
191,2 
624,6 
815,8 
Colonies 
248,6 
812,0 
1060,6 
3rd Countries 
2198,6 
987,3 
3185,9 
3rd Countries 
2198,6 
987,3 
3185,9 
Total 
2389,8 
1090,9 
1437,5 
4918,2 
Total 
2447,2 
1142,7 
2031,4 
5621,3 
SouRCE: Based on Salgado (1936: table 1). 
Note: The revised valúes were estimated according to the source by adding 50% to 
the valué of Portuguese exports and 30% to the valué of colonial exports. 
Exports from countries (imports) were not revised. 
TABLE 11 
Portuguese África Trade, 1901, 1913, 1927-36 and 1947-31 
(contos) 
Exports to Guinea C. Verde S, Tomé Angola Mozambique Total 
1901 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
74 
2 
273 
349 
303 
49 
21 
373 
4.480 
17 
— 
4.497 
4.208 
219 
101 
4.528 
146 
129 
1.612 
1.887 
9.211 
416 
2.007 
11.634 
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Exports to 
1913 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1927-31 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1932-36 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1947-51 Portugal 
Other 
Total 
Imports from 
1901 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1913 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1927-31 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1932-36 Portugal 
Other colonies 
Foreign countries 
Total 
1947-51 Portugal 
Other 
Total 
Guinea 
ll'i 
1 
1.209 
1.485 
21.390 
134 
17.586 
39.110 
19.285 
271 
10.608 
30.164 
107.553 
27.018 
134.571 
Guinea 
ni 
8 
374 
504 
213 
13 
1.402 
1.628 
9.028 
603 
22.105 
31.736 
9.066 
618 
17.349 
27.033 
109.667 
40.568 
150.235 
C Verde 
li,l 
21 
11 
314 
2.251 
206 
663 
3.120 
2.111 
140 
449 
2.700 
7.622 
207.655 
215.277 
C Verde 
435 
23 
458 
916 
238 
22 
948 
1.208 
8.405 
1.241 
23.946 
33.592 
6.548 
2.754 
14.188 
23.490 
31.958 
242.649 
274.607 
5. Tomé 
l.lik 
152 
10 
7.398 
59.325 
467 
765 
60.557 
30.597 
230 
32 
30.859 
19.763 
182.051 
201.814 
S. Tomé 
818 
234 
1.426 
2.478 
973 
440 
2.313 
3.726 
13.190 
9.828 
16.580 
39.598 
6.891 
4.387 
6.372 
17.650 
48.471 
210.156 
258.627 
Angola 
4.512 
229 
841 
5.582 
102.965 
9.275 
130.695 
242.935 
125.189 
4.027 
136.964 
266.180 
461.392 
1.462.827 
1.924.219 
Angola 
1.668 
49 
2.381 
4.098 
1.596 
14 
4.439 
6.049 
85.009 
845 
161.274 
247.128 
84.926 
475 
83.836 
169.237 
720.163 
751.739 
1.471.902 
Mozambique 
342 
1.265 
3.713 
5.320 
42.688 
5.277 
197.593 
245.558 
46.847 
4.972 
114.112 
165.931 
385.599 
603.520 
989.119 
Mozambique 
1.302 
283 
4.603 
6.188 
1.833 
904 
9.050 
11.787 
81.958 
17.833 
371.534 
471.325 
73.095 
5.236 
226.273 
304.604 
549.245 
1.181.660 
1.730.905 
Total 
\1M1 
1.668 
5.784 
20.099 
228.619 
15.359 
347.302 
591.280 
224.029 
9.640 
262.165 
495.834 
981.929 
2.483.071 
3.465.000 
Total 
4.345 
597 
9.242 
14.184 
4.853 
1.393 
18.152 
24.398 
197.590 
30.350 
595.439 
823.379 
180.526 
13.470 
348.018 
542.014 
1.459.504 
2.426.772 
3.886.276 
SOURCE: Salgado (1939: table 8). 
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The govemment in Lisbon imposed highly restricüve policies in the 
colonies which balancee! their budgets and the foreign trade déficits. Thus, 
the budgets of Angola and Mozambique moved into balance already in 
1931 and Mozambique run a fiscal surplus for most of the following period, 
due to the revenues that accrued to the colonial govemment from taxation 
of the native emigration to the Union of South África ^'. The effect of 
such measures on the African economies must have been severe. The 
govemment did not want to lose control of the intemal and extemal 
finances of its colonies and the colonies would not be allowed to became 
a burden for the metropolitan fínances. Yet, the problem was about to 
fade away because after World War 11 the African colonies once again 
became a source of foreign currency for Portugal. The «archaic» system 
of re-exports through Lisbon enhanced by the 1892 tariffs was replaced 
in 1930 by a system of exchange controls whereby eamings in foreign 
currency from African exports had to be deposited in the Banco de Portugal, 
in Lisbon, in exchange for Portuguese escudos and other colonial currencies 
(the proportion of the two currencies varying from colony to colony). 
Domestic imports into the colonies could be paid by escudos, in Portugal, 
and imports from foreign countries had to be paid for in foreign currencies 
provided, within certain limits, by the Portuguese govemment ^^. 
Offícial data for balances of payments within the empire dates only 
from 1964, but it is possible to gauge the contribution of the colonies 
to Portugal's balance of payments by looking at the other accounts. For 
example, table 12 shows that the balance of payments on income account 
of the empire (Portugal and its colonies) was positive for most of the 
period from 1950 to 1971. Up to 1965, the income account of Portugal 
alone was in déficit and the overall surplus was attributable to the 
contribution of the colonies''. From 1965 onwards, the colonies retained 
their surpluses with Portugal. But by then Portugal ran a surplus with 
foreign countries and the relative importance of the colonies declined. From 
1967 onwards contributions from emigrant remittances surpassed the 
colonies as sources of foreign exchange, and the contribution of the colonies 
to Portugal's foreign earnings had been dwarfed by 1973. In fact, the 
contribution of the colonies to Portugal's balance of payments can be 
correlated to their share in Portugal's trade. During 1960's, the share of 
" See Duffy (1961, p. 331). 
'" See Castro (1980, p. 168) and Clarence-Smith (1985, p. 16). 
" In the 1950's, the contribution of the African colonies for the balance of payments 
was also paramount for Great Britain, Belgium and France. See Rodney (1982, pp. 171-72). 
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1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1 
Portugal-Foreign 
Countries 
-3011 
-2461 
-397 
-152 
-1281 
-791 
-1072 
-1327 
-1406 
-2422 
-2137 
-2017 
-3176 
-6455 
575 
-711 
-495 
-485 
1868 
3974 
1268 
-514 
94 
7865 
8763 
6517 
TABLE 12 
Balance ofPayments 
(000 cantos) 
2 3 
Colonies-Foreign Portugal-
Countries Colantes 
45 
425 
868 
2331 
1702 
2876 
2460 
1956 
2298 
2242 
2962 
2807 
2647 
3349 
2263 
2476 
3626 
2454 
2044 
2093 
2847 
2157 
2437 
387 
1122 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
1861 
2945 
2002 
2417 
3033 
3587 
2167 
-200 
-641 
1886 
4 
Empire 
(1+2) 
-2966 
-2036 
471 
2179 
421 
2085 
1388 
629 
892 
-180 
825 
790 
-529 
-3106 
2838 
1765 
3131 
1969 
3912 
6067 
4115 
1643 
2531 
8252 
9885 
5 
Portugal 
(1+3) 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
na 
1366 
2460 
3870 
6391 
4301 
3073 
2261 
7665 
8122 
8403 
Notes: Until 1967, errors and ommisions of the balance colonies-foreign countries are 
included in column 1. 
SOURCE: Rocha (1982, tables 1 and 2). 
the colonies in the Portuguese exports was 24 per cent (see table 4 above), 
which represented 4 per cent of Portugal's GDP and a slightly higher 
percentage of the industrial output. The contribution to the balance of 
payments was equivalent to about 1.8 per cent of GDP, in 1964. 
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TABLE 13 
Sources offoreign currency compared 
(000 cantos) 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Note: 
1 
Portugal-colonies 
Balances of 
Payments 
1861 
2945 
2002 
2417 
3033 
3587 
2167 
-200 
-641 
1886 
2 
Trade 
1460 
2165 
1519 
2512 
2699 
2424 
1859 
448 
2110 
4081 
SouRCE: Rocha (1982, tables 3 and 7). 
3 
Total 
3321 
5110 
3521 
4929 
5732 
6011 
4026 
248 
1469 
5967 
4 
Foreign 
Prívate 
Transferí 
221Q 
3109 
4537 
5993 
7548 
11277 
13875 
18266 
21831 
25569 
5 
(3/4) 
1,463 
1,644 
0,776 
0,822 
0,759 
0,533 
0,290 
0,014 
0,067 
0,233 
TABLE 14 
An estímate of colonial benefits in 1957 
(000 contos) 
S. Tomé & 
Angola Mozambique Principe 
Guinea & 
C. Verde Total 
Offical transfers of foreign currency 
Other revenues in foreign currency 
Eamings from price differentials 
Retained capital, interests and deposits 
Total 
791 
561 
500 
800 
2652 
319 
0 
155 
466 
940 
0 
0 
0 
100 
100 
0 
0 
100 
50 
150 
1110 
561 
755 
1416 
3842 
SouRCE: Castro (1980, pp. 170-71, 230-31, 311-12 and 360). 
Armando Castro has provided altemative estimates of the contribution 
of the colonies to the Portuguese economy, the so called «colonial rent», 
for 1957 (see table 14). To official transfers of foreign currency, the author 
added the eamings from the sale of Angolan diamonds as well as transit 
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revenues eamed by the Benguela railways, which were exempt from 
exchange controls. He also takes into account the benefíts derived from 
differentials in die price Portugal paid her colonies for some of their exports 
(compared to the prices obtained on intemational markets), and the 
retained capital, interests as well as deposits owned by Portuguese 
nationals ^^ . According to Castro's estimates, the overall financial benefíts 
of the colonies surpassed the official transfers of foreign currency by a 
large margin. In 1957, transfers from Angola and Mozambique, amounted 
to 1,110 contos and the other benefíts totalled 2,732 contos, of which 
1,861 contos originated from Angola. Castro's estimate is not fully 
comparable to the data set out in table 12, because it may contain Ítems 
included in the balance of payments of the colonies and Portugal, as well 
as trade between the the colonies and foreign countries (particularly 
«hidden» revenues from diamond exports). Orders of magnitude are such, 
that we may safely conclude that the revenues from the colonies as 
estimated by Armando Castro imply a positive balance on current account 
for 1957, for Portugal and for the empire. Total benefíts from the 
Portuguese colonies could have amounted to 6% of Portugal's GDP and 
Castro's estimates may be represented as an upper limit of the contribution 
of the colonies to the supply of foreign currency to the Portuguese economy. 
How far colonial supplies of foreign currency made a contribution to 
Portuguese growth rates is debatable. Portugal had an investment gap due 
to a low level of domestic savings which had to be filled either by capital 
imports or invisible eamings from abroad and in that macro economic 
context the contribution of the colonies may have had an important role ' ' . 
Given that exports of capital from Portugal to the colonies remained low 
in the early 1960's, the low level of domestic savings (compared even to 
other southem European countries), was hardly imputable to the retention 
of the empire. Edgar Rocha has argued that, in the 1960's, emigrant 
remittances contributed to the «overvaluation» of the escudo and thereby 
favoured imports, particularly of capital goods, and thus a more capital 
intensive pattem of growth. In the 1950's and 1960's, Portugal had the 
lowest capital-output ratio of the southem European countries. Thus the 
bias in favour of capital intensive growth was probably not a major problem 
and the country's favourable balance of payments position arising from 
" In the 1960's, price differential tumed against the colonies. 
" See Green (1969, pp. 351-52). 
257 
PEDRO LAINS 
colonial revenues —and emigrant remittances— had probably a net positive 
effect on the Portuguese economy ^'*. 
Colonial wars, started in Angola in 1961 and pushed the expenditures 
with die colonies up to 26% of Portugal's public budget, from 1961 to 
1974 (see table 4, above) and the share of the military in that budget 
to 85%, which imposed a severe contraction of investment expenditures 
in the African economies. The manning of this military effort represented 
6% of Portugal's total labour forcé. The consequences of the expenditures 
on colonial wars for the Portuguese economy are diffícult to analyse. The 
cost of the war was certainly high (representing 8% of GNP throughout 
the 1960's), a proportion that is higher than even the more optimistic 
estimates of the gains from the colonies in the late 1950's (see table 10 
above). Although Edgar Rocha has argued that the increase in govemment 
spending induced by the war may have fostered the growth of demand 
for industrial goods, as well as the growth of domestic consumption, by 
reversing the tight fiscal policies that the govemments had maintained since 
the early 1950's " . 
4. CONCLUSIÓN 
Portuguese industrial exports were sold on protected markets in África 
and certainly that had effects upon the industrial structure of the metrópolis. 
Capital exports to the colonies remained low until the 1950's and only 
thereafter did they effect metropolitan financial markets. Emigration 
followed closely the pattem of capital exports and its effects should also 
be taken into account. Yet, the shares of the domestic industrial output, 
investment and population that were diverted by colonial protectionism 
were probably too low to make a large difference to the pattem and rate 
of Portuguese economic growth. This article deals in detall with only a 
part of the economic consequences of the empire, but that part was surely 
the single most important factor for macro economic growth. 
The main thrust in this analysis is to emphasise the role of the colonies 
as a major source of foreign currency for the Portuguese economy. 
Portuguese economic and industrial growth has been dependent historically 
on the possibility of fínancing an adverse balance on current account in 
order to sustain imports of industrial inputs and food. That is basically 
35 
See Rocha (1982, pp. 1070-74). For the capital-output ratío see Pintado (1964, p. 29). 
See Rocha (1977, p. 610) and Green (1969, p. 353). 
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why the foreign currency obtained through the sale of tropical producís 
from the colonies made a positiva contribution to metropolitan economic 
growth. 
The interests of the Portuguese state in imperialism are very oíd and 
for centurias can be representad in terms of the substantial contribution 
made by taxes on colonial trade ^^ . With tha indapandence of Brazil in 
1822, the Portuguesa empire was raduced to three enclaves in the West 
Indies, East Timor, Macau, the military and commercial outposts along 
Wast and East África and a few stations in the interior of tha continent. 
Up to the 1850's, Portuguese public and private imperial interests were 
centred in África and were pratty much rastricted to the slave trada, which 
was in process of being shut down by tha Britísh sea powar. In the following 
two decadas, trade with África was liberalised but there was no real increase 
in the economic links batwaan Portugal and the empire. Down to tha 
mid 1880's, tha administrative and military costs of the ampira must have 
surpassed tha revenues the stata collected from a meagra and slowly growing 
trade in tropical products. For the first time in yaars, thus, the empire 
became a burden to the Portuguesa govemment budget. 
Once the traaty of Berlin in 1885 had defined Portuguesa rights in 
África, govemments in Lisbon decidad to increase their investmants in 
colonisation. Between 1890-1914, substantial amounts of foreign currency 
were obtained for the home aconomy from tha sale of African produce 
re-axported through Lisbon. The Graat War and tha fínancial disruptions 
that followed andangered this versión of marcantilism. But between 
1930-31 a new system was created, based on the control of the monetary 
flows, rather than goods. This changa, which may be sean as an 
intensification of colonial exploitation, was helped by tha fact that the 
control of the African territories was aknost complete, after decades of 
military campaigns. The benafits for Portugal's balance of payments were 
probably high firom the start. Since 1948, when data for the balance of 
payments become available, they were undoubtadly important. The 
importance of the colonias for the aconomy was howevar being raduced 
by the early 1960's when Portugal incraased its trade, investment and 
emigration links with industrial Europe and when the colonies became 
increasingly dependent on imports of industrial inputs and capitals from 
foreign countries. The contribution of tha colonies as a source of extemal 
financing of the Portuguese economy faded away by the 1960's onwards 
" See Jorge Pedreira, this issue. 
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and, contemporarily, the wars of independence created a heavy burden 
for the Portuguese govemment finances. Certainly, it was not die fírst 
time in the long period from 1822, that the African colonies were both 
a burden for the central government budget and a weak provider of foreign 
currency, Yet, by 1974-75, the domestic and intemational political climate 
was such that the last European colonial empire in África carne to an end. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Two interrelated ideas are developed in this essay: first, that the 
consequences for the Spanish economy of loosing the last colonies —Cuba, 
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines— at the etid of the nineteenth century 
were relatively small, and that it hardly can be regarded, as many historians 
have done as the Disaster of 1898. Second, that despite its small overall 
direct impact on the Spanish economy, the independence wars fought with 
the colonies, and the defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1898. started. 
a_process of intense political nationalism that resulted in the adoption of 
westem Europe's most stringent autarchy at the beginning of the twentieth 
Qenturx..The colonial Disaster was therefore, an indirect one. Its economic 
consequences were first felt by Bentham's «ruling few» — i^n Spain's case, 
the wheat, flour, and textile traders of Castile and Catalonia— and later 
reached the «subject many» by way of their influence on the adoption 
of extreme protective measures («integral protection», as it became known 
by Spanish nationalists) facilitated by the general climate caused by the 
colonial loss. 
The essay is divided in five parts. After this introduction, a brief section 
surveys the commercial involvement of European countries with their 
colonial (or ex-colonial) possessions, and establishes the fact that only Spain 
and Portugal, and to a certain extent, Turkey, had i^  significant volume 
of trade —higher than ten or twelve percent of all exports— with their 
colonies. The third part of the essay analyzes the trends and cycles of 
the most important series affected by the Disaster —foreign trade, capital 
flow, and some sectoral indexes that suggest that far from the disastrous 
impact usually assigned to the colonial losses of 1898, the independence 
of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines had, in fact, beneficial 
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jconsequences for iJie SEanish ecpnqmy, specially through the inflow of 
capital that the war produced. The fourth section examines the losses 
suffered by special interest groups —Castillian wheat and flour traders, 
and Catalán textile producers— that enjoyed the colonial monopoly; and 
the last part focuses on the political impact of the Disaster and its economic 
consequences. 
n . COLONIAL MARKETS IN PERIPHERAL EUROPE 
Losing Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898 was not Spain's 
major colonial defeat during the nineteenth century. Nine decades before, 
the campaigns of Bolívar, Sucre and San Martín led to the emancipation 
of Spanish South America from Madrid. México had declared 
independence in 1810, and the Central American republics in 1823. Sucre's 
victory in the Ayachucho (Perú) battle against the Spanish royalist army 
in 1824, thus, put an end to three hundred years of the Spanish crown's 
sovereignty over a territoiy twenty five times larger than its peninsular 
dominions. Fear of a slave revolt —as in Haiti after emancipatíon in the 
1790s and 1800s— and the economic prosperity afforded by the integration 
into the North American market of the sugar plantation system, kept the 
Caribbean possessions loyal to Madrid. Several independence attempts 
were suffocated from the metrópolis, as in the case of Cuba's Ten Year 
War of 1868-1878, but Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines remained 
imder Spanish domination until the end of the 1895-1898 conflict and 
the American intervention '. 
In any case, losing the mainland at the beginning of the century had 
noticeable commercial consequences: between 1784/96 and 1815/20 
exports to the colonies dropped by sixty percent, and the pre-independence 
share of colonial markets on all Spanish exports, that accounted for over 
one third, was about one fifth at the end of the Napoleonic Wars ^. Colonial 
exports recovered to some extent after the first years of independence 
but did not keep pace with the general expansión of the Spanish foreign 
trade, this time re-oriented towards other European countries. The colonial 
export share declined through the nineteenth century to levéis below ten 
percent after the export boom of the 1890s (figure 1). 
' For a bibliographical review of Cuban history and its debates, see Santamaría García 
(1996b), pp. 505-539. 
' Prados de la Escosura (1993), pp. 262 and 267. 
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However, although most of Spain's foreign trade was redirected toward 
die rest of Europe after losing the colonial markets. exports to the remaining 
j-nlnnjf s <;ti11 wprp an important pa i t nf fnrpign sales Sales tO Cuba doubled 
between 1850/4 and 1885/89 and went up even further during the last 
decade of the century due to new colonial tariffs of the 1870s and the 
war supplies during the Spanish-American war .^ Although exports to Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines also grew throughout the century, the Cuban 
market was the destination of more than ninety percent of all Spanish 
sales to the colonies, and acted also as an entrepót for peninsular exports 
to the ex-colonies on the mainland, specially during the first years after 
independence. 
TABLEl 
Share of Colonial Exports in Several European Countries, 1885-1912 
(five year averages) 
Countries Exports 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1912 
Germany 
(mark) 
HoUand 
(gulden) 
Belgium 
(francs) 
France 
(francs) 
Portugal 
(milreis) 
Spain 
(pesetas) 
Total 
Colonial 
o/ /o 
Total 
Colonial 
% 
Total 
Colonial 
% 
Total 
Colonial 
% 
Total 
Colonial 
% 
Total 
Colonial 
% 
3,688,320 
7,871 
0.208 
1,406,345 
63,312 
4.521 
1,643,212 
12,268 
0.769 
3,607,240 
379,694 
10.486 
28,068 
3,912 
13.784 
937,278 
224,932 
23.346 
4,791,560 
14,662 
0.305 
1,838,677 
67,985 
3.709 
1,994,041 
10,049 
0.502 
4,215,420 
512,374 
12.154 
29,793 
4,599 
15.310 
875,994 
83,230 
9.512 
6,383,480 
33,012 
0.518 
2,185,132 
84,183 
3.848 
2,770,222 
15,444 
0.560 
5,299,460 
653,888 
12.344 
29,845 
4,641 
15.546 
982,436 
74,032 
7.539 
8,179,200 
45,633 
0.560 
2,825,954 
137,009 
4.831 
3,646,419 
26,593 
0.728 
6,341,100 
816,447 
12.860 
34,895 
3,657 
15.675 
1,107,516 
69,198 
6.088 
SouRCE: Statistical Abstract for the Principal and Other Foreign Countries, 1893-1912, Lon-
don, 1905-1914 [Cd. 2566], [6099] and [Cd. 7525]. 
' Maluquer de Motes (1974), pp. 330-333. 
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The importance of the colonial trade for Spain is best seen in 
comparison to other European cases of commercial relations with overseas 
territories. One of the best known facts in modem European commercial 
history is the intense concentration of foreign transactions among European 
countries. With the notable exception of Britain, which always retained 
strong commercial links with its colonies, most continental economies were 
the best clients of each other in foreign trade. Nevertheless, for some 
European nations —specially those from the periphery— colonial trade 
was still an important part of their total transactions. Table 1, shows to 
what extent the Belgian and Germán exports to their African colonies, 
the Dutch sales in Java and Guyana, and even the French, exports to their 
vast empire, were smaller as a percentage of total exports than the colonial 
exports of Spain and Portugal. Despite the lack of reliable data for the 
Turkish case, the available statistics also show that Turkey's integration 
with central and northem Europe was not as important as in the case 
of more developed economies at the time, and that its colonies and 
ex-colonial territories still accounted for about fifteen percent of Turkish 
exports at the beginning of the twentieth century''. 
m . THE DISASTER'S ECONOMIC IMPACT 
Despite the undeniable importance of colonial markets for the 
European backward metropolises, it is at least doubtful that the privileged 
monopolies they enjoyed were an indispensable requirement for their 
industrialization. However, traditional colonial historiography —at least in 
the Spanish case— has adopted the Leninist interpretation of Cuba, Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines as the last chance for Spain's industrial growth 
based on colonial markets. A good number of historians still debate the 
role of the last colonies as a leverage for acquiring the necessary market 
size for its manufactures, and consequently to what extent the Disaster 
of 1898 was a lost opportimity for Spain to join the ranks of industrial 
Europe ' . 
The debate centers around the two traditional but basic propositions: 
the need for colonial markets as outlets for domestic manufactured output, 
and the colonial exploitation of Cuba. Although the second question is 
" Mitchell (1995), pp. 523-527 and 610-611. 
' Vilar (1974), p. 91; Maluquer de Motes (1974), Izard (1980), Llera and Romero 
(1996), pp. 263-295, and Abellán (1978), pp. 90-95. 
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beyond the purpose of this paper, the performance of the Cuban economy 
during the second half of the nineteenth century in comparison to those 
Latín American countries that did secede from Spain at the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars seems to cast doubt on the suggestion of an exploitative 
relationship. The colonial governments maintained a system of relative 
political stability, achieved by the independent Latin American republics 
only much later in the century. In this context, the reciprocal comparative 
advantage of the US and Cuban economies led to an intense commercial 
relationship and efficient market integration based in specialization: around 
one fourth of all US export to Latin America went to Cuba during the 
XIXth century, and almost half of all Latin American sales in the US market 
were of Cuban origin .^ Per capita sugar consumption was growing at an 
annual rate of two percent in the US and British markets, and intensive 
technical and scale changes in the Cuban sugar sector led to rapid gains 
in productivity ^. The output per sugarmill grew fífteen-fold between 1790 
and 1860, and by mid-century Cuban per capita income was among the 
highest in the world, at the same level as those of Europe's advanced 
economies *. In any case, the «iniquitous colonial relationship between 
Cuba and the metrópolis» ^ gave place on the island to a substantially 
more prosperous economy —at least 30 percent higher in income per capita 
terms— than in Spain '°. 
With respect to the need of the colonies for industrialization, the 
rationale is the indispensable role played by captive colonial markets for 
metropolitan exports. In the Spanish case, the 1898 War translated into 
a drastic short-run reduction of exports to the Cuban protected market, 
but, as shown below, total Spanish exports were basically unaltered. As 
wül be evident later, a substantial amount of the volume of total exports 
to Cuba was redirected to altemative áreas of Latin America and Europe, 
and although they remained low relative to pre-1898 levéis before 1914, 
^ Fraile Balbín and R. and L. Salvucci (1993), pp. 80-85. 
' Santamaría García (1996a), pp. 225-250. Also see, Dye (1993), pp. 563-593. 
* Fraile Balbín and R. and L. Salvucci (1993), pp. 94-101. 
' Hart Baker Jr. (1976), p. 148. 
'» Fraile Balbín, R. and L. Salvucci (1993), p. 101, and Prados de la Escosura (1995), 
p. 197. Neither Spanish ñor American domination after independence seemed to have 
harmed Cuban interests or those of the Spaniards living on the island. Most lands remained 
in Spanish hands after independence, and the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 gave the island's 
cañe growers freer access to the US sugar market, and more revenues from it. S. Levergott 
concludes: «The prime economic beneficiaries of the Spanish-American War, in sum, were 
Spaniards and Cubans who owned Cuban sugar land at the start of the war.» See, Lebergott 
(1980), p.303. 
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exports to Cuba started to recover soon after the First World War, and 
by the interwar years reached levéis similar to those previous to the export 
boom of the 1870s ^\ In addition, the sales of services to the island 
remained almost unaltered. In contrast with the first experience of colonial 
independence, when Spain lost two thirds of its sales in transport, insurance 
and financial services '^, Spanish shipping companies remained very active 
in the island's trade, and most of the merchant fírms and property owned 
by Spaniards in Cuba was practically unaffected by independence in 
1898 '^. Furthermore, unlike the sixty percent drop after the first wave 
of colonial seccession in the 1820s ''', custom revenues went up by more 
than one third between 1880/1900 and 1900/1910 ' I Migration flows to 
Cuba doubled after independence '^, and this helped not only the growth 
of migrants-remittances '^, but also to increase and diversify Spanish exports 
—specially food products— to the ex-colony. 
It is doubtful, therefore, that the loss of this colonial market seriously 
jeopardized Spain's chances for industrial growth. In the rest of this section, 
a more rigorous assessment is developed of the real impact on the aggregate 
Spanish economy of losing Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in 1898. 
We propose to do this by searching for unusual years (outliers) or abnormal 
periods (structural breaks) using time series methods. We apply those 
techniques to several aggregate economic variables like foreign trade, capital 
flow and several sectoral indexes from the year 1859 to 1914. 
Our goal is to isolate «unusual» or unstable periods in several economic 
variables during the years 1850 to 1914. A basic condition for aggregate 
data to support the hypothesis of the existence of a «Spanish 1898 Disaster» 
is that the time series analysis of the data should be able to identify the 
period around 1898 as an «unusual» or unstable period, creating structural 
breaks in the parameters of constant parameter models built over the full 
sample period. For that purpose we use recent time series techniques 
developed and implemented by Gómez and Maravall *^. 
In particular, we consider that a certain year is «unusual» if the 
observation corresponding to that year is an «outlier» or if that year is 
affected by previous outliers. 
" Tena (1989), pp. 346-347 and 356. 
" Prados de la Escosura (1993), p. 262. 
" García Alvarez (1988), pp. 605-613. 
'" Prados de la Escosura (1993), p. 270. 
" Conun Comín (1985), pp. 72-73. 
"• Sánchez Alonso (1995), pp. 281-282. 
" García López (1992). 
'* The theory is explained in Gómez and Maravall (1994) and in Maravall (1988). 
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Let oz(t) be a particular economic time series variable observed at 
time t, for example OEXPORTS at time t, where t = 1850, ..., 1914 and 
let 2(t) be the same time series variable but corrected for the unusual 
events (outliers), EXPORTS. Therefore the relationship between the two 
variables is, 
o2(t) = outlier(t) + z(t) (1) 
If the outlier(t) component is equal to O for all time t, where t = 1850, 
..., 1914, this means that during this period there has been no structural 
change in the oz(t) variable. If on the contrary, the outlier(t) component 
is different than O for some t we then check if among those unusual years 
is the year 1898 or its near future. Four different types of outliers are 
considered for each economic variables: innovation outliers (lO), additive 
outliers (AO), temporal changas (TC) and level shifts (LS) ' ' . 
The basic idea of our methodology is the following: if the impact of 
losing Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the so called «Spanish 1898 
Disaster», affected aggregate economic variables we should be able to 
identify several outliers from 1898 and after. Otherwise, since we know 
that important events occurred, and this is not reflected on aggregated 
economic variables, it must be because aU of these real effects washed 
out on the aggregate through reallocation of resources among different 
sectors of the economy (distributional effects among different sectors) or 
among different countries (trade). On the contrary, when an outlier is 
detected for a certain year T we would like to have a methodology that 
can provide us with a quantitative measure of the temporal effects: How long 
{duration) does the impact last? How large {size) is the quantitative effect 
on the economic variable? In appendix A, we give a brief introduction 
to the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis. 
The economic variables selected for this quantitative study of the 
aggregate effects of «1898» are the following^": observed export series 
(OEXPORT) from 1850 to 1914, observed real gross domestic product 
per capita (ORGDPPOP) from 1850 to 1914, observed index of bank 
deposits (OBANKING) from 1850 to 1914, observed current account 
balances (OCCBAL) from 1851 to 1914, current account + / - reserve 
See appendix A for a detailed explanation of the estimated models, a definitíon 
ot each type of outlier and the unobserved components model decomposition (trend, 
cycle, etc.). 
See appendix B for an explanation of the terminology used for the analysis of each 
variable and for a detailed definition of the data used. 
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variations (CCBALM) from 1857 to 1914, manufacturing índex of food 
producís (FOOD) from 1850 to 1914 and manufacturing index of textile 
producís (OTEXnLES) from 1850 to 1914. 
Table 2 includes the time series (ARIMA) models estimated for the 
outlier corrected variable z(t). When certain types of outliers are detected 
in oz(t) from 1850 to 1914 this is reported in the table with the 
corresponding t-test of significance (t-ratio). In most of the cases analyzed 
in the paper, the absolute valúes of the t-ratios are always larger than 
the 1% or 5% critical valúes, and in those cases we always reject the nuil 
hypothesis that w = 0 in favor of the altemative hypothesis of having 
detected an outlier (w'O). When we do not report the t-ratio of w, like 
for the variables CCBALM and FOOD, it is because we could not identify 
any outlier effect on that variable (w = 0). 
All the series we are considering are nonstationary (with unit roots) 
and we therefore take fírst differences to make them stationary (no more 
unit roots). None of the autoregressive coefficients (AR) are significant 
in the estimated ARIMA models. The máximum moving average found 
was an MA(2) when modeUing the first difference of the exports variable 
(OEXPORT). The variables OCCBAL, CCBALM and FOOD of Table 
2, have significant moving average polynomials of order 1 (MA(1)). The 
fírst difference of ORGDPPOP, OBANKING and OTEXTILES have 
MA(1) coefficients which are not significant (white noise). In none of the 
models we were able to identify any type of misspecification (see bottom 
of Table 2 for details). 
Only two of the four types of outliers are detected in the seven variables 
analyzed in Table 2: additive outlier (AO) and temporal change (TC), see 
appendix A. During the whole sample period, 1850 to 1914, several 
«unusual years» are found and the following outliers were detected for 
at least one of the seven series, 1872, 1898, 1899, 1907, 1911 and 1914. 
Among those dates the years 1898 and 1899 correspond to our period 
of interest. However, those two years influenced only two of the seven 
aggregated economic variables analyzed, OBANKING and OCCBAL, but 
not the rest of them. 
In the observed index of bank deposits (OBANKING) the 
instantaneous impact of 1898 was equal to 2.05 million pesetas, with a 
significant t-ratio of 6.86 (see Table 2). The total impact until 1914 was 
6.80 million pesetas and coincides with the shaded área, indicated in figure 
2a of appendix C, when we compare the evolution of the variable 
OBANKING with that variable corrected for outliers (BANBQNG) from 
272 
THE SPANISH 1898 DISASTER: THE DRIFT TOWARDS NATIONAL-PROTECTIONISM 
TABLE2 
Detection ofOutliers and Estimation ofARIMA (p,d,q) Models 
by Exact Máximum Likelihood 
Additive Outlier (AO): out!ier(T) = w 1,(7) 
Temporal Change (TQ: outlier(T) = w {1/0.74} ¡,(T) 
oz(t) = oullierU) + z(t) 
where z(¡) is 
^B)Á{z(í) = ti} = 
= m)aU) 
AR(p) 
coeffs. 
MA(c¡) m) 
coefficients. Type ofoutliers detected 
Misspecifi-
cation 
detected * 
OEXPORTS variable (1850-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,2) ** 
\i = 18.86 
t-ratio = (4.13) 
— 
Oi = -0.23 
t-radio = (-1.85) 
62 = -0 .32 
t-ratio = (-2.42) 
Year = 1914 
Type = Additive outlier 
w = -5 4 3 
t-raüo(w) = ( -6.88) 
none 
ORGDPPOP variable (1850-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) 
— 
e, = 0.15 
t-ratio = (-1.27) 
Year = 1872 
Type = Temporal change 
w = 10776 
t-ratio(w) = (4.11) 
Year = 1911 
Type = Temporal change 
w = 11953 
t-ratio(w) = (4.53) 
none 
OBANKING variable (1850-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) 
M = 0.10 
t-ratio = (3.09) 
— 
61 = -0 .16 
t-ratio = (-1.33) 
Year = 1898 
Type = Temporal change 
w = 2.05 
t-ratio(w) = (6.86) 
none 
OCCBAL varúble (1851-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) — 61 = -0.73 t-ratio = (-8.60) 
Year = 1899 
Type = Temporal change 
w = 547 
t-ratio(w) = (3.94) 
none 
CCBALM variable (1857-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) 
— 
61 = -0 .56 
t-ratio = (-5.10) none none 
_ FOOD variable (1850-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) 
H = 0.72 
__t-ratio = (2.15) 
— 
e, = w0.40 
t-ratio = (-3.46) none none 
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Additive OutUer (AO): outlier(T) = w I,(T) 
TemporalChange (TC): outlieHT) = w {1/0.7A) ¡,(T) 
oz<!) = outlieHl) + z(t) 
where z(t) is 
(p(B)á{z<l) = IJ} = 
= &:B)a(t) 
AR(p) 
4>(B) 
coeffs. 
UA(q) e(B) 
coefficients. Type ofoutUers detected 
Misspecifi-
catton 
detected " 
OTEXTILES variable (1850-1914) 
ARIMA (0,1,1) 
M = 0.79 
t-ratio = (3.13) 
— 
01 = 0.06 
t-ratio = (0.47) 
Year = 1 9 0 7 
Type = Additive outlier 
w = 6.13 
t-ratio(w) = (4.71) 
Year = 1914 
Type = Additive outlier 
w = 7.27 
t-ratio(w) = (3.80) 
none 
* The misspecification analysis done corresponds to: Normality test of the errors, the auto-
correlogram and partial autocorrelogram oí the residuals and a test ofmns on the residuals. 
** See appendix A for a deeper explanation of the parameters estimated and the type of 
outliers. 
1898 to 1914. The temporal profile of this impact is represented in figure 
2b. It is clear that those effects are transitory with a decreasing impact. 
In fact, even though the effects last until 1914 the main duration of the 
1898 impact lasted eight years, from 1898 to 1906, and it is evaluated 
in 6.48 millions of pesetas which represents 95% of the total impact, see 
Table 3 and figure 2b. This variable OBANKING can be decomposed 
in terms of the unobserved components, the trend (BANKINT) and the 
irregular component (BANKINGI) and those are represented in figures 
3a and 3b. Clearly, since the outlier is of a temporal change (TC) type 
it is associated with the irregular component and not with the trend that 
would only include permanent changes. 
In terms of the observed current account balances (OCCBAL) the 
instantaneous impact of 1899 was equal to 547 million pesetas, with a 
significant t-ratio of 3.94 (see Table 2). The total impact until 1914 was 
1817.30 millions of pesetas and corresponds to the área between the two 
series of figure 4a from 1899 to 1914 and the shaded aerea of figure 3b. 
The temporal profile (TC) is represented in figure 4b. 
Once again, the impact of 1899 is transitory and decreasing in time 
with the major effects finishing in 1906. Those effects are quantified as 
1718.24 million pesetas and represents 95% of the total effect until 1914 
(see Table 3 and figure 4b). 
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TABLE3 
Temporal Evalúatton ofíhe Impact of Outlien 1898 and 1899 
on the Variables OBANKING and OCCBAL respectively 
Year OBANKING (TC)" Year CCBAL (TC)" 
1898 ** 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
2.0455063 
1.4318544 
1.0022981 
0.7016086 
0.4911261 
0.3437882 
0.2406518 
0.1684562 
0.1179194 
0.0825436 
0.0577805 
0.0404463 
0.0283124 
0.0198187 
0.0138731 
0.0097112 
0.0067978 
— 
1899 *** 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
— 
547.00684 
382.90479 
268.03335 
187.62335 
131.33634 
91.93544 
64.354808 
45.048365 
31.533856 
22.073699 
15.451589 
10.816113 
7.5712788 
5.2998951 
3.7099266 
2.5969486 
Period 1898-1914 Total: 6.80 Period 1899-1914 Total: 1817.30 
Period 1898-1906 Total: 6.48 Period 1899-1906 Total: 1718.24 
* The outUers are of the temporal change (TC) type. 
** The years of this shaded área correspond to the shaded área of figu-
res 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b. 
*** The years of this shaded área correspond to the shaded área of figu-
res 4a, 4b, 5a and 5b. 
The unobserved components of OCCBAL are represented in Figure 5a 
and 5b, respectively. The trend component (CCBALT) of Figure 5a has 
no clear tendency to grow and this is consistent with having an MA(1) 
with coefficient of - 0 . 7 indicating that this series is cióse to stationary 
without taking first differences. The temporal change found is therefore 
added to the irregular component (CCBALI) in Figure 5b. 
Finally, since the export variable is the most relevant one to analyze 
the aggregate impact of the «1898 disaster» on trade, we have completed 
a full analysis of this variable. In Figures 6a and 6b we represent the 
observed series and the additive outlier (AO) detected in 1914, respectively. 
Since Figure 6b is almost empty this means that there was no aggregate 
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effect until 1914, which is the last year of the sample analyzed. The 
unobserved components decomposition in trend (EXPORTT), business 
cycle (EXPORTO and irregular (EXPORTI) are represented in Figures 7a 
to 7c. Clearly the largest impact of the year 1898 and after, occurred in 
the cyclical component, but does not imply any structural change in the 
parameters of this component. Notice that it is the irregular component 
the one that was associated with the outlier found in 1914. 
IV. THE SECTORAL EFFECTS OF THE DISASTER 
Although the overall effect of colonial independence was not really 
a disaster for Spain, and despite the fact that it even had positive 
consequences for the ex-metropolis, the 1898 events did not leave Spain's 
industry and trade unaffected. To begin with, the assesment carried out 
in the previous section has not included the analysis of certain variables 
whose changes could have had direct and indirect, instant and lagged effects 
on the overall economic system. This is the case, for example, of the sharp 
depreciation of the Spanish exchange rate, and the increase in public 
expenditure and déficits of the 1895-1898 war^S and even the previous 
independence attempt of 1868-1878^^. But even more important, the 
previous aggregate analysis did not take into account the specific effects 
that the colonial link, and its rupture, could have had on concrete sectors 
of the economy whose connection with the colonial trade was specially 
intense. 
As in most colonial cases, the commercial relations between Spain and 
Cuba were dominated by a few sectors that included most of the 
transactions between the metrópolis and her colonies, and benefited most 
from the captive Cuban markets. From mid-nineteenth century on, four 
groups of products —flour, cotton textiles, shoes and wine— represented 
between one half and two thirds of all Spanish sales to the island, and 
in the two decades preceding independence, exports of flour and cotton 
textiles accounted for almost a third of the total ^ .^ It was in these activities 
that some industrial capital was accumulated, and where the dynamic effects 
of colonial trade were to be felt. As in most cases of colonial relations. 
Maluquer de Motes (1996). 
Comín Comín (1988), vol. I, p. 338, and Tortella Casares (1973), pp. 198-199. 
Maluquer (1974), pp. 340-341. 
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the special interests of these sectors organized powerful lobbies that played 
a decisive role in shaping the overall colonial policy. 
At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the oíd mercantilist policy of 
commercial exclusión for non-Spanish trade, was relaxed to some extent. 
But the 1847 tariff again tightened protection for metropolitan exports. 
Differential rates in favor of Spanish products were increased again in 
1870 and 1872, and under the Commercial Relations Act of 1882. However, 
that same year, an agreement was signed with the U.S.A. to accord 
preferential tariff treatment to American flour on the island in exchange 
for easier access of the colonial ingenios to the United States sugar market. 
From that moment on, exports of Spanish flour dwindled to almost nothing 
at the time of independence. Cotton textiles, on the other hand, continued 
to domínate colonial markets, and even though the loss of the colonies 
translated into an export crisis, this was only temporary. Exports to the 
rest of Latin America and Europe more than compensated for the Cuban 
market for at least one more decade after independence ^''. 
Flour exporters and wheat growers were located on the northem plateau 
of Castile, and used the port of Santander on the Bay of Biscay as their 
main connection with Cuba. The Caribbean trade made Santander the 
second mercantile port in Spain by mid-century, specially after the 
completíon of the Castile Canal (1852) and a railroad (1859) that linked 
the northem coast to the wheat growing plains of north-central Spain ^'. 
Between 1780 and 1860 about one hundred and fifty flotir miUs were 
installed along this transportation route, all of them engaged with the 
protected Cuban market. Large trading firms, all of them managed by 
local merchant families, developed and diversified around Santander and 
some Castilian towns. This was the case of the Pombos, whose assets ranged 
from milling into sailing, railroads, banking, textiles, and food processing ^^ , 
and the López-Dórigas (later Botín) who are now one Spain's oldest 
entrepreneurial families. They also started as colonial traders but later 
became involved in steel milis, Utilities, electricity, engineering, mining, 
sailing and banking (Banco Santander) ^^. Like Pombo and Botín, other 
family groups —Hiera, Huidobro, Homedo, Gallo— formed an extensive 
'" Sudria(1983),pp. 384-385. 
" Hoyo Aparicio (1993); Martínez Vara (1985), pp. 73-96, and Martínez Vara (1986), 
PP- 175-203. 
' ' Moreno Lázaro (1994), pp. 333-356. 
" Moreno Lázaro (1993), pp. 168-190. 
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and technically advanced network associated with milling and flour exports 
to the protected Caribbean market *^. 
Cotton textiles were heavily concentrated around Barcelona in 
Catalonia, and had developed behind high tariff walls from the last decades 
of the eighteenth century. Unlike flour, cotton textile exports started late, 
after the 1882 tariff reform that reserved the colonial market for peninsular 
producers. However, cottons became the leading export from the 
metrópolis after American wheat was awarded free entry in 1882. In any 
case, the reaction to the Disaster was very different in both sectors. The 
independence of the last Spanish colonies meant the loss of protected 
markets and the need to find alternative outlets for their products. This 
was difficult for Castilian wheat growers and flour millers whose total 
exports after Cuban independence practically disappeared due to the 
competition of American suppliers. But most Castilian merchants 
diversified their firms into food processing, textiles, coal mining, 
construction, electricity and banking ^'. Catalán textile producers, on the 
other hand, fared much better in the new open market (figure 8). They 
found alternative foreign outlets for their exports, and it was not until 
extreme tariff protection of the home market made domestic sales more 
profitable —and competition abroad unnecessary— that Spanish textile 
exports were replaced by domestic sales ^ °. 
In summary, for any complete analysis of the impact of loss of Empire, 
the global results presented in section III need to be taken in connection 
with their sectoral consequences. A closer look at the post-1898 events 
reveáis that the loss of the last colonies had, indeed, a disastrous effect 
on the Spanish economy, and that traditional historians are, after all, right 
in assessing its consequences as a Disaster. The adverse effects, however, 
were not due to the loss of the colonial markets, but rather to the 
institutional changes the colonial independence brought about in Spain. 
Although they are right about the Disaster, it is likely that they have put 
too much emphasis on the traditional (positive) dynamic effects of 
protected markets —capital accumulation, technical change, economies of 
scale, learning by doing— while ignoring their negative, also dynamic. 
*^ For an analysis of technological change in the Castillian milis, see Moreno Lázaro 
(1992), pp, 163-229, 
" Ibid., Hoyo Aparicio (1993), pp. 237-277. 
'° Despite their small size, the sucessfull performance of Spanish textile exports in 
open, post-colonial markets, is specialy relevant in view of the acritical aceptance by many 
economic historians of the Spanish manufacturers' inability to compete in International 
markets. See Sudriá (1983); Harrison (1974), pp. 345-346, and Izard (1980), pp. 113-121. 
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consequences. Captive colonial markets, as in any case of trade restriction, 
might have helped the accumulation of Spanish manufacturing capital in 
some sectors, like flour milling and cotton textiles. From the end of the 
nineteenth century to the Great Depression, output of Castilian wheat 
and flour and Catalán textiles expanded substantially, and it is likely that 
the increase was helped by the initial exploitation of the captive Cuban 
niarket. But it is at least doubtful that the reserved colonial market could 
have been the basis for successful industrialization in Spain. One of the 
dynamic effects of protection is increasing output in the short run, but 
another, seldom ignored dynamic effect, is the opportunity for output 
restriction that protection affords by eliminating foreign competition in 
small national markets. Spain's gradual deindustrialization (relative to other 
European economies) flowed from its very high barriers to trade ^'. In 
addition, the colonial character of the markets lost in 1898 by Spanish 
exporters had a clear differential effect at home. Losing the colonies put 
in motion a society-wide process of soul searching that carried in its train 
profound political consequences, and created the conditions for political 
nationalism and economic autarky. 
V. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISASTER 
In addition to its merely commercial aspects, European imperialism 
at the end of the century had important military and political consequences 
for the peripheral countries of Europe. Italy started its incursions into the 
Dodecanese, Eritrea, Somalia, Abyssinia, Libya, and later the Balkans. After 
losing Brazil in 1822, Portugal started its African territorial expansión, and 
between the 1885 Berlín Conference and 1935, acquired the recognition 
of its sovereignty over more than two million square kilometers. Similarly, 
after its independence in (1821-1828), Greece acquired through wars and 
diplomatic pressures the lonian islands (1864), Thessaly and part of Epirus 
(1881), Macedonia, Crete, west, and later east, Thrace (1920), and 
practically all the Aegean islands, and even invaded Turkey —reaching 
near Ankara in 1921 ^2. 
Only the two large colonial powers at both ends of the Mediterranean 
—Spain and Turkey— suffered territorial losses from their colonial empires 
at the turn of the century. In the Spanish case, the attempts to recover 
" Fraile Balbín (1991). 
" Gianaris(1982),pp. 36-37. 
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their Latin American possessions and to establish new colonies in África 
were not enough to alleviate «the Disaster» ^^ . As for Turkey, the territorial 
losses started at the end of the eighteenth century and resulted in military 
conflicts with all its neighbors, and even with France and Britain. 
Throughout the nineteenth century up to the Great War, the Turkish 
«disaster» resulted in the loss of the Balkans, Greece, Crimea, Egypt, the 
Middle East, and Northern África. 
The impHcations of these two processes were of great importance for 
both countries' economic development in subsequent years. Regardless of 
the direct impact of the colonial emancipation on Spain's foreign 
transactions, the political impact was of such magnitude, that losing its 
empire —or what was left of it— shaped policy making for a long time 
afterwards. The trend towards economic nationalism —specially through 
tariff protection— found in the political climate created by «the Disaster» 
is one of its most enduring legacies. 
From the Young Turks to Kemalism and its Six Arrows program of 
étatism and economic nationalism, the Turkish movement of «defensive 
modemization» was the reaction to the loss of territorial hegemony and 
capitulations ^^. The Spanish Disaster also had deep political consequences, 
which in tum created a path towards economic nationalism and autarky. 
Modem political analysis of nationalism assigns military defeat a central 
role in the development of national movements. Like economic 
exploitation, or the denial of cultural individuality, military defeat may be 
one of the most powerful affronts felt by the élite in charge of defining 
(inventing) national identity. Defeat at the hands of a foreign army becomes 
a powerful excuse and a basic reference for identifying the enemy and 
setting the limits to national enterprise. This helps not only to sanctify 
the natíon and the national project, but also to enhance the nationalist 
sentiments and to cement the state's central place as the project's leader. 
Recent research on nationalism indicates that this was the case of Spain 
" Attempts at regaining colonial control were made in Chile and Perú in 1866-68. 
An expedition was sent to Indochina in 1860, and to México in 1862. The expansionary 
movement in Morocco started at least with the war of 1859-60 and continued well into 
the twentieth century (1921-25). Even Portugal became an object of interest for unification 
and expansión in the so called Iherian Movement that started after the Napoleonic Wars. 
SeeRocamora(1994). 
'•• Mustafa Kemal's regeneration program during the 1920s and 1930s was based on 
six proclaimed principies: étatism, nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism and 
republicanism. See, Dumont (1984), pp. 25-44; Rustow (1973), pp. 100-101, and Gianaris 
(1982), pp. 43-44. 
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after the war of 1898 ^'. Spanish modem nationalism had already started 
half a century ago based on the «invention» of the war and victory against 
the 1808 Napoleonic invasión '^, so that the Spanish-American conflict 
put an abrupt and bitter end to a period of national myth-making. The 
public perception of the defeat in the 1898 Spanish-American War was 
that of a profound and far-reaching failure. The long historiography on 
the Disaster shows a firm consensus on the deep crisis that losing the 
last colonies meant, and on the pessimism it induced about Spain's 
economic conditions ^^ . Journalists, writers, intellectuals, politicians and, 
of course, the military, all combined to créate an atmosphere of 
disproportionate frustration that had not had any previous equivalent, even 
when Spain lost the bulle of its four centuries oíd empire eighty years 
before *^. While losing the mainland colonies in the 1820s was perceived 
as «a loss of the King's territories», the loss of 1898 —a mere 2 percent 
of what had been the large Spanish Empire's territory— was taken as 
«our own coUective failure» '^ by the nationalist élite. The Spanish 
intelligentsia, and the middle class «became suddenly aware of the country's 
backwardness» ^° and set out to put a remedy to it through national 
economic regeneration. 
The Disaster contributed to enhance the sense of both economic failure 
and urgency of reform, and this gave way to the ideas of a necessary 
nostrification of the Spanish economy as a remedy for backwardness. The 
nationalist path for progress was formulated by the regeneration writers, 
who as a consequence of the 1898 colonial defeat, found a further motive 
to nationalize the domestic market. The central figure of the regeneration 
movement, Ramiro de Maeztu, saw it in these terms: 
The loss of our colonial markets makes olear how shallow and peripheral 
our economic evolution is... It is poindess for Biscay to produce iron and 
" Alvarez Junco (1995), pp. 93-105. 
"• Alvarez Junco (1994), pp. 75-99. The debate on the origins of Spanish modem 
nationalism is focused on the notion of the need of a wide popular political movement 
that in Spain did not exist. See Blas Guerrero (1989, 1991, 1994, 1997); Payne (1964), 
pp. 403-422; Fusi Aizpurua (1990), pp. 33-34; Jover Zamora (1981), pp. Vn-CLXn, and 
Jover Zamora (1983), pp. 355-374. 
" Serrano (1996), pp 73-87. 
'* Rivera Córdoba (1978), pp. 70-80; Abellán (1978), pp. 90-95; Llera Esteban and 
Romero Samper (1996), pp. 263-295, and Várela (1997). 
" Alvarez Junco (1997), pp. 36-67. 
* Alvarez Junco (1995), p. 103. The influential thinker Francisco Giner de los Ríos 
wrote at that moment: «Spain is now the land where all spiritual and material misery is 
settled» [cited in López-Morillas (1980), p. 21]. 
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Catalonia to weave textiles... For these manufactures to take root on solid 
ground we would need now that our national nucleus, our granary, the 
Castillian plateau, would become an ampie market with enough consumption 
power'". 
The national market, however, was small and lacked enough purchasing 
power to support domestic manufacturing in competition with foreign 
suppliers. A period of isolation was deemed necessary for the development 
of economies of scale and competitive ability in matura industrial (and 
also agricultura]) sectors. Failure and urgency, then, combined to accelerate 
the trend towards autarky that characterized the twentieth century Spanish 
economy. This drift toward radical autarky had, of course, been started 
before, but it owed much of its strength to the climate of nationalism 
created by the loss of International status as a colonial power. The 
exaggerated perception of failure and urgency created a favorable 
environment for rent-seekers, some of them with sincere patriotic 
intentions. In addition to the groups direcdy affected by the loss of 
privileges, large social groups of the middle class that had not profited 
from the colonies felt their patriotic pride wounded, and channeled their 
frustration by blaming the State for the treason and dishonor imposed 
on Spain. Their rebellion found its best expression in the Producer 
committees (asambleas de productores), the chambers of commerce and 
agriculture, and an endless number of associations of farmers, merchants 
and small manufacturers that adopted regeneration, i.e., economic 
nationalism, as their central goal ''^ . 
Tariff protection and other means of isolation from foreign competition 
were, of course, oíd hat in the Spanish tradition. The tariffs of 1849, 1877, 
and specially 1892, made Spain one of Europe's most protected markets 
many years before losing the last colonies. In addition, the retum to tariff 
protection was common in all Europe. But in the Spanish case, the 
regeneration movement that pervaded the country at the turn of the century 
accelerated protectionism to a degree higher than in any other European 
economy ^^. Regardless of the economic losses for the country as a whole 
or for the two main sectors involved in colonial trade, the groups 
representing the colonial interests —notably wheat growers and textile 
"' Maeztu(1967), p. 102. 
« Seco Serrano (1988), pp.387-393. 
"" Liepmann (1938), pp. 383-398; for a more accurate estimate of Spain's differential 
protection levéis see, Tena (1997). 
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producers— organized themselves into powerful lobbies '*'' that found an 
irrefutable excuse and a favorable nationalistic framework to achieve 
unparalleled tariff protection. We could conclude, therefore, that the loss 
of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines was, indeed, a disaster for the 
Spanish economy, but not necessarily due to the direct impact of losing 
the captive colonial markets, but rather for the economic nationalism that, 
as an indirect consequence, was imposed in Spain during most of the rest 
of the twentieth century. 
APPENDEX A: ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
In this appendix we briefly review the main time series concepts that 
are needed to define the four different types of outUers used in this paper 
and to define the measures used for the impact (size) and the temporal 
effects (duration) of the outliers. 
Remember, from equation (1) of the text, that oz(t) is the observed 
variable and that z(t) is the same variable but outlier corrected, that is 
z(t) = oz(t) - outlier(t). 
The outlier corrected series z(t) can usually be represented by an 
autoregressive, integrated, moving average model, ARIMA(p,l,q), like 
(j)(B) A {z(t) - M} = e(B) E(t) (A.1) 
where Az(t) = z(t) - z(t - 1) is the first difference of the series z(t), 
E(t) is a sequence of independent, identically distributed, Normal variables 
with mean O and constant variance (white noise or innovations). B is the 
lag operator, so that B''z(t) = z(t - k), and the polynomials <|)(B) and (|)(B) 
are polynomials in B of order p and q. In particular the autoregressive 
polynomial of order p, AR(p), is (|)(B) = 1 + <|)iB + ... + (|)pBP and die 
m o v i n g a v e r a g e p o l y n o m i a l of o r d e r q, M A ( q ) , is 6 
(B) = 1 + 8jB + ... + 6qB'i. In practice with armual data the order of 
the autoregressive polynomials p and the order of the moving average 
polynomials q are usually lower or equal to 2. In our case p was always 
equal to O, AR(0), and q was always equal to 1, MA(l), but in the case 
of exports that was equal to 2, MA(2). Therefore the two types of estimated 
tnodels of Table 2 are: an ARIMA(0,1,1) which can be written as, 
Várela Ortega (1991), pp. 7-60, and Fraile Balbín (1991). 
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A {2(t) - MI = e(t) + di e(t - 1) (A.2) 
and an AR[MA(0,1,2) model, 
A {2(t) - |Li} = e(t) + eie(t - 1) + 62 e(t - 2) (A.3) 
The ARIMA(p,d,q) representation is very general and can give good 
approximations to most of macroeconomic variables expressed in real and 
monetary terms when d is equal to 1 or 2. Furthermore, equations (1) 
and (A. 1) to (A.3) allow us to incorpórate the four different types of outliers 
previously mentioned '*'. 
Let It(T) be a dummy variable defíned as It(T) = {1 if t = T and O 
if t í ' T } . That is It(T) is a variable which is always equal to O except 
for the year T, where the year T can be any year from 1850 to 1914. 
For example, if a «disaster» occurred in aggregate economic variables in 
1898 we should be able to identify T with the year 1898. 
Definition 1: Innovation outlier (JO) 
The outlier(t) is an innovation outlier at time T if it can be represented 
by, 
outHer(T) = w {6(B)/(t)(B)A} It(T) (A.4) 
where w is the constant that measure the size of the impact and the lagged 
polynomial {6(B)/(|)(B)A} measure the duration of the impact of the outlier 
at time T on the variable 02(t). Notice that when w = O, there is no outlier 
effect and therefore this is the hypothesis we are testing in Table 2 by 
reporting the t-ratio of w. The ñame «innovation» outlier comes from the 
fact the its effects on oz(t) are transmitted through the innovations e(t) 
of model (A.1). 
Definition 2: Additive outlier (AO) 
The outlier(t) is an additive outlier at time T if it can be represented 
by, 
outHer(T) = w UT) (A.5) 
where w is the constant that measure the size of the impact of the outlier 
at time T on the variable oz(t). Notice that now the outlier at time T 
has an instantaneous impact affecting, oz(t), only at time t = T but not 
during the rest of the years. 
^^ This is implemented by sing the program TRAMO of Gómez and Maravall (1996). 
284 
THE SPANISH 1898 DISASTER: THE DRIFT TOWARDS NATIONAL-PROTECTIONISM 
Definition 3: Temporal change (TC) 
The outlier(t) represents a temporal change at time T if it can be 
represented by, 
outHer(T) = w {1/6A} It(T) (A.6) 
where w is the constant that measures the size ofthe impact and the lagged 
polynomial {1/6A} measures the duration of the impact of the outlier at 
time T on the variable oz(t). Usually 6 is equal to 0.7 which means that 
the outlier at time T has an impact with effects that last several periods 
in the future (duration) and the sizes of the impacts on o2(t) decreases 
exponentially through time (transitory effect). 
Definition 4: Level shift (LS) 
The outlier(t) represents a level shift at time T if it can be represented 
outlier(T) = w{l/A}It(T) (A.7) 
where w is the constant that measure the size of the impact and the lagged 
polynomial {1/A} measure the duration of the impact of the outlier at time 
T on the variable oz(t). Notice that now the outlier at time T has apermanent 
impact affecting, oz(t), not only at time t = T but during the rest of the 
years (permanent effect). 
Once we have the estimated ARIMA model for the series z(t) we would 
like to decompose the observed series in three different unobserved 
components ''^ : the trend, the business cycle and the irregular component, 
oz(t) = trend(t) + cycle(t) + irregular(t) (A.8) 
This decomposition is interesting because we can associate and measure 
the impact of the outliers on the different components. This property is 
very important since the economic and policy implications of outliers are 
different contingent on affecting the trend (permanent component), the 
business cycle (transitory component) or the irregular component 
(innovations). 
^ The unobserved components models are obtained using the program SEATS of 
Gómez and Maravall (1996). 
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APPENDIX B: THE DATA 
OEXPORT is defined as exports (f.o.b) in constant 1913 pnces in 
millions of pesetas (Antonio Tena: «Comercio exterior», in Albert Carreras 
(ed.), Estadísticas Históricas de España. Siglos xix y xx, Madrid: Fundación 
Banco Exterior, 1989, pp. 340-343). 
ORGDPPOP is the real gross domestic product per capita at 1980 
constant pesetas (L. Prados de la Escosura: «Spains's gross domestic 
product...», cit., pp. 101-102). 
OBANKING is an index of bank deposits (1958 = 100) {ihid, 
pp. 77-78). 
OCCBAL is the current account balances in millions of pesetas (ihid.). 
CCBALM is defined as the current account balances plus (minus) 
changes in gold and silver reserves in millions of pesetas {ibid. and Juan 
Hernández Andreu: Historia Monetaria y Financiera de España, Madrid: 
Síntesis, 1996, pp. 239-241). 
FOOD is a manufacturing index of food products, 1958 = 100 (L. 
Prados de la Escosura: «Spain's Gross Domestic product...», cit., 
pp. 71-72). 
OTEXTILES is a manufacturing index of textile products 1958 = 100 
{ibid., pp. 71-72). 
The terminology used in the text, in Figures 2 to 7 and in Tables 
2 and 3 is the following: 
Consider the variable EXPORT where we have found some outliers 
and we have decomposed the series in three components: trend, business 
cycle and irregular. When outliers are found, the original series is identifíed 
by the ñame of the series but adding an O at the beginníng of the ñame, 
meaning observed series, oz(t), and the series corrected for outliers by 
the ñame of the series without beginning by an o, 2(t). Example, o2(t) 
= OEXPORT = Observed EXPORT series with outliers, and z(t) = 
EXPORT series corrected for outliers (free of outliers). 
The trend component of the series is identifíed by the ñame of the 
series but adding a T at the end of the ñame, meaning Trend. Example, 
EXPORTT = Trend component of EXPORT. 
The business cycle component is identifíed by the ñame of the series 
but adding a C at the end of the ñame, meaning Cycle. Example, 
EXPORTC = Business cycle component of EXPORT. 
The irregular component of the series is identifíed by the ñame of 
the series but adding an I at the end of the ñame, meatiing Irregular. 
Example, EXPORTI = Irregular component of EXPORT. 
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EXPLORING EXPLOITATION: 
THE NETHERLANDS AND COLONIAL 
INDONESIA 1870-1940 
FIERRE VAN D E R E N G ^ 
Australian National University 
INTRODUCTION ^ 
Studies of the economic relations between Great Britain and its 
colonies, such as Hopkins (1988) and O'Brien (1988), have revitalised 
controversy about the relevance of economic factors in the history of 
imperialism. Some have denigrated the relevance of the Hobson-Lenin 
thesis that capitalists required new overseas investment opportunities to 
postpone the collapse of capitalism, and the argument that colonies were 
a paying proposition. This article assesses the economic relations between 
the Netherlands and its colony Indonesia. It aims to raise the profile of 
this connexion in the controversy mentioned above, and to explore whether 
and to what extent the economic relationship may be crucial to explaining 
« m e t r o p o l i t a n » e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t a n d « p e r i p h e r a l » 
underdevelopment. 
The article will first list some key arguments in the intemational debate 
and survey the historiography involving the Netherlands-Indonesia 
relations. It wíQ proceed with an assessment of the relevance of the general 
arguments in the fields of commodity trade and capital flows for this 
tándem. It will also provide a concise indication of the contribution of 
income flowing from the relations with Indonesia to the Dutch economy 
before World WarH. 
' Department of Economic History, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, The 
Australian National University, Canberra ACT 0200, Austraüa. Tel. +612 6249 5438. 
' This is an abbreviated versión of a paper presentad at seminars and conferences 
in Canberra, Melboume, Davis, Groningen and Madrid. I am grateful to those attending 
these gatherings for their comments, in particular Professors Heinz Amdt, Peter Lindert 
and Patrick O'Brien. 
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THE MAIN ARGUMENTS 
The classic theory of economic imperialism is a combination of ideas 
formulated by Hobson and Lenin .^ In a nutshell, it suggests that 
imperialism is primarily driven by economic forces. Capitalists require new 
investment opportunities overseas to stave off falling profíts at home and 
thereby postpone the inevitable collapse of capitalism. State-capitalist 
collusion is required to guarantee entrepreneurs higher rates of retum. 
Collusion guarantees monopolistic rents and/or other mechanisms to raise 
factor payments (profíts, interest and metropolitan wages) above 
competitive market rates. Collusion also leads to political occupation of 
foreign áreas and the establishment of colonies. 
Neo-Marxist interpretations of economic imperialism have stretched 
the Hobson-Lenin thesis to cover several centuries in the development 
of world trade, rather than oiJy the situation around 1900. They suggest 
that imperialism is only one of the forms of capitalist oppression. Other 
arguments are that colonising countries required colonies to secure supplies 
of cheaper raw materials, and as markets for their manufactures. 
The «colonial drain» argument is based on the fact that many colonies 
ran a trade surplus. The extent to which the valué of merchandise exports 
exceeded that of imports is regarded as a loss to colonies and a gain to 
colonisers''. This view ignores the extent to which a merchandise trade 
surplus (or déficit) covers a déficit (or surplus) on the services provided 
by foreign capital and labour. As Ricardo demonstrated long ago, there 
are few reasons to postúlate that two countries cannot benefit from foreign 
trade. 
The dynamic, or developmental argument maintains that the political 
status condemned colonised countries to the production of primary 
commodities. It presumed a structural fall in the terms of trade of primary 
commodities against manufactures, which prevented colonies from reaping 
gains from foreign trade. Although the terms-of-trade argument may have 
been valid in the short term, the argument fails to appreciate that 
' There is a wealth of literature on «imperialism» and «colonialism», which goes well 
beyond the Lenin-Hobson thesis. See e.g. Fieldhouse (1983). 
'' See: Golay (1976). There is no essentíal difference between the Hobson-Lenin thesis 
and the «drain» argument, apart from the fact that the Hobson-Lenin thesis states that 
state-capitalist collusion results in retums to capital above the opportunity cost of capital, 
which the «drain» thesis assumes only implicitly. 
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improvements in productivity generally off-set adverse changes in the terms 
of trade .^ 
The Netherlands-Indonesia tándem has hardly featured in these 
discussions, partly due to die lack of fundamental research exposing these 
issues to rigorous testing, partly because historians of Indonesia tacidy 
adhere to such explanations for Indonesia's underdevelopment. The 
common opinión in the economic historiography of the Netherlands is 
that the Netherlands-Indonesia association does not fit the Hobson-Lenin 
model. Van Zanden's (1989, 1996) surveys indicate that industrialisation 
and «monopoly capital» played a relatively minor role in the Dutch economy 
during the 19th century, which makes the Netherlands a special case among 
colonising countries. 
This view was recently confirmed by Kuitenbrouwer (1991, 1994) in 
surveys of the current debate on Dutch imperialism. He concluded that, 
unlike Great Britain, «metropolitan» economic interests carne second to 
both strategic and «peripheral» factors in Dutch colonial expansión in 
Southeast Asia. Conversely, the success of Dutch commercial expansión 
was not based on its overseas contacts with the colonies, but on the 
development of intra-European economic coimexions, in particular with 
Germany. Although Kuitenbrouwer discussed at length the political reasons 
behind Dutch imperialism, both in the Netherlands and in the «periphery» 
in Indonesia, his survey was brief about perceived or actual economic 
reasons for the consolidation of Dutch colonial rule. 
The importance of late-colonial Indonesia for the Dutch economy does 
not feature prominently in current Dutch economic historiography .^ Some 
recent monographs have established the significance of Indonesia for 
individual enterprises or industries, but there is little attention to the overall 
importance of Indonesia to the Dutch economy during 1870-19401 An 
article by Derksen and Tinbergen (1945) on the contribution of Indonesia 
to Dutch national income during 1925-38, published 50 years ago, is still 
the most authoritative study. 
Yet, the «colonial drain» argument is a contentious issue in the 
economic historiography of Indonesia. Booth (1989) re-identified it as a 
' 0'Brien(1997)p. 93. 
' Van Zanden (1989, 1996) omits it from his surveys of current Dutch economic 
historiography, 
For instance, the authors of a tecent textbook on Dutch economic history (Van Zanden 
and Griffiths 1989) asserted that colonial Indonesia had been very important during 1900-40, 
but only spent 5 of 165 pages on the issue. 
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key malefactor in explanations of Indonesia's underdevelopment, albeit 
without scrutinising all intricacies. In general, historians of Indonesia 
assume that «fabulous riches» from the colonies accrued to the Dutch 
economy. This view was re-enforced by Maddison (1989), who assumed 
that the Indonesian merchandise trade surplus could be equated to the 
«drain» of funds from Indonesia to the Netherlands. Albeit crude, this 
indicaitor of «colonial exploitation» goes in Maddison's opinión a long way 
to explaining underdevelopment in Indonesia and development in the 
Netherlands up to World War 11. 
If the economic arguments for Dutch imperiaÜsm stand up, we would 
expect an intensification of bilateral trade, a prominent and growing 
position of Indonesian primary commodities in Dutch imports and a 
privileged place for Dutch manufactures in Indonesian imports. We would 
also expect Indonesia to have a large share in Dutch foreign investments, 
and profits of foreign enterprise in Indonesia to have been relatively high 
due to state-capitalist collusion. The article will address each of these issues 
in tum. 
BILATERAL TRADE 
Table 1 surveys the development of bilateral trade of the Netherlands 
and Indonesia. There are some problems in the comparabüity of the foreign 
trade statistics of both countries. In particular, the discrepancy between 
Dutch import from Indonesia and Indonesian export to the Netherlands 
is caused by two factors .^ Firstly, Dutch foreign trade statistics were not 
corrected for transit trade (generally to and from Germany and Great 
Britain) befóte the major revisión of 1917. This explains the discrepancy 
between columns 1 and 10 up to the 1920s '. Secondly, during the 19th 
century most Indonesian goods were shipped to the Netherlands for auction. 
With the improvement of intemational Communications (particularly the 
telegraph), Indonesian exports were increasingly shipped to the Netherlands 
«for order». Ships received orders for their final destination outside the 
Netherlands at ports en route to Europe. This explains the discrepancy 
* Lindblad (1988), Lindbkd and Van Zanden (1989). 
' It is likely that the problem continued to plague the Dutch trade statistics. The 
Netherlands had a sigiüficant import surplus with Germany and an export surplus with 
the UK during the 1920s and 1930s, which may reflect transit trade. See: Keesing (1947) 
pp. 52, 92, 140, 207 and 269. 
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TABLEl 
Dutch and Indonesia» Merchandise Trade, 1870-1939 
(million guilders or rupiahs) 
1870-79 
1880-89 
1890-99 
1900-09 
1910-19 
1920-29 
1930-39 
Ihe Netherlands 
Imports 
from 
Indone 
sia 
a; 
74 
88 
219 
366 
357 
141 
79 
Total % 
Exports 
to 
Indone 
(2) (3) 
690 10.7 
1,080 8.2 
1,445 14.6 
2,463 14.9 
2,544 14.0 
2,493 5.6 
1,464 5.4 
sia 
(4) 
41 
46 
59 
72 
116 
158 
71 
Total 
0) 
513 
864 
1,242 
2,022 
1,979 
1,672 
1,018 
% 
(6) 
7.9 
5.3 
4.7 
3.5 
5.8 
9.5 
7.0 
Imports 
from 
the 
Nether-
lands 
(7) 
42 
51 
55 
73 
108 
205 
78 
Total 
(8) 
90 
137 
162 
213 
458 
932 
457 
Indonesia 
Exports 
% to the 
Nether-
lands 
(9) (10) 
46.8 107 
37.2 75 
33.8 79 
34.0 103 
23.5 166 
22.0 257 
17.1 126 
Total % 
(11) (12) 
156 68.6 
191 39.2 
207 38.3 
325 31.7 
820 20.2 
1,562 16.4 
700 18.1 
Note: Ten-year annual averages. The Dutch and Indonesian guilder were almost at par. 
SouRCES: Calculated from MITCHELL, B. (1981): European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 510-5 and 562-5; KORTHALS ALTES, W. L. (1991): Changing 
Economy in Indonesia Yol. 12a: General Trade Statistics 1822-1940, Amsterdam: Royal Tropical 
Institute, pp. 76-103. 
between columns 1 and 10 in the 1920s and 1930s. The difference between 
the columns 4 and 7 in the 1920s is mainly caused by variations in the 
unit prices of imports in Indonesia, compared to the Netherlands. 
Table 1 indicates that the Netherlands had an important merchandise 
trade déficit and colonial Indonesia a notable surplus. Furthermore, the 
total valué of Indonesia's trade was much lower than that of the 
Netherlands. Even if the Dutch data are corrected for transit trade, 
Indonesia's trade amounted to 45 percent of Dutch trade during 
1872-1913 '°. In per capita terms, Dutch exports were around /495 (/135 
excluding transit trade), compared to /8 in Indonesia in the decade after 
1900 '^ Consequently, the Dutch economy depended to a much higher 
degree on foreign trade than Indonesia. 
'" Lindblad and Van Zanden (1989, p. 262) provided such corrected data. 
" The Dutch guilder was official currency in both the Netheriands and colonial 
Indonesia. During 1870-1930 the guilder traded at around US$0.40. 
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Dutch foreign trade expanded rapidly during the three decades 
preceding World War I, which conforms with the rapid growth of world 
trade '^. The main expansión of Indonesian foreign trade took place during 
1900-29, despite the disruption caused by World War I and the volatility 
of global commodity markets. In both countries total imports and exports 
increased faster than trade between them, which is reflected in the fall 
of the shares in columns 3, 6, 9 and 12. Any discrepancies in the data 
are not substantial enough to cast doubts on these trends. It is possible 
to circumvent the defíciencies of the Dutch trade statistics, by using data 
on Dutch foreign trade, from which an estimate of transit trade is deducted, 
and the Indonesian data on Dutch-Indonesian bilateral trade ^^ . In that 
case the share of Indonesia in Dutch imports fell from 31.7 percent in 
the 1870s, to 19.3 percent 1880s, 15.4 percent 1890s and 15.3 percent 
1900s, while the share of Indonesia in Dutch exports remained roughly 
constant at 15.5 percent in the 1870s, 17.4 percent 1880s, 15.3 percent 
1890s and 15.7 percent 1900s, after which it started to fall. These estimates 
confirm the trends in the columns 3 and 6. 
The bilateral trade contacts may have been of importance to the 
Netherlands and of great signifícance to Indonesia in the 187Os, but 
thenceforth trade links between both countries decreased continuously. 
lilis is in contrast to the development of trade relations between Great 
Britain and its colonies during these years, and contradicts economic 
interpretations of imperialism. 
TO OBTAIN RAW MATERIALS 
The decreasing importance of bilateral trade reflects the demise of the 
Netherlands as the staple-market for traditional Indonesian export 
commodities, such as spices, sugar, coffee, tea and tobáceo. During the 
19th century most of these had been auctioned in Amsterdam. But the 
improvement of intemational transport and Communications made it 
possible to auction products in Indonesia or ship them directly to overseas 
customers. 
A major explanation for the fall of the share of the Netherlands in 
Indonesian exports is the termination of sugar exports to refineries in the 
Netherlands, After the demise of the Cultivation System in 1870, exposure 
" Lewis(1978). 
" Lindblad and Van Zanden (1989), p. 262; Korthals Altes (1991), pp. 76-103. 
296 
EXPLORING EXPLOITATION: THE NETHERLANDS AND COLONIAL INDONESIA 1870-1940 
to intemational competition forced many sugar faetones in Java to 
re-organise their operations. Their owners updated the processing facilities, 
started to refíne sugar in Java and inereasingly shipped produee direcdy 
to overseas customers. In 1870 86 pereent of Java sugar went to the 
Netherlands, by 1880 only 10 pereent. Another commodity which helps 
to explain the general trend is rubber. Most of Indonesia's rapidly increasing 
rubber exports during the 1910s and 1920s was sent directly to processing 
plants in Singapore and the United States (US). 
Henee, most of the raw materials exported from Indonesia were not 
processed in the Netherlands. They inereasingly went to countries other 
than the Netherlands for consumption or further processing, including 
many other developing countries in Asia. For instance, India, China and 
Japan became major purchasers of Java sugar. Primary materials indeed 
continued to domínate Indonesia's exports up until the 1980s, but the 
expansión of Dutch colonial rule was obviously not accompanied by growing 
Dutch dominance over Indonesia's raw materials. 
Nevertheless, particular commodities could have been important for 
the establishment and development of several Dutch industries. After 1870, 
the most important products among Indonesia's exports to the Netherlands 
were tobáceo, coffee, tin ore and copra. Table 2 indicates that the Dutch 
share increased only over time in the case of tobáceo. 
The Dutch sugar refíning industry had evolved on the basis of raw 
sugar from Java. With the refurbishing of the Java sugar industry after 
TABLE2 
Percentage share ofthe Netherlands in Indonesian exports, 1874-1939 
Share of export to the 'Netherlands Product share 
in Indonesian 
1874-1904 1905-30 1931-39 exports, 1905-30 
Tobacco 65.3 86.4 92.0 8.9 
Coffee 74.8 41.6 20.7 3.5 
Tin/tinore 87.2 45.5 18.8 5.7 
gopra 16.8' 31.0 24.2 6.5 
° 1890-1903. 
SouRCES: Calculated from LINDBLAD, J. Th. (1988): «De Handel tussen Nederland en 
Nederlands -Indié, 1874-1939», Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch jaarboek, 51, pp. 295-7; 
KoRTHALS ALTES, W . L. (1991): Changing Economy in Indonesia Yol. 12a: General Trade 
Statistics 1822-1940, Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, pp. 69-75 and 151-64. 
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1870, Dutch sugar faetones changed to processing domestic sugar beet, 
tuming the Netherlands into a sugar exporter. The position of sugar in 
Dutch imports from Indonesia was taken over by coffee and since the 
1890s by tobáceo and tin. 
Auctioning and processing coffee had made Amsterdam a major 
intemational coffee market. In the ISth century it handled coffee from 
the Middie East, not just from Indonesia. The expansión of the Amsterdam 
coffee market in the 19th century was based not just on Indonesian coffee, 
but also on the rapid growth of coffee imports from Brazil and later Central 
America. Moreover, during the 19th century Indonesia's superior Arábica 
coffee was increasingly shipped directly to overseas customers. Indeed, the 
fall in Indonesian coffee production in the 1890s due to a disease that 
ravaged the Arábica piantings did not affect the Amsterdam coffee market 
as much as the rise of other coffee markets, such as Le Havre in France. 
Increasing tobáceo imports from Java and the renowned cigar wrapper 
tobáceo from Deii (North Sumatra) spurred the Dutch cigar industry in 
the late 19th century. The Dutch share in Deli tobáceo exports remained 
80-85 percent, despite increasing exports of Deli tobáceo to the US. 
Although much tobáceo exported from Indonesia to the Netherlands was 
aetually transhipped to Germany, it is obvious that Indonesian tobáceo 
sustained the Dutch cigar industry. 
Until the 1920s most tin ore produced in the Indonesian islands of 
Bangka, Singkep and Belitung was smelted in Belitung and Singapore '''. 
In 1928 the main tin produeer Billiton established a subsidiary in The 
Netherlands to smelt tin ore. Although the venture started off processing 
Bolivian ore, after 1933 it turned increasingly to Indonesian tin ore. This 
arrangement mainly aróse from the heavy involvement of the colonial 
govemment in the exploitation of Indonesian tin mines. But during the 
1920s and 1930s increasing quantities of Indonesian tin ore were smelted 
in Singapore and later in the US, because the smelting eapacity in both 
Indonesia and the Netherlands was insufficient to keep up with the rapid 
growth of Indonesia's tin exports. 
The Netherlands, in particular Rotterdam, became a major contender 
in the intemational market for oils and fatty substanees in the late 19th 
century. This was not directly related to the expansión of colonial rule 
in Indonesia, but rather to the rapid growth of demand in Europe for 
margarine, soap and detergents. Indonesian copra, and later also 
" Kamp(1960). 
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groundnuts, soybeans and palm oil, were traded at or through the 
Rotterdam market. However, most Dutch imports of these products did 
not come from Indonesia, just as most Indonesian exports of these products 
did not go to the Netherlands. Dutch soap and margarine industries, in 
particular the two Dutch companies which amalgamated into the 
Anglo-Dutch Untlever in 1929, indeed processed Indonesian copra and 
coconut oil, but did not depend exclusively on imports from Indonesia ' ' . 
Dutch interests were central for the development of the Indonesian 
petroleum industry. The exploitation of such oil reserves in Indonesia 
around 1900 and the refining of raw oil in the Netherlands provided the 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company with a start to maturation into the 
multinational Anglo-Dutch Shell oil company. But in the 20th century the 
Bataafiche Petroleum Maatschappij (BPM, 1907), its Anglo-Dutch subsidiary, 
was only one of the many interests which both the Royal Dutch and Shell 
had throughout the world. The refineries of the Royal Dutch in Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam did not depend on operations in Indonesia, while most 
Indonesian oil was refined in the country itself '^. 
These were Indonesia's most important export commodities. The 
country exported a wide range of other commodities which have been 
of varied importance to Dutch industries. For instance, Indonesia had a 
near-monopoly in the global production of cinchona bark. Since 1886 most 
of the bark was processed into quinine in Amsterdam, until the 
establishment of a similar plant in Bandung in Indonesia in 1897. Other 
products of minor importance to both Indonesian exports and Dutch 
industries are kapok, cocoa, spices, resins etc. 
On the whole, some imports from Indonesia were of importance in 
the establishment of commodity trade and processing industries in the 
Netherlands. But it is difficult to maintain that the trade relations with 
Indonesia formed the base for the further expansión of such industries, 
as the decreasing shares of Indonesia in Dutch imports and of the 
Netherlands in Indonesian exports in Table 1 indícate. Section A in Table 3 
gives a concise overview of the extent to which Dutch industry relied on 
imports from Indonesia in 1938. Such imports were not crucial to the 
development of Dutch industry as a whole. Indonesia only retained its 
importance for some Dutch industries, in particular the tobáceo industry. 
The high shares of rubber, sugar and tea are deceptive, because most 
" Wilson (1954), in particular volume 2. 
'" Lindblad (1989), Gabriéls (1990). 
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TABLE3 
The role of Indonesia in the composition of Dutch foreign trade, 1938 
A. Dutch impon of raw materials: 
Stones, cement eíc. 
Chemicals 
Fertiliser 
Inflammable and lubricating oils 
Timber 
Yam and fibres 
Rubber 
Hides and leather 
Coal 
Metals and ores 
Paper and paper products 
Grains and flour 
Oily seeds 
Fodder 
Raw sugar 
Tobacco leaves 
Coffee 
Tea 
Total of these 
B. Dutch export of manufactures by 
industry groups: 
Food and luxury foods industries 
Pottery and glass industries etc. 
Wood processing industries etc. 
Paper industry 
Textile industry 
Garments industry 
Leather, shoes and rubber industry 
Metal industry, shipbuilding etc. 
Printing and industrial art 
Total of these 
Total 
fmln. 
14.5 
62.5 
34.8 
46.8 
65.0 
88.0 
4.7 
28.4 
52.5 
222.6 
19.9 
85.4 
98.8 
12.4 
5.5 
21.0 
15.6 
11.3 
889.7 
233.7 
7.4 
105.5 
22.2 
77.8 
3.2 
13.0 
228.9 
9.0 
706.3 
Ofivhich from/to 
fmln. 
— 
7.5 
— 
0.6 
1.3 
1.7 
2.5 
3.2 
— 
33.4" 
— 
2.0 
12.1 
2.7 
4.1 
11.0 
4.1 
9.8 
96.0 
9.5 
0.5 
11.6 
2.0 
34.0 
0.5 
0.7 
35.8 
2.2 
98.1 
1 Indonesia 
% 
— 
12.0 
— 
1.3 
2.0 
1.9 
43.2 
11.3 
— 
15.0 
— 
2.3 
12.3 
21.8 
74.5 
52.4 
26.3 
86.7 
10.8 
4.1 
6.8 
11.0 
9.0 
43.7 
15.6 
5.4 
15.6 
24.4 
13.9 
' Of which tin ore and tin: /32.4 million. 
SouRCE: Calculated from DERKSEN, J. B. D. (1946): «De Economische Beteekenis van 
Nederlandsch-Indié voor Nederland met Cijfers en Statistieken Toegelicht», in W. H. van 
Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (eds.): Hecht Verbonden in Lief en Leed, Amsterdam: Else-
vier, p. 371. 
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Indonesian rubber, sugar and tea was exported to other countries. The 
Dutch rubber-using industry was relatively small, while sugar and tea were 
imported for domestic consumption. 
TO SELL MANUFACTURES 
Table 1 indicates that, except for the 1920s, the valué of Dutch imports 
from Indonesia exceeded the valué of Dutch exports to Indonesia, which 
suggests that Indonesia was more important to the Dutch economy for 
its supply of raw materials than as a market for Dutch manufactures. As 
noted above, the protection offered to the export of some manufactured 
products to Indonesia was important for the establishment and 
development of the Dutch textile and shipbuilding industries during the 
first half of the 19th century. This continued to be the case during the 
second half of that century, as Table 4 indicates for the textile industry. 
During the first half of the 19th century, weaving was primarily a cottage 
industry in the Netherlands. Apart from the spinning milis, the export of 
textiles to Indonesia did not primarily benefit big capitalist entrepreneurs, 
as the economic theory of imperialism would suggest. The growth of textile 
production after 1850 was indeed based on the expansión of textile 
faetones, producing yam and cloth at the expense of the cottage industry. 
However, the expansión of the Dutch textile industry after 1850 was largely 
due to the growth of production for the domestic market, rather than 
for overseas markets '^. 
Dutch textile producers lost their preferential access to the Indonesian 
market in 1874, but they maintained their share in the Indonesian market 
at around one-third through specialisation '*. To Indonesia they mainly 
supplied sarongs and bleached textiles for the Indonesian batik (dyeing) 
industry. Textile imports from the Netherlands constituted one-third of 
Indonesian textile imports, the rest consisting of luxury textiles from Britain 
and unbleached textiles from Japan. This balance changed in the late 1920s, 
when Japan expanded its export of bleached textiles to Indonesia at the 
expense of Dutch producers. The Dutch share in Indonesian textile imports 
gradually fell to a low of 12 percent in 1932-35. The loss of markets was 
not acted upon until late 1933. The regulation of Indonesian imports 
" De Jonge (1968), pp. 82-129, in particular pp. 117-20. 
'* Fischer (1981), p. 19; Wolters (1990); Sugiyama (1994). 
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TABLE4 
Role of manufactures in Dutch-Indonesian bilateral trade, 1874-1939 
Textiles Machinery Metal goods 
A. Average shares of export to Indonesia in Dutch exports of manufactures: 
1874/1904 63.0 43.0 4.2 
1905/1930 40.7 57.0 27.4 
1931/1939 40.3 7.8 13.3 
B. Average shares of the Netherlands in Indonesian imports of manufactures: 
1874/1904 51.5 62.5 65.0 
1905/1930 31.5 52.8 36.1 
1931/1939 20.4 31.1 13.8 
SouRCE: LlNDbLAD, J. Th. (1988): «De Handel tussen Nederiand en Nederlands-Indié, 
1874-1939», Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, 51, p. 294 (note 47) and pp. 297-8 
(notes 84 and 90). 
through quota and tariffs indeed reserved markets for Dutch textiles, but 
that only started to take effect in 1937. 
Henee, during most of the late-colonial period the trade policies of 
colonial Indonesia did not discriminate against textiles from third countries, 
and did not facilítate monopoly profits for the Dutch textile industry. 
Although textiles had a prime place in Dutch exports to Indonesia, the 
Dutch textile industry was not primarily dependent on Indonesia. For 
instance, Table 4 shows that most of Dutch textile exports did not go 
to Indonesia. In fact, most textiles were produced for the Dutch domestic 
market before World War ü '^ 
As noted above, the monopolisation of the shipment of govertunent 
commodities during the Cultivation System benefited the Dutch shipping 
industry, thus re-enforcing the prominent position which Dutch companies 
had occupied for many centuries in intemational shipping. The industry 
suffered in the 1870s, when the privileged Dutch position in Indonesian 
trade was relinquished, and in the 1880s, due to the intemational economic 
crisis, but recovered soon after. Although Indonesia became an increasingly 
important node in the web of Dutch shipping lines during the 19th and 
20th centuries, this web spanned the whole world ^°. 
" Kockelkom (1989). 
'" De Jonge (1968), pp. 132-6 and 136-8; Huijts and Tus (1994). 
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The Dutch shipbuilding industry depended largely on the development 
of Dutch shipping. It also suffered in the 1870s, but several companies 
found relief through a growth of domestic demand for products from the 
metal, metal engineering and machinery construction industries. The 
shipbuilding industry bounced back after 1890, due to the general 
expansión of Dutch shipping as a consequence of the upswing in worid 
trade. This is not to deny that increased shipping to and from Indonesia 
contributed significantly to the rapid expansión of the Dutch merchant 
fleet during 1890-1910. For instance, BPM alone ordered 150 ships from 
Dutch wharfs for the transport of oil during 1907-40. 
Apart from the textile and shipbuilding industries, it is difficult to 
establish a direct link between the development of Dutch industry and 
colonial expansión, because since 1890 Dutch manufacturing industry 
entered a phase of expansión and diversification. As Table 4 indicates, 
the relation with Indonesia remained important up to 1930 for Dutch 
engineering industries, who flourished from investment in Indonesia. After 
1895, the colonial government invested considerable sums in the 
development of infrastructure. Metal products were required for the 
construction of railways, bridges, harbour installations, etc. The Indonesian 
economy had been opened up to private investment in 1870, but it took 
until the 1890s before private investment started to grow. In particular 
capital-intensive industries in Indonesia (such as the sugar industry) 
required steam-driven processing equipment. During 1881-93 around 7.5 
percent of the boilers in steam generators used in Indonesia had been 
made by companies in the Netherlands, but by 1910-12 this had risen 
to 30 percent, a time when more than 50 percent of orders for new boüers 
went to Dutch factories ^'. 
Table 4 indicates that Dutch companies lost ground in Indonesian 
imports of machinery and metal goods, although a clear preference for 
Dutch goods remained. We can only guess the reasons, because Dutch 
produce enjoyed minimal preferential treatment in Indonesia's foreign trade 
regime. It is likely that the colonial government preferred to order metal 
goods for the construction of railways and bridges in the Netherlands ^ .^ 
Another possibility is that capital-intensive companies in Indonesia were 
generally foreign-owned. Dutch company owners may have preferred 
products from affíliated Dutch industries. Furthermore, Dutch engineering 
'^ Van Hooff (1990), pp. 237-38. 
'' Van Hooff (1990), pp. 238-41. 
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companies specialised in equipment for the processing of tropical 
commodities. For instance, the Stork company supplied installations for 
sugar manufacturing, which it not only sold to Indonesia, but to many 
other countries producing cañe sugar, such as Cuba. In the 1920s more 
non-Dutch companies established subsidiaries in Indonesia, which may 
explain the growth of machinery and metal imports from Great Britain 
and the US, and the fall of the Dutch share. 
Manufacturing exports to Indonesia were of some importance in the 
initial phases for a range of small Dutch industrial ventures in the 19th 
century. But, like the industries which initially depended on imports of 
Indonesian raw materials, most then diversified their overseas sales since 
the late 19th century, in the expansionary phase of such ventures ^^ . As 
with the import of raw materials, by the 1930s Dutch manufacturing 
industry as a whole did not depend on sales to Indonesia. 
After the failure of the World Economic Conference in 1933, increasing 
compartmentalisation of intemational markets and falling exports forced 
the Netherlands and Indonesia to explore the extent to which they could 
support each other. But the Dutch market was too small to absorb 
Indonesia's commodities, while the assortment of Dutch manufactures was 
too limited to satisfy Indonesia's import requirements. For instance, the 
main Dutch foreign exchange eamers (horticulture and agriculture) had 
littíe to offer for Indonesia. In short, the two economies had grown apart 
and their products were not complementary. A system of imperial 
preferences, akin to the British Commonwealth, could not have had 
comparable results. 
While avenues of greater cooperation were explored, observers pointed 
out that Indonesia and the Netherlands had grown apart and that foreign 
trade and payment policies had to conform to that state of affairs ^^. The 
interests in foreign trade policies were still formulated for Indonesia by 
the Dutch govemment, a situation which prompted the rise of an economic 
nationalism with the support of both Indonesians and Europeans in the 
colony. 
Although difficult to specify, the net result of the regulation of bilateral 
trade through quota and licences has benefited sections of Dutch 
manufacturing industry: in particular Dutch textile industry, and to a lesser 
extent the fertiliser, light bulbs and cement industries^'. However, the 
" Dejonge (1968), p. 358. 
2^  Wirodihardjo (1951), pp. 229-38. 
" Wirodihardjo (1951), pp. 238-53. 
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preferential access of Dutch textiles to the Indonesian market was 
accompanied by a policy of import restrictions aimed at furthering the 
textile industry in Indonesia, despite the fact that Indonesian products 
competed with protected Dutch imports ^^ . The overall trend of increasing 
import-substituting industrial development in Indonesia and growing 
integration of the Netherlands into Europe, was re-enforced when the 
Germán occupation of the Netherlands in May 1940 cut the colonial ties. 
EXPORT OF DUTCH CAPITAL 
The Netherlands has long been an exporter of investment capital. Such 
exports slowed down during the first half of the 19th century. This was 
to some extent due to the emergence of domestic investment opportunities 
during a hesitant first phase of industrialisation, but mainly by the rapid 
growth of investment in Dutch public bonds, fiaelled by the costly Belgian 
war of secession in the 1830s. Still, even when domestic investment 
opportunities increased further after 1850, much Dutch capital found its 
way abroad, especially in the form of portfolio investments in Russian and 
Austrian public bonds and American and Russian railways ^^ . 
There were investment opportunities in Indonesia, especially after 1870, 
but Dutch investors hardly seized them. During the 19th century capital 
formation in Indonesia was largely generated by public investment in 
infrastructure, financed with revenues from the Cultivation System and 
realised with corvée labour. Private capital formation in Indonesia was 
mainly initiated by Dutch private entrepreneurs, many of whom had started 
under the Cultivation System as contractors of the colonial govemment. 
Even after the demise of the Cultivation System in 1870, the stock of 
foreign capital in Indonesia only expanded very gradually. Exact data are 
not known, but the numbers of companies with limited liability status in 
Indonesia indícate significant growth only after 1890 *^. This corresponds 
to the gradual establishment by the colonial govemment of preconditions 
for the operations of private enterprise in the form of infrastructure and 
a transparent legal framework. 
Numbers of incorporated enterprises may be misleading, because 
most new ventures (apart from sugar factories) were not capital-intensive. 
'<• Wirodihardjo (1951), pp. 131-96; Telkamp (1981). 
" Jonker (1991). See also: Bosch (1948), pp. 1-23 and 59-70; Veenendaal (1996). 
'" ACampo(1996), p. 73. 
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Many of the sugar factories operated on the basis of short-term 
consignment-contracts with Dutch trading houses, which operated as banks. 
These houses supplied the required working credit on the condition that 
produce would be delivered to them. After the termination of their 
Cultivation System contracts, many sugar factories required funds to 
upgrade processing facilities and to expand the scale of production in 
order to be able to meet competition. After the 1880s many 
consignment-contracts started to include investment in fixed capital and 
thus involved a long-term obligation to sell produce to the trading houses. 
On the whole this meant a growing involvement of the big trading houses 
in the production phase. Gradually the original owners of the weaker 
ventures were bought out and the houses took control ^^ . Ownership thus 
gradually changed from the Indonesia-based owner-operators to the Dutch 
shareholders in these trading houses. 
Dutch entrepreneurs who started other ventures in Indonesia after 
1870, such as plantations with tobáceo or tree crops such as tea, coffee 
or chinchona, often raised investment capital in their own circles, rather 
than on money markets in the Netherlands. Banks were generally not 
interested in such ventures, either because of their inexperience with such 
crops, or due to risks inherent in agricultural enterprises, such as pests, 
diseases, weather and volatile commodity markets. Raising money on the 
Dutch stock market was often not an option, because stock market listings 
required a mínimum of /500,000 subscribed capital. At that stage 
plantations could generally not meet this condition, because their capital 
requirements were modest compared to sugar factories. Investment was 
generally only required to access concessions, pay labour to clear the land, 
plant the soil and bridge the period until harvesting, not for expensive 
processing facilities. 
If such ventures prosperad, they started a transitional phase during 
which they repaid their debts and started to plough back profits through 
provisions for an accelerated depreciation of assets and the formation of 
precautionary reserves ^^. This phase may have taken more than ten years 
in the case of tree crops, which means that the first enterprises started 
this phase in the 1890s, rapidly growing in numbers after 1900. 
After this phase, ventures may have entered an expansionary phase. 
Expansión was generally not financed with loans from Dutch banks on 
'^ This account of events can be found in Helfferich (1914, 1916). 
'° This point elabórales the purport of Drake (1972). 
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the basis of accumulated assets in Indonesia. On the whole, the interest 
from Dutch capital markets in tropical ventures remained limited. Rather, 
self-made entrepreneurs in Indonesia financed expansión by incorporating 
their ventures. An owner-operator would form a syndicate with Dutch 
friends and/or a large trading house on the basis of a long-term 
consignment-contract. Shares were issued against the assets of the existing 
venture, which were brought into the new limited liability company. Shares 
were either issued for the expansión of operations or to buy out the original 
owner-operator who then retired. 
The expansionary phase implied a shift from unincorporated proprietary 
enterprises to legally incorporated firms. Where the original owners were 
bought out, the ownership of the assets often changed from the previous 
owner-operators residing in Indonesia to free-standing compatiies in the 
Netherlands, and in some cases to the shareholders of the big Dutch trading 
houses. Companies became ventures administered by salaried managers, 
or specialised management agencies in case of smaller companies, rather 
than owner-operators. Moreover, after 1900 several large mining enterprises 
were estabÜshed in the Netherlands for operations in Indonesia. Their 
shares were often floated on the Dutch stock market. The upshot is that 
after 1900 both the top management of Dutch ventures in Indonesia and 
the ownership of private enterprise in Indonesia passed to the Netherlands. 
This increasing reliance of private enterprise in Indonesia on the Dutch 
capital market explains the fact that Dutch-owned companies formed about 
75 percent of foreign investment in Indonesia. After 1870 entry into the 
Indonesian economy was not reserved to Dutch companies. The only formal 
obstacles were that legislation, such as the 1899 Mining Act, required limited 
liability companies operating in Indonesia to be registered in Indonesia or 
in the Netherlands. The 1870 Agrarian Law also stipulated that long leases 
could only be granted to Dutch nationals or to residents of Indonesia (since 
1919 in East Sumatra) ' \ In effect this meant that non-Dutch companies 
had to establish subsidiaries in either Indonesia or the Netherlands, or use 
agencies. In short, Dutch companies may have found it easier to overeóme 
institutional hurdles, because the legal systems in both countries were similar 
or because of the use of the Dutch language in Indonesia. 
The fact that non-Dutch companies were not prevented from entering 
Indonesia became especially clear after about 1910, when many of them 
ventured into new sectors of the economy to seize opportunities which 
" Hacco(1957), p. 196. 
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Dutch companies neglected, especially in petroleum, rubber and palm oil, 
and, since the late 1920s, in import-replacing manufacturing industries 
(such as Goodyear and the British-American Tobacco Company). UnÜke 
Dutch plantations, these ventures were not mainly financed with re-invested 
profits, but with foreign direct investment (FDI). Direct capital inflows 
into Indonesia also increased after about 1910, due to the growing 
capital-intensive exploitation of mineral reserves by foreign enterprises, in 
particular in the oil sector. The growing involvement of such big foreign 
companies meant that in the late colonial era Dutch companies registered 
in Indonesia may have had the numbers, but not the volume ^^ . 
Clearly, the nationaMty of Dutch companies in colonial Indonesia causes 
problems. Incorporated companies operating in Indonesia may have had 
been registered in Indonesia. But the gradual shift of ownership to the 
Netherlands, as indicated above, meant that companies were increasingly 
controlled from the Netherlands. Likewise, foreign subsidiaries may have 
been registered in Indonesia, but may actually have been under foreign 
control ^^ . On the whole, the biggest «Dutch» companies operating in 
Indonesia were registered in the Netherlands, or were controlled by 
free-standing companies or shareholders in the Netherlands. The majority 
of small «Dutch» companies registered in Indonesia were controlled by 
Dutch nationals of Indonesian extraction, or by Chínese residents or ethnic 
Indonesians '^'. This is one of the problems which plagues the estimation 
of the stock of foreign, in particular Dutch investment in colonial Indonesia. 
Another problem is that the accumulation of foreign-owned productive 
assets in Indonesia was based on relatively modest initial capital injections 
from overseas. The inflow of prívate capital during 1820-1938 indeed adds 
up to only about one-third of the estimated replacement valué of 
foreign-owned productive assets in Indonesia in 1938, as shown in Table 
5 ^'. Most of the expansión of incorporated prívate enterpríse in Indonesia 
was therefore based on foreign entrepreneurship and financed Avith 
re-invested profits. Estimates suggest that on average one-quarter to 
" Hacco (1957), pp. 202-7. Lindblad (1992, pp. 4-5) estimated diat 58 percent of 
paid-up capital of companies operating in Indonesia was from companies registered in the 
Netherlands, 20 percent registered in Indonesia and 6 percent from Indonesian-Chinese 
companies. 
" Hacco (1957, pp. 196-8) provides an overview of where plantations were registered 
in 1937. 
'^  Korthals Altes (1987), pp. 142-4. On definition problems, see Lindblad (1991). 
» Korthals Altes (1987), pp. 72-95. 
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TABLE5 
Stock of accumulated Dutchforeign investment, 1900-1938 
(million guilders) 
Foreign direct investment 
Indonesia 
United States 
Other 
Total 
Public bonds, Indonesia 
Total portfolio investment 
Total foreign investment 
1900 
750 
20 
40 
810 
45 
3,100 
3,910 
1914 
1,680 
340 
250 
2,270 
170 
2,800 
5,070 
1938 
2,850 
690 
1,270 
4,810 
1,200 
3,910 
8,720 
' Public bonds and unredeemed govemment-to-govemment loans. 
Note: The data have been estimated from a range of different sources, which are not 
entirely comparable. They should be taken as indications of the order of magnitude. 
SOURCES: Calculated from GALES, B. P. A., and SLUYTERMAN, K. E. (1993): «Outward 
Bound. The Rise of Dutch Multinationals», in G. Jones and H.G. Schróter (eds): The Rise 
of Multinationals in Continental Eumpe, Aldershot: Brookfield, pp. 65-66 and 92-93 (con-
verted with current exchange rates); DERKSEN, J. B . D . (1941): «Berekeningen over het 
Nationale Inkomen van Nederland voor de Periode 1900-1920», Maandschrift van het Cen-
traal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 36, p. 80; CALUS, H . G. (1942): Foreign Capital in Southeast 
Asia, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 36; LEWIS, C. (1948): The United States 
and Foreign Investment Problems, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 298-43. 
one-third of company profits were ploughed back during 1925-38 ^ . 
Assuming that 75 percent of profits were remitted as dividends, it is possible 
to estímate the accumulated re-invested profits during 1820-1938 with data 
on remitted dividends and profits. The estímate índeed adds up to about 
two-thírds of the replacement valué of foreign-owned productive assets 
in Indonesia in 1938 ^ .^ This estímate may be too low, because it assumes 
that profits were only ploughed back when dividends were remitted. It 
^ Only incomplete data are available. CKS (1930, p. 14), suggests that 30 percent 
of declared dividends were ploughed back in 1925, or 23 percent after taxes. Korthals 
Altes (1987, p. 41), suggests a much higher estímate of 37 percent in 1925 and an average 
of 26 percent for 1910-26. Frange (1935, pp. 91-92), estimated an average of 33 percent 
during 1925-30, while Geselschap (1949) estimated an average of 33 percent during 1928-39. 
" Data in current prices from Korthals Altes (1987, pp. 72-95), accumulated as follows: 
1938 
Total = £ (1/0.75 - 1) X remitted dividend (t) 
t = 1820 
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is likely that profits were ploughed back regardless, especially when most 
ventures were still managed by the owner-operators. On the other hand, 
the estímate may be too high, because it does not take account of losses 
due to bankruptcies and liquidations. Still, both estimates indícate the 
tremendous ímportance of re-invested profits in financing the expansión 
of prívate enterprise in colonial Indonesia. 
This helps to explain vi^ hy Indonesia initíally absorbed only small 
amounts of Dutch capital. Most Dutch overseas ínvestment was in the 
form of portfolio investment in other parts of the world, as Table 5 
indicates. Even by 1914 Dutch portfolio investment in the US was valued 
at / 2 billion, in Russia /940 million, altogether much more than 
Dutch-owned productive assets in Indonesia ^^ . The gradual transfer of 
ownership of companies in Indonesia to the Netherlands explains the rapid 
growth of the volume of Dutch FDI in Indonesia after 1900. 
The bíggest single category of investment capital transferred from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia involved the purchase of Indonesian public bonds 
by Dutch investors. These were popular, because they were guaranteed 
by the Dutch govemment. Indonesian public debt accumulated quickly 
during the 1920s, when the colonial government borrowed for investment 
in infrastructure, and the 1930s, when it borrowed to finance current 
expenditure, despíte relentless pruning ^'. 
It is now possíble to understand the somewhat odd situation that the 
colonial govemment had to borrow money abroad, despite Indonesia's trade 
surplus. The trade surplus reflected to a large extent payments related 
to the foreígn ownership of the assets of prívate enterprise, rather than 
payments generated by the actual inflows of past FDI. Prívate enterpríse 
had largely been financed with re-invested profits. These had remained 
unobserved, because they did not enter international financial exchange. 
Re-investment of profits had been necessary for two reasons. Firstly, 
because of the initíal reluctance of Dutch investors to raise capital for 
ventures in Indonesia. Secondly, because there was only a very small capital 
market in Indonesia both duríng the 19th and the early 20th century '*". 
Savíngs in Indonesia were low and exceeded by capital requirements by 
far, while banks ín Indonesia were maínly involved in financing current 
operations of prívate enterpríse. Consequently, the colonial government 
could not raise the required funds domestically and had to borrow overseas, 
'" Bosch (1948), pp. 46-8; Van Hom (1993), pp. 436-7. 
" Tervooren (1957), pp. 74-125. 
* Van Laanen (1980), pp. 31-3. 
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despite the fact that the Indonesian economy had a substantial trade 
surplus. 
This section indicated that most Dutch capital invested overseas was 
not directed towards Indonesia. The share of Indonesia in Dutch foreign 
investment indeed increased from 20 percent in 1900 to 46 percent in 
1938. This change was not mainly caused by a flow of FDI from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia, but rather due to: (a) the transfer of ownership 
of prívate enterprises in Indonesia from Indonesia-based owner-operators 
to shareholders in the Netherlands; (b) the increasing valué of productive 
assets in Indonesia due to the accumialation of re-invested profits. The 
upshot is that Dutch holders of shares in prívate companies operating in 
Indonesia expected payment of dividends in the Netheríands. The next 
question is therefore whether the actual returns to Dutch investors were 
significantly higher than alternative investment oppoitunities. 
PROFITABILITY OF DUTCH CAPITAL 
It is often suggested that foreign investment in colonial Indonesia was 
extremely profitable and that the overseas remittance of such profits robbed 
the country of any developmental capital. Several authors have used the 
ratio of dividend payments and nominal share capital to suggest that Dutch 
investments in colonial Indonesia yielded super-normal returns. There 
indeed were companies which at times paid dividends of up to 200 percent, 
which may have given the impression of «exploitation». But often these 
were small companies operating very successfully in lucrative niche markets. 
They were able to reap windfaU profits or high entrepreneurial premiums 
for a few years, until market forces eroded extraordinary dividend rates. 
Moreover, easy references to such cases ignore the fact that many 
companies did not pay dividends or went bankrupt. 
Recent publications have used the registers of incorporated companies 
operating in colonial Indonesia to approximate average dividend rates, the 
results of which are summarised in Table 6 '*'. Although illuminating, it 
should be noted that the results are only based on the minoríty of companies 
which reported dividend payments. Moreover, Lindblad's data are 
'" These data refer to all incorporated enterprises in Indonesia, not only the 
foreign-owned ones. However, A Campo (1995, p. 65) and Lindblad (1991, pp. 206 and 
211) maintain that dividend rates did not differ between companies with seats registered 
in the Netherlands or in Indonesia. 
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TABLEÓ 
Average dividend rutes of incorporated companies in Indonesia, 1893-1938 
Average 
A. Weighted averages 
1889 
1900 
1913 
B. Ünweighted averages 
1918 
1923 
1928 
1935 
1938 
C. Ünweighted average 
1930 
10.5 
11.0 
17.5 
17.5 
10.8 
17.9 
9.3 
9.9 
9.0 
Sample 
(117 
(290 
(380 
(622 
(453 
(572 
(402 
(401 
(aU 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
Total 
ca.400) 
ca. 1,300) 
2,686) 
3,656) 
3,288) 
2,794) 
2,108) 
2,158) 
2,838) 
Source 
(a) 
(a) 
(a) 
(b) 
(b) 
(b) 
(b) 
(b) 
(c) 
SouRCES: (a) Á CAMPO, J. N . F . M. (1995): «Strength, Survival and Success: A Statístical 
Profíle of Corporate Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, I%%'i-I9\'i»,]ahrbuch ftir Wirtschafts-
geschichte, n.° 1, pp. 63 and 71; (b) LINDBLAD, J. Th. (1991): «Foreign Investment in Late-
Colonial and Post-Colonial Indonesia», Economic and Social Science in the Netherlands, 3, 
p. 205; (c) LiNDBi^, J. Th. (1993): «Ondememen in Nederlands-Indié, c.1900-1940», Bij-
dragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Ceschiedenis der Nederlanden, 108, p. 709. 
ünweighted averages, which yield upwardly biased results due to the fact 
diat very successful companies were often small. A Campo (1995) corrected 
his data on the assumption that non-reporting companies did not pay 
dividends, which brought the weighted dividend rate down to 4.5 percent 
in 1900 and 8.0 percent in 1913. Such a correction of Lindblad's (1991) 
data may genérate ünweighted averages of 3.7 percent in 1928 and 2.3 
percent in 1940. These corrected dividend rates do not indicate 
super-normal profíts. In fact, A Campo's corrected estimates of 5-8 percent 
are only 2-3 percentage points higher than the interest rate on public bonds. 
They do not differ much from the average estimates of 6-8 percent retums 
on equity of English companies operating in Great Britain and overseas 
during 1870-1913 ^^. 
Even if adequate average dividend rates could be calculated, we should 
keep the character of foreign investment in colonial Indonesia in mind. 
"' Edelstein (1982), p. 157; Davis and Huttenback (1987), p. 105. 
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Dividend rates do not give an adequate impression of the actual retums 
to foreign investment, because of the importance of accumulated 
re-invested profíts. These are not reflectad in the nominal valué of equity 
capital, although they should be included, because they flow from decisions 
by investors to give up present for future gain, which is the main 
characteristic of investment. For this purpose estimates of the replacement 
valué of foreign-owned productive assets in Indonesia are required. 
Table 7 contains estimates of the actual retums to capital on the basis 
of approximations of this measure of the stock of foreign investment. The 
resulting ratios do not differ substantially from the standard discount rate 
of the Java Bank or the interest rate on debentures of the colonial 
govemment. This evidence suggests that the quest for investment outlets 
through imperialism and the expansión of colonial rule was not very 
successful in raising the retums to Dutch capital invested overseas. The 
retums to the actual amounts of foreign capital invested in Indonesia were 
not extraordinarily high. 
The volume of foreign investment in Indonesia may have been high 
compared with neighbouring countries. But in per capita terms the countries 
of Southeast Asia were all minor recipients of foreign investment in an 
intemational context. For instance, the 1938 stock of foreign investment 
in Australia and New Zealand (8.5 million people) of US$4,450 million 
was higher than the total foreign investment of US$4,273 million in the 
whole of Southeast Asia (145 million people) '*^. 
Why did the colonies of Southeast Asia fail to attract more investment 
from overseas if profíts there were so extraordinarily high? Why did the 
first Dutch entrepreneurs have to finance their ventures with capital from 
family and friends? The main reason is that ventures in colonial Indonesia 
were relatively risky, despite the presence of a sympathetic colonial 
govemment. Most were agricultural enterprises, which are by nature more 
prone to pests, diseases and weather conditions. Commodity markets 
proved to be very volatile during the period under consideration, especially 
during 1914-39. Many companies in Indonesia were successful, but many 
others did not pay dividends or went bankmpt. Á Campo (1995, p.48) 
estimated that by 1930 only 41 percent of the companies established before 
1890, 23 percent of companies established in 1890-99 and 32 percent 
of companies established in 1900-09 were still in business, either due to 
amalgamations or to bankruptcies. 
*" Calcukted from Lewis (1948, pp. 298-43) and population estimates. 
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TABLE7 
Foreign capital stock and retums in Indonesia, 1900-1939 
1900 
1914 
1922 
1930 
1937 
1939 
Foreign investment 
Total 
direct 
invest-
ment 
(1) 
729 
1,681 
2,650 
3,984 
2,554 
3,500 
Total 
/ • / / • 
(2) 
773 
1,851 
3,500 
4,972 
4,097 
4,540 
Source 
Retums to foreign capital 
Paid 
divi-
dends 
m guilders) 
(3) 
(a) 
(a) 
(b) 
(a) 
(a) 
(c) 
(4) 
24 
105 
174 
112 
173 
Remitted 
dividends. 
profits, 
interest 
0) 
30 
109 
242 
136 
230 
129 
Ratio 
(4/1) 
3.2 
6.2 
6.6 
2.8 
6.8 
Ratio 
Dis-
rate 
Java 
Bank 
- (percentages) 
0/2) 
3.9 
5.9 
6.9 
2.7 
5.6 
2.8 
(6) 
4.5 
3.5 
3.5 
4.5 
3.0 
3.0 
Inte-
rate 
public 
honds 
(7) 
3.0» 
5.0' ' 
6.0 
4.5 
3.0 
• 1898. 
'' 1915. 
Notes: The estimates of capital stock are very rough, but not likely to be too high. 
If capital stock was higher, the retums to capital will be lower. 
SouRCES: (a) CALUS, H . G. (1942): Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia, New York: Institute 
of Pacific Relations, p. 36 (converted with current exchange rates); (b) DE COCK BUNING, 
W. (1923): «Kapitaalbelegging in Nederlandsch-Indié», Nieuw Indié, 2, n.° 8, p. 6; (c) BROEK, 
J. O. M. (1942): Economic Development of the Netherlands Indies, New York: Institute of 
Pacific Relations, pp. 31-33; dividends, KORTHALS ALTES, W. L. (1987): Changing Economy 
in Indonesia Vol. 7: Balance of Payments 1822-1939, Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 
pp. 139-41, and DERKSEN, J. B. D. (1946): «De Economische Beteekenis van Nederlandsch-
Indié voor Nederland met Cijfers en Statistieken Tocgelicht», in W. H. van Helsdingen 
and H. Hoogenberk (eds.): Hecht Verbonden in Uef en Leed, Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 373; 
remitted interests, profits and dividends, Korthals Altes (1987) pp. 89-95; interest rates 
on govemment bonds from CREUTZBERG, P . (1976): Changing Economy in Indonesia Vol 2: 
Public Finance 1816-1939, The Hague: Nijhoff, p. 79; discount rate Java Bank, VAN LAANEN, 
J. T. M. (1980): Changing Economy in Indonesia Vol. 6: Money and Banking 1816-1940, 
The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 88-91. 
This may be hindsight, but foreign enterprise in Indonesia endured 
significant losses after 1929. The total of retained profits less losses is 
estimated to have been a negative / I bülion during 1930-36, implying 
a loss of 20 percent of the total stock of foreign investment in colonial 
Indonesia '*''. Thereafter, the Indonesian economy suffered from the 
Japanese occupation (1942-45) and the war for independence (1945-49). 
*• Polak(1943),p. 66. 
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Both caused losses and considerable damage. In 1947 total damage to 
foreign enterprise was estimated on the basis of prewar replacement cost 
to be ¡2.2 billion ''^ . Dutch colonial rule apparently provided no safeguard 
against such losses. 
RETURNS TO THE DUTCH ECONOMY 
Apart from the rather rough approximations of Maddison, mentioned 
above, there are no consistent long-term estimates of Indonesia's 
contribution to Dutch national income. An attempt to provide such 
estimates of the contribution is vitiated by the fact that Dutch balance 
of payments data are incomplete before 1925 and do not distinguish income 
from Indonesia from other foreign income. 
De Jonge (1968, p.356) suggested a contribution of inflows from 
Indonesia on the capital account of 2-3 percent of national income during 
1870-90, and 5 percent in 1890 if income from shipping and exports to 
Indonesia is included. Estimates for later years by Derksen and Tinbergen 
(1945) of the contribution of Indonesia to Dutch national income have 
retained authority in Dutch historiography. Table 8 contains Derksen's 
slightly revised and extended later estimates. It indicates that the direct 
and indirect contributions amounted to an annual average of 18 percent 
during 1926-29, 8 percent during 1932-35 and 14 percent in 1938. 
This is not the place to comment extensively on the assumptions and 
estimating procedures which underpin the data in Table 8. One crucial 
assumption is the multiplier of 1.7 to approximate secondary income in 
the Netherlands (category B.4), which raises the total contribution to Dutch 
national income to impressive heights. Moreover, the data refer mainly 
to two exceptional periods in the economic relations between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia: the late-1920s and the late 1930s, when 
Indonesia experienced strong economic growth. Lastly, the data cannot 
be taken as the results of a counterfactual scenario simulating the Dutch 
economy without economic ties with Indonesia. It is likely that Dutch 
productive resources not employed in Indonesia would in that case have 
been employed elsewhere in the world. Part of the income they generated 
would have benefited the Dutch economy. 
Still, even if only the categories A. 1-4 are included, which relate to 
the employment of Dutch capital and labour in Indonesia, the contributions 
Fruin(1947), p. 47. 
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TABLE8 
The contribution of Indonesia to Dutch national income, 1926-1938 
Anual Averages 
1926-29 
257 
49 
12 
26 
85 
; 115 
60 
604 
1932-35 
76 
21 
5 
27 
35 
26 
25 
215 
1938 
155 
29 
5 
26 
63 
75 
^1 
388 
A. Dutch primary income from Indonesia: 
1. Dividends and interest 
2. Management costs, pensions, etc. 
3. Prívate remittances 
4. Pensions public setvants, furlough payments, etc. 
5. International shipping to and from Indonesia 
6. Dutch exports to Indonesia, 75% of total valué 
7. Trade in tropical products and other Ítems (rough 
approximation) 
Total 
B. Indonesia's contribution to Dutch national 
income: 
1. Total national income of the Netherlands 
2. Primary income dependent on Indonesia 
3. Retained profits of Dutch companies in Indo-
nesia (approximation) 
4. Secondary income dependent on Indonesia (70 
percent of item 2) 
5. Total income dependent on Indonesia (items 2, 
3,4) 
Ibidem, as percentage of Dutch national income 18% 
C. Other data: 
Income of Dutch nationals in Indonesia (approxima-
tion) 300 
Repayments of public debt from Indonesia 31 
6,000 
604 
50 
422 
1,076 
4,700 
215 
0 
150 
365 
8% 
5,150 
388 
40 
272 
700 
14% 
150 
42 
175 
36 
Note: Million guilders, unless indicated otherwise. 
SouRCE: DERKSEN, J. B. D. (1946): «De Economische Beteekenis van Nederlandsch-
Indié vcwr Nederland met Cijfers en Statistieken Toegelicht», in W. H. van Helsdingen 
and H. Hoogenberk (eds.): Hecht Verbonden in Lief en Leed, Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 374. 
to Dutch national income add up to 5.7, 2.7 and 4.2 percent respectively. 
If all primary income is counted, Indonesia contributed 10, 4.5 and 7.5 
percent respectively to Dutch national income, which broadly compared 
to the 5 percent in 1890 mentioned above. 
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It is not possible to put this estimate in an intemational perspective, 
as similar calculations do not exist for other colonising countries. But 
perhaps it is relevant to note that in such context the Netherlands has 
aiways had a small economy. In 1929 the size of its economy was only 
13 percent of that of Great Britain, and only 3 percent of that of the 
US. Due to the lack of natural resources relative to the size of its population, 
the Dutch economy was very open, with total foreign trade (imports and 
exports) being 75 percent of national income in the 1920s. This means 
that income from foreign trade and related economic operations overseas 
was bound to be relatively important to the Dutch economy. 
CONCLUSIÓN 
Neither the Hobson-Lenin thesis, ñor later neo-Marxist interpretations 
are very helpful in assessing the economic relations between the 
Netherlands and Indonesia during 1870-1940. Apart from the fact that 
the evidence for the key claims in these approaches is thin, their basic 
shortcoming is that they provide a static explanation of what was in fact 
a dynamically changing bilateral relationship. 
Based on Amsterdam's function as an entrepot market, trade relations 
were strong in the 19th century, even if the volumes of trade of both 
countries remained relatively small. With Indonesia's economic 
development, it became increasingly obvious that the merchandise of the 
two countries was not complementary. Moreover, the development of 
intemational transport and Communications eroded the function of the 
Amsterdam market. Bilateral trade relations declined, and the emphasis 
shifted to financial relations. The main reason for this shift was that 
Indonesia's capital requirements outstripped its savings. In a way, the 
existing ties between the two countries gave Indonesia privileged access 
to the well-endowed Dutch capital market. However, the initial investment 
flows from the Netherlands to Indonesia were small, partly because prívate 
investment in Indonesia was risky, partly because there were ampie 
altematives at home and elsewhere abroad for Dutch investors. It should 
therefore not be surprising that the retums to Dutch capital in Indonesia 
were on average not much higher than retums from other altematives. 
That does not mean that the Dutch economy did not gain from its 
economic relations with Indonesia. It is difficult to imagine that Dutch 
productive resources would have been committed there if that had not 
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been the case. In fact, the Dutch economy relied to an increasing ejctent 
on the revenues from colonial Indonesia during the 1920s. This was caused 
by the fact that Indonesia did not occupy a prime position in Dutch foreign 
investment around 1900. Successful Dutch entrepreneurs in Indonesia used 
their profits, rather than new FDI, to deprecíate assets, accumulate reserves 
and expand ventures. In this way the valué of Dutch assets in Indonesia 
increased without substantial FDI inflows over the years. The holders of 
shares in such ventures generally resided in the Netherlands, which 
generated a flow of capital income from Indonesia to the Netherlands. 
This flow peaked in the 1920s, when total direct income from Indonesia 
accounted for a considerable 10 percent of the small Dutch economy. 
This does not underline the Leninist adage that colonising capitalist 
countries are so dependent on overseas investments that their economic 
Systems cannot be sustained without them. Dutch economic recovery after 
World War 11 and after Indonesia's independence in 1949 proves that 
such notions are untenable. 
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In May 1940, among panic-stricken ministers and politicians, General 
de Gaulle was virtually alone to reflect and proclaim that France was not 
vanquished as long as it retained its colonial empire, which would serve 
as the springboard for France's future liberation and status as a world 
power. Not many of his contemporaries shared his conviction, and his 
loneliness testifíes to the detachment of public opinión and politicians 
vis-a-vis an empire which in extent ranked second only to the British. In 
spite of the headlines, newsreels, slogans, colonial exhibitions and 
propaganda, most Frenchmen would have probably agreed that, over the 
years, the mother country had spent more on its colonies than it had 
received. 
The imperial venture had started a little over a century before. In 1815 
France had been virtually stripped of all her overseas possessions by 
Britain '. Thanks only to Castlereagh's benevolence and Talleyrand's skills 
did the UK Government in the aftermath of the treaties of 1814-5 retum 
a few islands and patches of land to French sovereignty (Guadeloupe, 
Martinique, Bourbon (Reunión), French Guiana and Senegal). 
The conquest of Algeria, which started in 1830 constituted the 
resumption of France's imperial ambitions. Colonial expansionism gathered 
momentum under Napoleón DI when French expeditions set foot in 
Indochina, África and —though the attempt failed— in Latin America. 
By 1870 the French clearly lagged behind the British. But the loss of 
Alsace-Lorraine gave a new Ímpetus to colonial expansionism as well as 
employment to an army buoyed by the newly-adopted conscription. From 
1880 to 1914, French overseas possessions were multiplied by a factor 
' The westem part of the Island of Santo Domingo had become independent under 
the ñame of the Haitian Republic in 1804 after a successfiíl slaves' revok. 
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of twelve in área (from one to 12 million square kilometers), their 
population reached 50m-odd. Like its British counterpart, the French 
empire included territories with varying legal status and links to the 
mothercountry. There were outright colonies subjected to semi-military rule; 
protectorates in Tunisia, Morocco, Laos and Cambodia, and 
«départements», resembling the standing enjoyed by British dominions. 
Aíter World War One, the Empire was further Consolidated by the 
mandates bestowed by the League of Nations on former Germán and 
Turkish dependencies (see table Al in the appendix). 
The building of this poHtical edifice must have reflected the strength 
of imperialist ideology in Franca during the late 19th century. But by most 
accounts, neither the govemment ñor public opinión were very enthusiastic 
about the adventure. «From 1880 to 1930 a minority of die-hard colonialists 
acquired and occupied a larga colonial empire on behalf of a non-committad 
majority of the French paople» (Marseille, 1984b, p. 367). The tide tumed, 
apparantly, with the onset of the depression of tha 1930s and was carried 
forward by mounting isolation in Europe. Paradoxically the French started 
to behold their colonial empire with growing interest and affection at a 
tima when independence movements were alraady taking hold in the 
subjected lands. The main questions to answar are: could the French have 
made better use of the possession of a large ovarseas empira before tha 
1930s and did they, conversaly, commit themselvas too far aftarwards, when 
it was becoming claar than the ties betwaan ex graat powars and their 
colonies were likely to be soon severed? 
1. THE COST OF CONQUEST AND SUBSEQUENT 
COLONISATION 
Various attempts have been made at quantifying the cost of 
empira-building for the mothar country. Despite tha fact that tracing 
expendituras is made diffícult by the changas to govammental accounting 
proceduras, we have a fairly good idea of how much the French govemment 
spent on military conquest. For civilian expenditure, by contrast, the picture 
is blurred by the dispersión of accounts among different ministries 
(according to the so-called «small parcel technique» ^). All assessments 
so far have been mada on the basis of treasury issues and the question 
' A budgetary device used by cabinet officials to ward off debate among and, if possible, 
notice by legislators. 
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remains open as to how much the colonizers managed to extract from 
subjected indigenous populatíons to pay for their civilising mission. A 
preliminary distinction must be made between Algeria which was the fírst 
overseas territory secured by France after 1815 and the other territories, 
in África and Asia which were brought under French rule much later. A-'-t^ 
í 
1.1. Algeria 
The conquest of Algeria took more than 60 years to complete, but 
the major thrust occurred under the July monarchy (1830-48) and the 
beginning of the Second Empire (1851-70). For this period, Algeria 
represented always over 50% of total colonial expenditures by the French 
govemment, the bulk being assigned to military upkeep and railway 
construction and operation. Net transfers were of the order of F 60-80 
million annually, as is seen in figure 1. The official aim of placing the 
three Algerian départements (districts) on the same footing as France's other 
87 in 1880 implied that Algerian public finances were integrated into the 
central government's budget as of 1901. 
Military expenditure represented essentially outlays for final 
consumption in the form of pay and services for the rank and file of the 
army and navy units stationed in Algeria as well as the purchase of goods 
necessary for their upkeep and maintenance. Civilian expenditure, by 
contrast, included some degree of investment. To be sure the aggregated 
figures consist of labour costs as well as indirect «capital formation». Labour 
costs and intermedíate consumption tended to become more important 
as time went by, and (as can be seen in table 1), the major investment 
effort in terms of outlays was made during the Second Empire and at 
the beginning of the Third Republic. Investments had essentially to be 
made in public works and infrastructure: roads, digging of wells, building 
of dispensarles, etc. But it also included massive subsidies to rail or sea 
transport companies. After the construction by the army of the first strategic 
railways, and several failed attempts by concems set up locally, the 
govemment entrusted the PLM, France's then major rail carrier, with the 
building of trunk lines in Algeria. But the PLM's subsidiarles had to be 
bribed in the same way as the parent company had been on the mainland. 
Apart from the initial grant (so-called «dépemes de premier établissement,» 
typically financed by the govemment), the treasury had to guarantee the 
retums on railway bonds (at a mínimum of 5% per annum). According 
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FIGURE 1 
French government transfers to Algeria, 1850-1900 
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to Bobrie (1976), the cumulated subsidies amounted to F131m to the 
PLM and F360m for other railway companies for the period 1865-1900. 
Who in the end benefited from these investments? There is strong 
suspicion that public involvement served first the interests of those with 
a stake in the coiony's economy. In the case of Algeria, numbers involved 
are rather iarge because of all French territories, it is the only one to have 
attracted «massive» immigration (a total of 0.6m persons between 1830 
and 1914). And in this respect, the improvement of transport facilities 
certainly allowed small plantation owners to reduce the cost of exporting 
their produce and guaranteed the geographical mobility of residents inside 
TABLEl 
Distribution of public expenditure in Algeria by decade, 1850-1900 
(in Fm) 
1850-60 
1860-70 
1870-80 
1880-90 
1890-1900 
Total 
Civtlian 
99.5 
162.2 
162.1 
196.7 
160.5 
781.0 
In% 
47.0 
57.5 
50.8 
43.6 
31.7 
44.1 
Mílitary 
112.2 
119.9 
157.0 
254.5 
345.8 
989.3 
Total 
211.7 
282.1 
319.1 
451.1 
506.3 
1770.3 
SOURCE: Bobrie, 1976, p. 1231. 
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the colony. However, some groups seem to have profíted more than others 
from the government's investment in infrastructure in Algeria. Research 
inte the comparative returns on mining and railway companies are in 
process. 
1.2. Other dependencies 
As in the case of Algeria, data on colonial expenditure tend to be 
scattered in budgetary documents. While the bulk of expenditure for the 
conquest and subsequent colonisation of overseas possessions was incurred 
by the Colonial ministry, the War and Navy ministries in fact carried a 
large share of the burden. Of the total outlays on the formation of the 
French colonial empire between 1850 and 1914, around 67.7% was 
allocated to military operations. Military campaigns figure prominently 
because they were financed by special budgets (under the heading of 
«extraordinary expenditure») that had to be approved by Parliament. Each 
of France's acquisitions between 1850 and 1914 signáis a rise in the military 
expenditure by the French government (see Table 1 in the appendix for 
the chronology of French conquests). The conquest of Cochinchina 
(Southern Vietnam) in 1853 cost Fl35m, Tonkin (Northern Vietnam) 
F346m, Tunesia in 1881, Fl33m. In addition to Ministry of War's 
disbursements, the Navy also spent around 5% of its operational budget 
TABLE2 
Civilian government expenditure in the colonial Empire, 1830-1913 
1850-9 
1860-9 
1870-9 
1880-9 
1890-9 
1900-13 
Total 
(1) 
164.8 
161.3 
255.0 
351.2 
561.7 
154.8 
1648.8 
(2) 
15.3 
70.5 
94.7 
127.6 
165.5 
245.8 
674.4 
0) 
95.7 
251.6 
320.6 
545.9 
643.4 
266.9 
2424.1 
(4) 
80.4 
159.5 
166.4 
194.7 
164.3 
15.7* 
781.0 
O) 
8.0 
18.0 
22.5 
23.6 
25.1 
14.7 
19.1 
* From 1901 the three departments of Algeria acquired their own budget. 
Legend: (1) personnel (incl. wages and debt payments); (2) subsidies and transfers; 
(3) public investments; (4) of which made in Algeria; (5) investment as a % of total expen-
diture. 
SouRCE: Bobrie, 1976, p. 1239. 
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FIGURE 2 
(in Fm) 
450 
Military and total colonial expenditure of the French govemment, 
1850-1913 
Source: Bobrie, 1976, p. 1233 
on military expeditions. But this is surely an undervaluation since it doesn't 
include the bilis for pay. 
As far as civilian expenditure is concerned, from the beginning the 
French govemment pursued a policy geared to making its newly-acquired 
colonies financially self-supporting. Despite this doctrine and the creation 
of the «federal budgets» (for Indochina in 1899, Western África in 1905 
and Equatorial África in 1910), the colonies continued to depend, to some 
extent, on injections from central govemment. 
As far as overhead expenditure is concerned, a small yet growing 
number of civil servants were after the tum-of-the-century reform, paid 
from local taxes. For infrastmcture, as in the case of Algeria, the central 
govemment had to supply the initial Ímpetus in transport, Communications, 
public health and education. In addition, there were an array of subsidies 
to transplanted businesses from the home country. 
Investment remained generally low in the rest of the overseas empire. 
French authorities encouraged the local govemment to rely on public loans, 
some of them subsidised. According to Bobrie (1976), between 1880 and 
1913, the Ministry of the Colonies disbursed some Fl56m in various forms 
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oí assistance, the Ministry of Public Works, F288m. As can be easily 
assessed, these outlays were dwarfed by the oudays on Algeria. 
On the whole, France secured her colonial empire on the cheap. Despite 
a visible upturn after 1880 (corresponding to the conquest of Tunisia), 
the French govemment always allocated less than 7% of its budget to 
colonial expenditure between 1850 and 1914 (a 6% average over the 63 
year period). Even military expenditure in the empire never exceeded one 
third of France's budget for the army and navy. 
Such were the major costs incurred by the French govemment during 
the «formation period» of the colonial empire. Law and order expenditure, 
however, escalated after World War Two, especially after 1949. Not 
surprisingly the effort was greater in those parts where the govemment 
—as well as prívate enterprises— had invested the most: Indochina and 
Algeria. 
2. THE EMPIRE AS ESSENTIAL TRADING PARTNER 
Among the benefits, the French economy is presumed to have drawn 
from the possession of a large overseas empire, the question of trade 
relations figures prominendy. How far did the Empire contribute as a 
supplier of materials and commodities to the home country, and conversely 
as a purchaser of French-made goods? Did the trade balance favour home 
industries or, altematively did it weaken French competitiveness? In other 
words did the «colonial system» (elsewhere known as «imperial 
preference») work to the benefít of its own promoter? 
2.1. The «colonial system» as a virtual reality ? 
There is disagreement as to whether colonial trade brought a net 
contribution to French economic development. The contention that the 
colonial markets were not only «unnecessary but also embarrassing» has 
been made repeatedly. Behind this statement lies the classical conviction 
that it pays for a relatively industrialised country to trade with rich partners 
rather than with poor colonies. Any counterfactual model endeavouring 
to assess the impact of the cióse commercial association between France 
and her empire must take a long-term view. The conquest of a large 
ensemble of overseas possessions created a situation that in tum modiíied 
the initial set-up of economic incentives for traders and producers alike. 
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For a long-time popular wisdom held that the empire played a negligible 
part in France's extemal trade. Until 1913 it represented only a fraction 
of its volume, hovering around the 10% before 1913, reaching 14% in 
1928. Only the experience of the worldwide depression in the thirties and 
then wartime disorganisation promoted the empire to France's first supplier 
and purchaser (albeit amidst considerable impediments). The country's 
commercial partnership with its empire was therefore and at least in part, 
an artificial one. That is why the Jeanneney report of 1963 among others 
denounced the «illusions of the franc-zone». 
Against this pessimistic view, another interpretation of commercial 
trends stresses the strategic advantages that France eventually obtained from 
imperial trade. As early as 1896, the empire had become as essential a 
trading partner as Germany and the UK. From 1924 onwards it stood 
as France's second trade partner in the world and rose to first place after 
1948. Moreover this role is fully revealed if one takes into account ratios 
of trade volume per capita when weighing the empire's importance as 
against the rest of the world: Its inhabitants purchased more from France 
and likewise supplied more than any other nation. Furthermore it exhibited 
a stronger (as well as more even) growth over the long-run than other 
markets: Between 1880 and 1958 exports to the empire grew at an average 
3.8% per annum, while the secular trend of exports to the rest of the 
world increased at a rate of 1%. Imperial trade carne to play a «balancing 
role», «slowing down contractions» but at the same time moderating 
expansionary booms in French overseas trade. 
This is especially perceptible during the depression of the 1930s 
(figure 3). While French trade with the rest of the world virtually collapsed 
(by 65.8%), the overall contraction in trade with the Empire was negligible 
(-1.7%). After World War Two, and especially after the first GATT 
agreement (1949), the intensification of trade flows across countries and 
continents of the industrialised world, progressively shrunk the relative size 
of imperial markets. To be sure these still played an important role in 
supplying key necessities (especially foodstuffs in the immediate war 
aftermath) to French consumers and provided outlets for the surviving 
French firms (e.g. in 1944 exports to the empire totalled F2.4bn against 
F2.2bn to the rest of the world). In the short run, in many cases, imperial 
markets sustained vital economic activities both on the input and output 
sides. In the long-run, however, it created or reinforced distortions in the 
French structure of production. 
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FIGURE 3 
Trends in French Trade during the 1930s depression, 1927-1938 
(in 1914 Fbn) 
French imports from Empire 
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
2.2. A trade cycle stabiliser? 
Did the Empire always absorb a sizeable share of French exports and 
did French businesses weave privileged ties with customers in the empire? 
Did these relations influence the structure of the French «commodity mix» 
over time? 
At first sight French colonies provided over the long-run a whole range 
of stable (and solvent) markets which «cushioned» the ups and downs 
of the commodity flows between countries, especially during the interwar 
period as the crisis brought about mounting protectionism. The probiem 
is that of path dependence: once purveyors of trade had retreated onto 
the «safe» imperial markets, they found it more difficult, after the 
international liberalisation of world trade, to look for other, but more 
competitive markets, and thereby reduced their incentive to innóvate. 
According to Marseille (1984) the empire was promoted to first among 
France's customers just before the 1929 financia! crisis. Until the late 1920s 
only a handful of industries relied on imperial markets. The discontinuity 
can be dated to the «formation period» of the empire; between 1880 and 
1898. While rest-of-the-world exports were stable in valué (in an overall 
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deflationary context), exports to the colonies had doubled in valué. Many 
businessmen and politicians perceived that the country's colonies offered 
the outlets that Europe's «saturated markets» could not longer offer. As 
Premier Jules Ferry then put it: «[Our] colonial policy is the daughter 
of [our] industrial policy.» Indeed French exports to the empire were by 
then heavily skewed towards the staples of the first industrial revolution: 
cotton cloth, semifínished iron bars and píate, steam engines, tabes and 
wire goods as well as beer and candles. Before 1914, «France exported 
more sesame oil than rails, more lard barréis than engines, double the 
amount of leather gloves compared to steel and as much candle wax as 
iron and steel combined» (Marseille, 1984b, p. 37). From the beginning 
therefore French exports to the Empire were dangerously «locked into» 
manufactured staples. The cotton industry, the metal trades, spirit-making 
and sugar refining which represented 42.6% of manufacturing value-added 
sold 40% of their output to the empire. 
Ironically other countries «benefited» as much if not more from French 
colonisation with regard to trade. In the decade before 1910, and despite 
tariff barriers imposed since 1892, 53% of French colonial trade was with 
the rest of the world. Trade flows between the colonies and France's rivals 
were longer than those with the home country (Brunschwig, 1960, p. 99). 
Besides, until the uptum of 1906, the colonies ran substantial déficits with 
the rest of the world (Fl5m between 1894 and 1906). The resumption 
of colonial exports after 1906 balanced the accounts and released some 
currency eamings. Those were, however, short-lived. The disruption of 
world trade following the outbreak of World War One eroded those meagre 
gains. 
As result of the reallocation of trade flows in the 1930s, home suppliers 
of staples maintained their dominant position while other associated trades 
joined the club. The «colonial party» thus gathered the representatives 
of various sectors which soon coalesced into a powerful interest group 
with influential politicians on their payrolls (Andrew & Kanya-Forstner, 
1974). By 1958, while exports to the rest of the world fínally regained 
their pre-depression (1927) peak, the export volume index to the French 
Union (as the empire was now known) had been multiplied by a factor 
of three. By that date, however, it was becoming clear that the colonies 
served as «dumping ground» for traditional home industries' surpluses: 
such an outlet was not only unnecessary, it was illusory in so far as it 
operated to discourage the movement of French firms into more 
competitive and irmovative fíelds, especially capital goods. 
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FIGURE 4 
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Shares of Manufactured Exports to the French Colonies, 1 9 1 3 - 5 8 
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2.3. A safe reservation ? 
Imperial propagandists and critics of imperialism claimed likewise that 
the French exploited (or should have been in a position to exploit) their 
empire's natural resources and secure their inputs at costs lower than world 
market pnces. Was this the case? 
As eariy as 1914, French colonies had become essential suppliers of 
raw materials for domestic key industries. Apart from tropical produce, 
several sectors carne to depend on colonial supplies including: sugar 
refining, chemicals and non-ferrous metallurgy. In addition, import trade 
between France and its colonies exhibits the same secular growth trends 
as for exports, especially after 1930. While imports from the rest of the 
world recovered their 1930 level only in 1958, those coming from the 
Empire increased by 75% during the same interval. 
At the beginning of the period the flow of goods from the empire 
took a long time to gather speed. The Great Depression at the end of 
the 19th Century did not stimulate any growth in imports that occurred 
later in the immediate prewar boom (1906-13). In the 1920s furthermore, 
imports increased drastically. After 1922 the Empire occupied the second 
place among France's suppliers, just behind the USA, and in 1928 took 
first place. The growth of imperial imports both in the 1930s ( + 5.5% 
per annum) and in the first postwar 1945-54 ( + 6.5% as against 4.8% 
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with the rest of the world) remained strong. These trends must be evidence 
surely that the empire supplied France with inputs without which the 
economic performance of the mother country could have been restrained? 
In particular abundant supplies from the empire enabled the domestic 
economy to save on hard currency earnings (or gold reserves) in order 
to pay for necessary imports. During the postwar decade when France 
was confronted with the «dollar gap», imports from the Empire were doubly 
valuable as they supplied franc-denominated primary products for French 
industry .^ By drawing most of her imports from the zone franc, France 
was able to relieve demands on her hard-currency earnings. 
The question of prices is an intricate one as this potential gain in 
monetary terms must be weighed against losses incurred because of price 
differentials. Whüe imperial imports relieved immediate pressures on 
France's balance of payments' position, they also reduced the purchasing 
power of domestic consumers and pushed up the price of French exports, 
thereby adding future pressures on the balance of payments. A random 
review of prices in October, 1956, shows that «tropical products from 
French West África cost 21 to 50 percent more than comparable imports 
from the British West Indies or the Belgian Congo» (Poquin, 1957, p. 
97). Offícial estimates put the consumers' annual bilí for the colonial system 
in the mid-50s at about F60bn. This raises the question as to whether 
and to what extent imperial preference on imports determined the 
development of industries which could make use of these imports, to the 
detriment of others. These imports directly (through customs duty 
exemptions and price support measures to export industries) and indirectly 
(through subsidies to shipping companies) partly financed by the 
govemment, created a «vicious circle» of «artificial» (which were really 
loss-making) activities prospering at the expense of the rest of the economy. 
2.4. Balance oftrade and balance of payments 
Further hints to the existence of growing and inefficient biases in favour 
of colonial trade emerge from trade and payment balance accounts. As 
long as imports and exports remained in balance until the depression of 
the 193 Os, such effects must have been limited. Thereafter the French 
trade balance with the empire was, except for the depression years 1932-9, 
' By that time colonial currencies were múltiples of the franc and freely convertible 
toit. 
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almost continuously in surplus (see figures 3 and 5). This had been true 
even before World War One. The size of this surplus varied but it went 
up in the postwar period. In 1952 when the empire absorbed 40% of 
France's exports, the cover was 161%. With the rest of the world France 
ran a persistent trade déficit after the war, largely because of reconstrution 
and domestic inflation, which undermined the competitiveness of French 
exports (Carré etal, 1975, p. 370-9). 
TABLE3 
The French trade balance with the Franc zone and the Rest 
ofthe World in 1938 and 1956 (in 1938 Fbn) 
1938 
Foodstuffs 
Fuel 
Raw materials and 
Consumar goods 
Capital goods 
Total 
Balance 
1956 
Foodstuffs 
Fuel 
Raw materials and 
Consumer goods 
Capital goods 
Total 
Balance 
semi-finished 
semi-finished 
Imports 
RoW 
3.6 
8.7 
167 
2.4 
2.2 
33.6 
- 1 1 . 4 
RoW 
7.5 
13.7 
28.7 
3.5 
7.8 
61.2 
- 1 6 . 7 
F-zone 
10.0 
2.2 
2.2 
0.2 
0.05 
12.5 
- 4 . 1 
F-zone 
13.6 
0.1 
4.8 
0.1 
0.05 
18.7 
+ 2.3 
Exports 
RoW 
2.8 
0.4 
12.2 
5.0 
1.8 
22.2 
RoW 
5.4 
2.9 
22.7 
7.2 
6.1 
44.5 
F-zone 
1.6 
0.1 
2.0 
3.7 
1.0 
8.4 
F-zone 
3.8 
1.2 
4.3 
8.3 
3.5 
21.1 
SoURCE: INSEE, Annuaire Statistique 1966, p. 3Í1. 
In this context, colonial markets supplied a «liferaft» for selected French 
industries, specifically traditional small-scale, high-cost firms. It allowed 
them «an opportunity to remain backward» (Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 381). 
Wary of world markets, they were typically reluctant to cut costs and engage 
in International competition. The persistence of empire «crowded out» 
more productive forms of resource allocation; within the empire it pushed 
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FIGURE 5 
Valué of French imports from and exports to the Franc Zone, 1937-58 
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Source: INSEE, 1996, p. 349; INSEE, 1988, p. 286. 
up prices and production costs. This in tum rendered colonial exports 
less competitive with the rest of the world and, via the circular nature 
of the 'colonial system,' pushed French domestic inputs (and therefore 
production costs) further up. The franc zone constituted a «hothouse 
economy», thriving on imperial preference and exchange controls that could 
only crumble if and when these and govemment subsidies were to be 
removed. 
After World War Two, the country accumulated a surplus on colonial 
trade for eight of the ten years from 1945 to 1955 ''. In face of the mounting 
trade surplus with the franc zone (several hundreds billions francs between 
1945-55), several astute observers started to envision the possibility that 
the colonial system might be back-firing and to ask «how are the colonies 
paying for this accumulating déficit?» In fact, it was becoming clear that 
•* Moreover, the supply of shipping and connected services was biased in favour of 
French fínns and strengthened the balance of invisibles on current accounts. «Control of 
colonial markets thus delivered a payoff not restricted to merchandise exports alone» 
(Fitzgerald, 1988, p. 377). 
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France's trade surplus with the empire was balanced by an ever-increasing 
flow of French public funds inte the colonies. 
3. CAPITAL DIVERSIÓN? INVESTMENTIN THE COLONIAL 
EMPIRE 
In 1880 cumulated French foreign investment was of the order of 
Fl4bn; by 1913 it had increased by 175%, totalling F38.5bn^ At this 
date two thirds of traceable investment flows were going to Russia, The 
Near East and South America which accounted for only 14% of French 
exports, while the French empire came behind such heavy weights, with 
10% of the cumulated stock of capital invested overseas. Did the empire 
therefore constitute, like the imperialism literature supposed, a privileged 
preserve for French financial interests? And if so, is the reason behind 
these flows that the rate of retum on investment in the colonies was 
particularly high? Finally, did the home government play a significant part 
in directing or supplementing prívate funds with public participations? 
FIGURE 6 
Main RecipJents of cumulated French Foreign Investment, 1913 
5 % Ottoman 
„ , „ . Empire 6 % Spain I 
6 % Austria V ^ - — - ^ 35 % Ofhers 
Hungary^ 
10% 
Empire 
15% 
Latin America 
23 % Russia 
' Still far ijehind the capital stock invested in the British Empire of FlOObn (or £4bn). 
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3.1. A privileged preserve for French investors ? 
There is a measure of uncertainty when we attempt to assess investment 
flows between one country and another. Of the many pitfalls, that of the 
nationality of the original investor is the most acute. A London financier 
may very well place his funds on the París stock exchange. With these 
restrictions in mind, one must attempt to make first some crude 
measurements of capital flows between France and her colonies. 
Before 1914, French investment must have been of the order of F4bn, 
divided between the holdings of 200 «colonial companies» (for 2bn), public 
funds (1.2bn) and loans issued by local authorities in North Afríca (0.8bn). 
Marseille contends the total must have been higher because the present 
figures are heavily skewed in favour of Algería (which would have accounted 
for three quarters of the total). Thus this author proposes to reevaluate 
the pre-1939 estimates on the basis of a Vichy government survey of 1943 ^  
(table 5). 
TABLE5 
French cumulated investments in the French empire, 1914-58 
(in 1914 F billion) 
Ante 1914 
1915-29 
1930-39 
1940-58 
TOTAL 
Prívate issue 
1.97 
1.62 
0.80 
1.99 
6.38 
Government loans 
2.10 
0.67 
3.39 
— 
— 
Public investment 
2.42 
0.23 
0.54 
10.00 
19.36 
Total 
6.49 
2.53 
4.73 
11.99 
25.74 
Despite the underlying switch from long-term to short-term securities, 
the post World War One period, represents the «golden age» of colonial 
investment. In the 1920s colonial companies issued 70% of the total equity 
put on the French market (against 25% in 1913). Between 1914 and 1929, 
the stock had increased by 80%, representing 40% of French foreign 
investment. But this «success» was in part illusory. Pre-1914 French 
holdings abroad had been reduced by about 50% as a result of the war 
and the default of Soviet Russia, while cumulated productive investment 
from prívate sources remained desperately low (3.6bn in 1929, out of a 
' Postwar estímales are drawn from League of Naüons intematíonal accounts. 
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total outflow of 9bn). Investment in the empire was also clearly limited 
to a small number of subscribers who, moreover, faced a narrower range 
of opportunities. With the onset of the financial world crisis in 1929, prívate 
investment crumbled to a dismal F80m per annum in the 1930s. In this 
decade, public investment surged partly to supplement failing prívate capital 
flows and in part to support economic activity in the colonies. As a result, 
in 1939, out of the cumulated 15bn invested in the empire, lObn had 
been drawn from the public purse. Prívate investment already feeble before 
the war, completely defected after 1945. As a consequence, from 1940 
to 1958, public investment represented over 70% of capital flows. Although 
this was enormous by imperíal and historícal standards, it was equivalent 
to the effort accomplished in the pre-1914 era and accounted in fact just 
about 4 % of total govemment expenditure. It seems as if the French 
govemment realised belatedly that the exploitation of the empire could 
only progress if it took steps to ensure its profitability. 
TABLEÓ 
Geographkal distribution of public loans in the French empire, 1914-39 
(in current Fm) 
Algeria-Tunisia-Morocco 
Western África (AOF) 
Equatorial África (AEF) 
Togo, Cameroon 
Madagascar, New Caledonia 
Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Reunión 
Indochina 
Total 
1914-30 
2,490 
100 
390 
0 
0 
20 
60 
3,045 
1930-39 
5,630 
3,120 
13,760 
10 
850 
431 
1,770 
13,452 
SouRCE: Bloch-Lainé, pp. 108-9. 
3.2. The profitability of colonial investments 
Data on actual returns on colonial investments, are patchy. More 
research needs to be done on comparíng rates of retum and dividends 
between domestic and colonial firms .^ 
see Davis and Huttenback (1988). 
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At first sight and embracing the whole period under consideration, 
the Empire did constitute a privileged preserve for direct investment, 
comparable to pre-1914 Russia. Like Russia it offered apparent (!) lower 
risk and more secure returns (in the form of bonds essentially) as 
exemplifíed by the longevity of colonial fínancial companies: half of those 
extant in 1958 had been created befóte 1914. Cursory evidence suggests 
that profítability was in the long as in the short run, far superior compared 
to domestic investments. Profit increases of 30% were not rare. The 
standing of the colonial stocks on the stock exchange also suggest that 
they offered attractive opportunities. This good standing might be explained 
by the structure of colonial investment. One third was made up by mining 
companies, another by commercial and transport ventures. As Marseille 
emphasises, these thrived on «plunder», on the exploitation of the colonies' 
natural resources. Furthermore if direct investment kept flowing into the 
colonies after 1920, (representing 68% of French foreign investment in 
1929), this is surely the sign of competitive returns. While the French 
securities general index rose by 444% between 1913 and 1929, that of 
the valué of equity of colonial companies increased by 685%. 
Yet these figures might be misleading. In so far as they represent the 
performance of a limited number of large companies, the apparent financial 
vitality of colonial ventures might not reflect their real viability, least of 
all their effects on long-run economic development in the colonies, but 
simply result from a sequence of artificial, speculative bubbles. Apart from 
those inserted in the «colonial system», the life expectancy of colonial 
ventures was particularly short and over one third of the interwar creations 
did not mature. The bulk of fixed assets was concentrated in mining and 
plantation companies (53%) and a further fraction was held by sea shipping. 
The impression of mere colonial plundering is reinforced by the fact that 
the equity quoted on the stock exchange differed from productiva assets 
actually created in the colonies. From 1929 onwards the growth of the 
latter markedly slowed down, before reaching virtual stability in the 1950s 
(1914 F5.5bn in 1929, 6.2 in 1938, 6.9 in 1958). Obviously as investors 
became more and more reluctant to buy colonial securities, likewise 
entrepreneurs retreated from prospective projects in the Empire. The 
average profit levéis declined as did annual dividends at the same time 
as concentration seemed unavailable. In 1914 46 companies reaped a total 
F l l 7m in profits; the figure (expressed in constant money) was 105m for 
132 companies in 1958. The twenty largest companies eamed 61% of total 
profits in 1929 and 68% in 1958. Profitable business in the Empire 
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benefíted in fact only a selective sample of firms and clustered in only 
a few áreas of business activity: «[geographically it] was restricted to 
Indochina and Algeria» (Marseille, 1984, p. 132). Henee the vigour with 
which French govemments attempted to preserve these two pillars of the 
«French Union». * 
3.3. Prívate losses, Public relie/ 
Between 1930 and 1958 public authorities dominated investment flows. 
Even before this period, governments had been already involved in funding 
colonisation (a cumulated sum of 1914F 1328m had been allocated to 
civilian capital formation between 1880 and 1930). After 1945, public 
investment represented 80% of all capital flows to the empire which dwarfed 
the resources local businesses could hope to find in domestic financial 
markets. Obviously public authorities had to shore up prívate investment 
to maintain a continuous flow of resources to the colonies. Furthermore, 
the Caisse des Dépóts et Consignations (a financial arm of the French 
govemment) offered interest payment relief to prívate businesses to help 
them with promising colonial projects. The govemment also encouraged 
local authoríties to finance development programmes through borrowing. 
As a consequence, public investment carne increasingly to compénsate for 
prívate disinvestment. From 1952 current accounts between France and 
its empire were balanced only through govemment transfers. 
Some investment was to prospect for oil and other underground 
resources (metallic ores). But most just served to balance the yawning gap 
between the exports supplied and the imports purchased by the mother 
country. Another reason why public transfers to the Union swelled in this 
decade, is that part of national social programmes were generously extended 
to some French territoríes, especially Algería, Guadeloupe, Martinique and 
Reunión (which had been granted département status in 1946). As of 1941 
non agricultural labourers already were entitled to family allowances and 
in the 1950s varíous benefits were added for school enrollment in 1950 
and for housing in 1954. 
Flows of this magnitude imposed significant domestic costs on 
metropolitan France. It constrained domestic capital formation. 17% of 
' The one-million pied-noir population of Algeria also acted as a powerful element to 
keep Algeria a French territory (The three départements were integrated to the homeland 
and not part of the «French Union»). 
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TABLE7 
Public and prívate transfersfrom France 
to the French Union, 19^2-38 
(im 1952 ct Fbn) 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Prívate 
-257 .8 
-238 .6 
-245 .9 
-313 .5 
-557 .7 
-551 .2 
-745 .3 
Public 
287.5 
251.6 
269.5 
372.2 
575.6 
665.0 
800.0 
Balance 
+ 29.7 
+ 13.0 
+ 23.6 
+ 58.8 
+ 17.9 
+ 113.8 
+ 54.7 
SOURCE; Marseille, 1984, p. 134, and INSEE, 1988, p. 286. 
total French public investment (or F737bn) originally earmarked in the 
Monnet (first) plan for reconstruction were directed into colonial 
development projects (Bloch-Lainé & Bouvier, 1986, p. 158). The outflow 
of domestic capital offset the colonies' payments déficit with France and 
made possible the continuous imbalance in colonial trade. But in addition, 
French dependencies, unlike their British counterparts, managed to import 
more from and export less to the Rest of the World. Instead of thriving 
on profitable «triangular trade» derived from colonial net exports to the 
rest of the world, the «colonial system» had led to exactly the reverse. 
Even when France managed to run a surplus on its current accounts, the 
Empire always ran a déficit (figure 7). In the 1950s, the Empire's negative 
contribution to France's total balance of payment déficit never fell under 
8% and was usually very much higher. This worsened the dollar shortage 
that the country had to face by about a fifth (Moussa, 1957, p. 248). 
In short, when commercial accounts are balanced not just at the imperial 
levéis but also with the rest of the world, the utility of colonial markets 
to domestic exporters seems to have been more than offset by the empire's 
negative influence on France's overall payments position: over time the 
imperial connection had become a drain, not an asset. 
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FIGURE 7 
Foreign Balance on Current Account in Franc Zone, 1945-58 
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CONCLUSIÓN 
From patchy information collected here, emerges a contrasted balance 
sheet of French imperialism. The colonial systetn served the interests of 
a small group of French economic concerns, but their gains imposed 
substantial long-term costs on French economic development, costs that 
became heavier and more apparent as time went by. 
From the very beginning, France could not reserve for herself the 
exploitation and development of her colonial acquisitions. Until the 1930s, 
domestic protectionism (colonial imports were treated on a par with foreign 
imports) rendered the colonial system ineffective, by hindering the 
development of the empire, which could only proceed with a certain 
measure of free trade. French industrial firms were never in a position 
to absorb all colonial exports or monopolise the supply of colonial imports. 
When France decided to tum more decisevely towards its colonial 
dependencies, it was a more or less forced move made necessary by the 
contraction of world trade in the 1930s and the lack of interest from private 
investors. It became apparent that this enterprise did not promote a fruitful 
relationship with the empire and the government had therefore to step 
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in and increase public transfers. In the end, the outcome was logical: 
speculation forms the sinews of colonisation. Profitable retums were 
expected but always in the dístant future; meanwhile, further investments 
had to be made, draining further resources from the mother country to 
its dependencies. In the 1950s, many government officials as well as 
politicians had come to realise that the «Empire cost dear and eamed 
little for France». Imperialism, tuming against its erstwhile promoters, was 
clearly now turning against the interests of domestic economic development. 
It had clearly not been the best option, it had only been for a time, the 
second best, fullfilling what economists cali «satisficing» objectives. 
Second-best strategies (apart from the fact that they benefited and were 
therefore subsequently defended by committed interest groups) are thus 
perceived as the only «realistic» options because they are presented in 
a particular set-up of political-economic circumstances inherited from the 
past. 
But potential economic losses from miscalculations and missed 
opportunities (which decolonisation fínally accomplished) must be weighed 
against the whole sequence of historical developments in the 20th Century. 
In the long-run, to be sure, the economic association of France with her 
empire was bound to benefít the latter and tilt the balance of net transfers 
on the side of the colonies, in so far as the latter required constant inflows 
of capital both to balance their trade déficit and to promote local 
development. Clearly in this regard, decolonisation made economic sense 
as it unleashed energies previously constrained by imperial commitments. 
But in the course of the turbulent 20th Century the French Empire also 
supplied human resources in wartime without which the French people 
would have been the worse off at critical moments of its history. 
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Université de París-Sorbonne 
1. The French empire played a significant role during the two world 
wars. During World War One, North África and the sub-saharan colonies 
sent to the Western front some 370,000 men; 75,000 of them (one out 
of five) were killed in action. As the Allles were, at some periods, desperately 
short of men, this fresh supply of troops was not negligible, compared 
to a total 8 million Frenchmen were called up between 1914 and 1918. 
On the other hand, the use of Arab and African troops during the 
occupation of the Rhineland and of the Ruhr created deep resentment 
among the Germán population. As a result, during the campaign of 1940, 
the Nazis executed at once some Black servicemen who fell in their hands. 
In the course of World War Two, the Vichy government pretended that 
the Empire was a trump card, which helped it to resist Germán demands. 
Vichy did not resist much— but, the empire did play such a role. 
Some colonies defected and rallied to General de Gaulle and although 
they were far away and poor (Equatorial África and the pacific Islands), 
they gave him a territorial base and some troops. 
The Anglo-American landing in Morocco and Algeria in November, 
1942 (and the rallying of those two territories, after a token resistance) 
gave to the Allies a springboard for attacking Sicily, then Italy, and later 
for the landing in Provence. The First French Army played a significant 
part in Italy and then in France in 1944-45. This represented its main 
contribution to the Allies' victory. It was made up of Europeans settled 
in North África, of Algerian and Moroccan natives, plus men who had 
fled from France to North África through Spain. 
So, we may apply to France Peter Cain's view about the British empire: 
if it was a net loss in peacetime, it made up for this in wartime. 
2. However, from the political and military point of view, there is 
also a heavy debit side to the balance sheet. 
In the late 19th Century and up to 1914, colonial disputes poisoned 
relations first with the UK, then with Germany. Britain and France almost 
went to war during the Fachoda crisis (1898). Colonial rivalry caused 
increased expenditure on the French Navy and on coastal fortifícation. 
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There is no need to stress the connexions of two crises over Morocco 
in 1905 and 1911, to the origins of World War One. 
After World War Two, France wasted a good deal of money in trying 
to «develop» its colonial dependencies, and much more in fighting against 
nationalist movements for independence. The long wars in Indochina 
(1945-54) and in Algeria (1954-62) are notorious, but less bloody and 
shorter conflicts also took place in Tunisia, Morocco and Madagascar. 
Today these wars seem sheer madness, but earlier decolonisation, was not 
possible in the political context of the late 1940s and of the 1950s, both 
internal and extemal (the US govemment pressed the French to go on 
with the war against the Communists in Vietnam). The iron will and wile 
of de Gaulle were needed to impose the independence of Algeria on the 
French political élite. 
At the time, some people considered that those wars were ruining 
France's economic chances. This pronouncement certainly seems excessive, 
but they help to explain why France did not enjoy an economic miracle, 
like Germany, Italy, Japan, why she was the laggard among Western 
countries, possibly why she is today still one of the poorest. The cost of 
resettHng in France one million Europeans, who had to flee North África 
(specially from Algeria in 1962), must also be taken into account. 
Certainly, the period 1945-62 was the one when the negative 
consequences of Empire were the most serious; one can safely assume 
that a faster economic growth would have been attained by France, if 
decolonisation had been achieved earlier and without these expensive wars. 
Finally, unüke Brítain or the Netherlands, France has not completely 
shed her «imperial responsibilities». 
She has retained an economic and military hold over many former 
colonies, especially South of the Sahara. This has been denounced, both 
at home and abroad, as «neocolonialism», through which the exploitation 
of those countries was continued. Actually, this policy has been quite 
expensive, and one can wonder about the economic benefits it has brought 
to France —except as in colonial times, the gains to special interests ' . 
One shocking example is the purchase of Algerian oil and natural gaz 
well over world prices. Moreover, the influence which France has retained 
in Francophone África contributes to her illusion of remaining a great 
power. 
' France runs a large surplus in trade with África, which is, of course, financed by 
the French taxpayer. 
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One must also mention the Dom-Toms (overseas departments and 
territories), which are mainly remnants of the first French empire 
(Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana, Reunión), plus some relies of the second 
(Tahiti and other islands in the Pacific). Their cost is large, as their 
inhabitants enjoy the same social services as in France. 
Finally, there is the burning issue of immigration from África, which 
largely results from the colonial past, and which destabilizes France. 
Overall and in the longue durée, the balance-sheet of Empire is 
disastrous. Colonial expansión is one of the factors which have made France 
a backward, miserable, poor and wretched country. A factor of the 
phenomenon I cali «le malheur frangais»- the French catastrophe. 
APPENDIX 
TABLE Al 
Overseas possessions retained by, restored to or conquered by France, 1815-1940 
Colonies Protectorates 
St. Fierre et Miquelon (off Newfoundland) 1635 
Pondichéry (Bengal) 1699 
Reunión (Bourbon Island) 1715 
Senegambia 1817 
(Arguin 1727, St. Louis 1779) 
Guadeloupe 1817 
Martinique 1817 
French Guiana 1817 
Algeria 1830 
Wallis and Futuna 1842 
Tuamotu Islands (South Pacific) 1842 
Tahiti 1843 
New Caledonia 1853 
Ivory Coast 1853 
Cambadla 1863 
Annam (Southern and central Vietnam) 1867 
Kuang Chu Wan (China) 1874 
Society Islands (Southern Pacific) 1880 
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Colantes Protectorates 
Tunisia 1881 
Tubuai Islands (South Pacific) 1881 
Somaliland (Djibouti) 1884 
Tonkin (Northern Viet-Nam) 1884 
Comores (Indian Ocean) 1885 
Madagascar 1885 
(Ft. Dauphin 1746, Ste-Marie 1750) 
Benin 1892 
Laos 1893 
Niger 1896 
(French) Congo 1898 
«Soudan» (Tchad) 1899 
Morocco 1912 
League ofNations mándales: 
Cameroons 1920 
Togo 1920 
Syria 1920 
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WAS IT WORTH HAVING? 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1850-1950 
PETER CAÍN 
Sheffield Hallam Universitv 
The question of whether the possession of an empire under a regime 
of free trade was beneficial or not to Britain has become a serious matter 
of dispute in recent years amongst British and American economic 
historians. Nonetheless, as some of them recognise, the question they are 
asking is hardly a novel one: they are often consciously reviving, in a more 
sophisticated form, a controversy which was already dividing 
contemporaries in Britain at the time the Com Laws and the Navigation 
Acts were repealed in the late 1840s and which only lost its relevance 
when decolonisation began in earnest in the late 1950s. O'Brien and Davis 
and Huttenback are on the side of those who traditionally disparaged the 
economic valué of empire and saw it as the preserve of special interests: 
Edelstein and Offer, though careful not to justify empire, are more willing 
to accept that the nation as a whole might have benefíted materially from 
its possession even if the benefits were very unevenly spread. The 
discussion, though ingenious and highly informative has, however, been 
somewhat narrowly focused. So, in the latter part of the paper, it is 
suggested that a full assessment of the valué of the empire to Britain 
depends upon taking account of a wider set of circumstances than has 
usually been evident in the current debate. In this respect, present day 
historians may have something to leam from the contemporary controversy 
where the question of the material costs and benefits of empire was always 
considered in the context of the social and political trajectory of the British 
nation. 
Throughout the period under review a long Une of liberáis, radicáis 
and socialists, of whom Cobden, Gladstone and J. A. Hobson were among 
' I would like to thank Michael Edelstein fot taking the trouble to read and criticise 
a draft of this paper and all the participants in the conference held in Madrid in February 
1997, especially Stan Engerman and Patrick O'Brien, for their helpful comments and 
encouragement. 
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the most famous early examples, insisted that the possession of empire 
not only brought no material benefits to the nation as a whole but actively 
harmed its growth prospects. The Victorian and Edwardian critics of 
imperialism had in mind a distinction between what Herbert Spencer called 
«militant» and «industrial» societies .^ The former were those dominated 
by a territorial aristocracy whose rule was authoritarian and whose rationale 
was war and conquest: the latter were societies based on liberal institutions 
and on peaceful market activity. Imperialism was a natural outcome of 
militant societies but was inimical to industrial ones which, through the 
International división of labour, encouraged world economic development, 
interdependence and mutual understanding. Radicáis feared imperial 
expansión as a throwback to militancy: they claimed that it encouraged 
high levéis of defence spending and warfare and thus increased taxes, 
lowered savings and investment, made a retum to protection more likely 
and undermined the standard of living of the «industrious classes» in the 
interests of the traditionally privileged. Not only were the costs of 
imperialism higher than the benefits: the benefits went to the few, the 
nation paid the costs ' . In J. A. Hobson's analysis, corrupt financiers 
supervising a diseased capitalist system replaced the landed aristocracy as 
the chief motivators of imperialism but the thrust of the argument did 
not change. He fervently believed that the source of Britain's wealth and 
strength was the free domestic market and that the key to prosperity was 
to improve and extend it. Imperialism and colonialism were simply cosdy 
diversions which, by maldistributing income and wealth, posed a threat 
to the long term economic stability and to the valúes of liberal society. 
Implicit in both Cobden's and J. A. Hobson's stance was the belief that 
a properly functioning market society would always guarantee full 
employment of resources''. 
On the other side was an equally long line of apologists for empire 
of whom Disraeli, Rosebery and Joseph Chamberlain were amongst the 
most prominent. Put in Spencerian terms, their argument was that some 
of the features identified as militant were necessary to the functioning 
of British economy and society. Implicitly rejecting the radical assumption 
that full employment was an automatic outcome of free markets, they 
claimed that the empire was a positive source of strength to the nation 
' Spencer (1902), pp. 568-642. See also Caín (1979). 
' For a famous statement see Gladstone (1878a). 
•* J. A. Hobson (1988). There is an excellent summary of the main argument in J. A. 
Hobson(1898). 
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in terms both of the markets it provided and the openings for investment 
it created and fully justifíed whatever defence costs were necessary to 
preserve or extend it. Imperialists attacked the Cobdenite assumption that 
British and world trade would be unaffected if empire was abolished and 
the Hobsonian one which claimed that a redistribution of income and 
wealth in Britain would boost domestic demand to such an extent as to 
make foreign or imperial trade less necessary. Abandoning the empire, or 
failing to extend it when the occasion aróse, would mean either that large 
tracts of territory would disappear from the world economy or that, at 
the least, they would be occupied by Britain's rivals and subjected to tariffs 
which would harm British trade. Either way, the result would be less output, 
investment and employment in Britain. Also, since imperialists thought of 
intemational society as basically anarchic and unpredictable they valued 
empire as a resource which could be called upon to defend Britain in 
times of crisis or war ' . Again, while radicáis saw empire as a threat to 
a liberal society, the apologists for empire candidly accepted that it brought 
economic benefits which helped to preserve the economic and social status 
quo, with its peculiar mix of traditional and modem elements, and because 
it gave the nation a galvanising sense of mission .^ Some imperialists, such 
as the leader of the Liberal Imperiaüsts, Lord Rosebery, argued that all 
the essential benefits of empire could be captured within the free trade 
framework. Others, Joseph Chamberlain most obviously, became convinced 
that empire was of such signifícance that it should be given privileged 
economic status either within a Zollverein or through a system of 
preferences. 
n 
Implicit in this radical-imperialist debate are what we would now 
recognise as counterfactual assertions. Leaving aside the question of psychic 
benefits or disabüities ,^ radicáis were arguing that, if Britain had not 
possessed an empire, then the nation as a whole would have been either 
no worse off or better off in material terms while imperialists were asserting 
the opposite. What modem economic historians have done recently is to 
' Henee Disraeli's flamboyant use of Indian troops during the Middle Eastern Crisis 
of 1877-8. See Eldridge (1973), pp. 223-4. 
' See the extracts from Disraeli's famous Crystal Palace speech of 1872 in Bennett 
(1962), pp. 257-9. For a more extended treatment a good source is Dicey (1877). 
' Offer thinks that the psychic benefits of empire were significant. See Oífer (1993), 
p. 232. 
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try to specify these counterfactuals rigorously and to quantify as precisely 
as possible (within the limits set by data constraints) what the benefits 
and the costs of the empire were. A number of «back-of-the-envelope» 
calculations have been attempted over the years, but the modem discussion 
really began with Michael Edelstein's elegant formulation in 1981 which 
covered the period 1870-1914 and which he has recendy extensively revised 
to take account of criticism and new data *. 
Aware that for a world bereft of the British empire there are an infínity 
of possible outcomes, he offers two plausible standards of comparison to 
measure against what actually occurred. The first, the «marginal standard», 
is a world without empire in which the level of global economic 
development is assumed to have been the same throughout the 1870-1914 
period. Here, the only change faced by Britain would be tariffs or, in 
the case of the white settled colonies or Dominions, possibly higher tariffs 
than actually existed. On this basis, Edelstein tests what the outcome would 
have been assuming the general adoption of a tariff level equivalent to 
that of the United States which rose firom about 20 per cent to 40 per 
cent ad valorem between 1870 and 1914. In order to estímate benefits 
on the marginal standard he then has to make rough estimates of the 
price eiasticity of British demand for colonial goods and vice versa, and 
of the empire's marginal propensity to import. The second, or «strong 
standard» of comparison is one where Britain's withdrawal from empire 
meant that these territories were less integrated into the world economy. 
In this case, Edelstein assumes that the white colonies would have probably 
reached the Argentinian standard of development with a level of per capita 
exports at about 70 per cent of the actual. For the dependent empire 
like India, he uses countries such as China as a yardstick and argües that 
they might have taken one quarter of their actual level of British exports 
if independent. 
After reminding his readers that «the numbers which follow are to 
be taken as conjectures of direction and order, not precise magnitudes», 
Edelstein concludes that, on the marginal standard, Britain's possession 
of empire brought benefits in terms of visible and invisible trade worth 
1.6 per cent of GNP in 1870 and 4.9 per cent in 1913 when the empire's 
share of British exports was 26 per cent and 36 per cent respectively. 
However, on the plausible assumption that white colonial tariffs were in 
practice set independently of Britain and would have been no higher in 
« Edelstein (1994a). 
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a non-empire world, he then reduces the marginal standard gains of 1913 
to 3.8 per cent. In comparison, using the strong standard, he claims gains 
from empire of almost 4 per cent of GNP in 1870 and 6.5 per cent in 
1913 '. Edelstein's calculations thus offer a certain amount of support for 
the case made by imperialists and also suggest that the benefits of trading 
with the empire increased over time. 
The assumptions lying behind Edelstein's calculations on trade can 
certainly be attacked. For instance, in discussing the «marginal» standard, 
Edelstein discounts the possibility that, by stimulating world industrial 
growth, increased tariffs in ex-empire countries could have increased the 
demand for British exports in the long run. As for the «strong» standard, 
his argument that countries such as India would have cut their contacts 
with the world economy drastically can also be challenged '". In support 
of the Edelstein position, Paul Kennedy has reiterated the view, expressed 
most forcibly by Charles Dilke in 1868, that India's place in the world 
economy depended upon imperial control '^  and that, since Britain's trade 
with India was vital to the system of multilateral payments based on sterling, 
imperial trade also helped to keep the International economy afloat. O'Brien 
however, believes that even if Britain had done much less trade with India 
the transfer problem could have been settled by Britain abandoning 
unilateral free trade, taking an active role in tariff bargaining with America 
and Europe, reducing its déficits with them and stimulating world trade 
in the process '^ . Whatever one's views on this particular issue, the 
assumptions underlying the «strong» standard may be too rigid. For 
example, one possible outcome of a British withdrawal from empire was 
the absorption of India and similar tropical or semi-tropical colonies by 
other European imperial powers. In those circumstances, even if Britain 
faced higher tariffs, tropical development could have produced levéis of 
trade with Britain significantly higher than Edelstein assumes. 
O'Brien also claims that, if foreign tariffs did affect trade or empire 
markets were lost, any such loss could have been made up either by finding 
new markets abroad or in Britain itself: he goes further than McCloskey 
who offers a simple Say's Law perspective '^  and agrees with J. A. Hobson 
that there was an underconsumption problem in Britain and that a judicious 
' Edelstein (1994a), pp. 202-4. 
'° O'Brien (1988), pp. 167-70. 
" For Dilke's statement see Bennett (1962), p. 240. 
'^  P. M. Kennedy (1989), pp. 186-7; O'Brien (1989), pp. 192-4. 
" McCloskey (1970). 
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redistribution of income would have increased employment, stimulated the 
domestic economy and reduced the need for foreign markets. O'Brien 
then goes on to suggest that empire was not only unnecessary but was 
also a positive hindrance to growth since, in providing safe outlets for 
Britain's older staple exports, it retarded the rate of economic change in 
Britain and aggravated the problem of relative industrial decline '''. There 
are problems with the O'Brien approach because his counterfactual world 
is based on an inherendy implausible mix of factors and policies: as we 
shall see, the combination of domestic demand stimuli and a pragmatic 
tariff policy which he suggests was not politically possible before 1939. 
Nonetheless, his critique highlights the fact that Edelstein's calculations 
probably indícate the upper bounds of possible gains from trading with 
empire before 1914 and that, if underconsumption is taken seriously, the 
empire may even have had a negative impact on British growth ' ' . 
m 
Calculating the gains from investment in the empire is a trickier process. 
Even the absolute amount of British capital abroad has been questioned 
in recent years '^. However, the consensos now appears to be that the 
traditional figure of around £4bn. of accumulated assets abroad in 1913 
is roughly correct and that about 60 per cent was portfolio investment 
—that is, investment in foreign-owned companies— and the rest direct 
investment '^. There is also general agreement that British investors 
preferred social overhead capital, mainly in railways, in countries of white 
settlement and that investment in empire represented only about two-fifths 
of the total, with the white colonies providing a much more important 
outlet than India or the dependencies '*. 
Agreement on rates of retum is harder to come by. The most 
comprehensive evidence has been compiled by Davis and Huttenback, 
based on a survey of the published accounts and records of 482 British 
firms operating between 1860 and 1912 and assessing expost realised rates 
of retum. They come to the rather startling conclusión that, before the 
'" O'Brien (1988), pp. 170, 184. 
" It should be noted that, in his earlier work, Edelstein also showed some sympathy 
with underconsumptionist arguments. See Edelstein (1982), ch. 8. 
"• Platt(1986). 
" Feinstein (1990), Corley (1994). 
'* Davis and Huttenback (1986), ch. 2. 
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mid-1880s, investments in empire brought better retums than either 
domestic or foreign but that from 1884 to 1913 the position was reversed ' '. 
Davis and Huttenback's sample of firms has been criticised as 
unrepresentative and their results are also questionable because they take 
no account of risk and because of their reliance on company statements 
and records which are notoriously flawed and easy to falsify. Their data 
also has an in-built bias in that it ignores govemment bonds, one of the 
most important forms of empire investment and one in which retums on 
imperial investments were impressively higher than on similar domestic 
securities ^°. The main altemative to Davis and Huttenback is Edelstein's 
earlier study of the financial market fate of retum of 566 stocks, culled 
from the financial press ^^ This presents methodological difficulties of its 
own ^^ ; but the data is adjusted for risk, the list of securities is more 
comprehensive in scope and, it has been claimed, Edelstein's measure 
captures the «constant review of expectations and prospects [which] is 
the essence of economic Ufe» ^^ . Edelstein does not sepárate out imperial 
from foreign investment in any systematic way but an arrangement of his 
original data on railway investment does show that retums in the empire 
were on average 0.7 per cent per annum higher than in the domestic market 
and that there were similar differentials on govemment and other social 
overhead investments in the empire. '^' On the other hand, although retums 
on imperial investments were signifícantly higher on average over the whole 
period 1870-1913, Edelstein demónstrales that domestic securities were 
a better bet than either comparable foreign or empire ones between 1870-6, 
1887-96 and 1910-1913 ^'. Imperial exploitation at levéis imagined by 
Marxists and other critics of empire did not exist except in a few spectacular 
and unrepresentative cases. 
In assessing gains from investment in empire it is necessary to take 
into account the fact that members of the empire paid less than foreigners 
on their borrowings. Legal enactments such as the Colonial Stocks Acts ^^ , 
and British confidence that standards of law and justice in the empire 
would be similar to those at home, made it possible for the empire to 
" Davis and Huttenback (1986), ch. 3, esp. pp. 106-10. 
» Offer (1993), pp. 216-20. On this issue see also Hopkins (1988) and Alford (1988). 
" Edelstein (1976). See also Edelstein (1982), ch. 4. 
" O'Brien (1988), pp. 177-8, and Pollard (1989), pp. 77-81. 
" Offer (1993), p. 219. 
'" Davis and Huttenback (1986), p. 81, and Edelstein (1994a) p. 206. 
" M. Edelstein (1994b), pp. 182-5. 
^^  Jessop (1976). Some colonial investments had been given trustee status in the 1870s. 
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borrow more cheaply. To that extent imperial investments were subsidised 
and were a cost to the British nation, the subsidy being measured by the 
difference in borrowing rates offered to foreign countries at similar levéis 
of development ^^ . Taking this inte account, Edelstein concludes that, on 
the marginal standard described, the loss to Britain of cheaper empire 
borrowing was about 0.2 per cent of GNP in 1870 rising to 0.94 per 
cent in 1913. On the strong standard of measurement, the higher interest 
rates paid by independent white colonials would have been offset by their 
borrowing less. However, although an independent underdeveloped empire 
would probably have paid twice as much for the privilege of borrowing, 
it might also, using countries like China and Turkey as a measure, have 
borrowed only one-fifth of the actual total. On that basis he concludes 
that the investment gain to Britain from possessing an empire under strong 
standard assumptions was about 0.3 per cent of GNP in 1870 and 0.5 
per cent in 1913^*. 
Clearly, the gains from investment in empire were small at best and, 
on Edelstein's marginal standard, may have been non-existent or even 
negative. Moreover, as in the case of trade, Edelstein's calculations are 
based on the assumption that the resources sent abroad were surplus to 
domestic requirements. There is now a considerable literature which argües 
strongly that foreign and imperial investments were frequently a 
misallocation of resources ^'. On this reading of the evidence market failure 
and segmentation based on traditional divides between City and provincial 
industry, and aggravated by inadequate company law and accounting 
practices which perpetuated ignorance, meant that Britain had two distinct 
capital markets with traditional élites dominating the City and overseas 
investment ^^ W. P. Kennedy in particular has persistendy pointed out that 
the average rate of retum on industrial investment in Britain as a whole 
was considerably higher than on overseas investment. A better distribution 
of income and more efficient capital markets would, he believes, have 
produced more investment in domestic equities and less in safe imperial 
and foreign bonds; and this, in turn, would have meant much more domestic 
investment, a stemming of the flow of emigration and a rate of growth 
far higher than that actually achieved between 1870 and 1914 ' ' . 
" Davis and Huttenback (1986), pp. 171-4. 
'* Edelstein (1994a), pp. 207-10. 
'^' O'Brien (1988), pp. 181-6, and W. P. Kennedy (1987) 
'° Davis and Huttenback, ch. 7. 
" W. P. Kennedy (1987), pp. 152-3. 
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W. P. Kennedy's stance is highly controversial. The fact that two-fifths 
of British overseas investment was direct suggests that it is wrong to 
characterise all overseas investment as low risk: the rise of the so-called 
«free standing company» after 1870 is an example of innovative foreign 
investment ^^ . On the domestic front, some historians have questioned 
whether the traditionally successful part of British industry could or would 
have responded to new opportunities had the City of London offered them 
since there is strong evidence that the time-honoured and local methods 
of raising funds was quite sufficient for the needs of most entrepreneurs ^^ . 
There is also evidence that inept state and local govemment controls 
hobbled profits and investment in key áreas of new technology such as 
electricals and motor vehicles and this, rather than unresponsive City 
institutions, made it difficult to raise money for these industries in 
London '^^ . However, there remains a possibility that some innovatory 
entrepreneurs, those at the frontiers of technological and organisational 
change, were seriously disadvantaged by the existing structures of capital 
markets in Britain. The traditional financial institutions which serviced 
industry, such as the clearing banks, sometimes failed to adapt to their 
needs because of their emphasis on liquidity; while the funds they wanted 
to raise were, in amount and in form, outside the purview of the City 
of London which was geared mainly to providing large loans for 
govemments and public Utilities at home and abroad ^'. Although Edelstein 
is sceptical of arguments such as Bill Kennedy's '^, he does recognise that 
if resources were diverted abroad by some kind of market failure then 
imperial and foreign investment could have been harmful to the economy ''^. 
Indeed, if there was misallocation of resources affecting trade as well as 
investment the gains from empire, even under the strong standard, would 
have been low or even negative. In that case, the whole imperial exercise 
was actually a burden on the economy even if it was beneficial to some 
sectional interests such as traditional élites *^. 
" Wilkins(1988). 
" Davis (1966) and Cain and Hopkins (1993a), pp. 190-5. 
'" Michie(1988). 
" Capie and Collins (1996). 
" Edelstein (1994b), pp. 187-92. 
" This question of the relationship between financial institutions and British industry 
is far too complex to be treated adequately here. For further information see the excellent 
surveys of the evidence from both sides of the argument in Pollard (1988), ch. 2; Kynaston 
(1995), pp. 449-72, and J. M. Wilson (1995), pp. 119-31. 
'* Edelstein(1994a), p. 214. 
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IV 
The possibility that the empire was indeed an albatross around the 
neck oí the nation appears to be increased when defence costs are taken 
into consideration. Davis and Huttenback stirred renewed interest in this 
aspect of British imperiaüsm when they argued that, between 1860-1912, 
Britons paid £2.4 per head per annum in tax, £1.14 of which was spent 
on defence and a further £0.7 was payment on debt accumulated in previous 
imperial wars, and that these burdens were much greater than those borne 
by foreign states. While admitting that India paid its own defence costs, 
Davis and Huttenback also point out that the Dominions paid virtually 
nothing. Without this imperial burden, taxes could have been much lower 
with beneficia] effects on savings and investment. In reality, goveming élites 
of «peers and gents» and their financial and professional associates got 
the benefíts not only of investment in empire but also the cream of the 
naval, military, political and administrative jobs associated with it, while 
the rest of the population bore the tax burden ^'. 
Davis and Huttenback's statistics, and the inferences they and O'Brien 
have made from them, have both been seriously questioned. Comparing 
Britain's defence costs with a ragbag of «foreign countries» is a pointless 
exercise: the obvious comparison is with the expenditure of other great 
powers including the United States while keeping in mind that defence 
costs had also to be assessed in relation to the risks each nation faced'"'. 
As far as the contribution of the Dominions is concerned, Offer has argued 
strongly that, in an alliance with Britain where the latter was much larger 
and also more immediately vulnerable in war, the bulk of defence costs 
were bound to fall on the mother country''^ Again, it has been claimed 
that comparing defence spending on a per capita basis is misleading because 
it is capacity to pay that counts and a better measure of that is the share 
of defence spending in national income '^ .^ Using the latter criterion, J. M. 
Hobson has recently compared expenditure by the great powers between 
1870 and 1914 and shown that only the United States had a lower ratio 
of defence spending to NNP at factor cost than Britain and that, in 1913 
for example, the latter's expenditure was 22 per cent lower than Germany's 
" Davis and Huttenback (1986), chs. 5, 7, 8, and O'Brien (1988), pp. 186-95. 
* Offer(1993), p. 226. 
'• Offer (1993), 229-31, 
'' P. M. Kennedy (1989), pp. 190-1. 
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and 49 per cent and 60 per cent lower than that of France and Russia 
respectively ''^ . Moreover, he believes that the figures underestimate the 
gap between Britain and the European great powers because they do not 
capture the hidden costs of the conscription system '*''. O'Brien argües that 
British foreign and defence strategy was ultimately a failure because it 
did not confront the Germán threat early enough and deter it and the 
reason for this was that Britain was obsessed with imperial defence '''. J. M. 
Hobson agrees that Britain failed to deter Germany but counterclaims that 
this was the outcome of a delibérate choice to keep defence expenditure 
down rather than a consequence of imperial overstretch. An additional 
expenditure of 2 per cent of NNP per annum, easily affordable especially 
with a tariff, would have given Britain an army of 1.3m men in 1914 and 
put her on a par with Continental forces ''^  Moreover, he disputes the 
implicit assumption of Davis and Huttenback that defence was a 
dead-weight loss to the economy and points to the possibilities of 
technological spin-offs ^^. 
Nonetheless, historians who are already dubious about the trade and 
investment benefíts of empire could easily infer that even a defence cost 
as low as 3 per cent of national income was sufficient to wipe out any 
other gains and that the nation would have been better off without formal 
empire at all. And, although no serious attempt has yet been made to 
assess gains and losses in a systematic way for the interwar period, it seems 
likely that despite additions to territory as a result of the First World War 
the empire was, at best, a shrinking economic asset before 1939. A rough 
calculation, using Edelstein's strong standard (which, as we have seen, 
expresses the outer limits of possible gains from empire) on data for 1937 
yields a gain of 3.3 per cent of GNP from trade with the empire and 
an additional gain of between roughly 0.5 and 0.7 per cent from investment 
at a time when current defence costs were 3.8 per cent of GNP. (See 
Appendix.) 
At this point in the discussion, however, it is vital to remember that 
the empire was a part, and not the most signifícant part, of a truly global 
" J. M. Hobson (1993), pp, 464-5, 478-80. 
^' J. M. Hobson (1993), p. 493, and Offer (1993), pp. 225-6. Hobson and Offer assume 
that conscription diverted labour from producing output: but if there was heavy 
unemployment or underemployment in countries where conscription was practised this would 
not necessarily be true. I owe this point to Patrick O'Brien. 
"' O'Brien (1988), p. 195. 
* J. M. Hobson (1993), pp.494-9. 
"' J.M. Hobson (1993), p. 471. 
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system of trade and investment. Both British economic policy and defence 
strategy had a cosmopolitan focus rather than a mere imperial one. The 
abandonment of the «oíd colonial system» of preferences and of the 
Navigation Acts by 1850, and the stout maintenance of free trade in the 
face of mounting European and American tariffs after 1880, is proof enough 
of this. As Gallagher and Robinson classically demonstrated many years 
ago, Britain's interest was seen to lie in maximising trade and investment 
flows world-wide and, insofar as it acquired influence abroad, Britain was 
happier with «informal» control and resorted to «formal» empire only when 
informality proved impossible •**. Whether, as Gallagher and Robinson 
claimed, extensión of the formal empire were due mainly to the collapse 
of informal arrangements on the periphery or whether, as others contend, 
the main source of the growth of empire was economic change in the 
metrópolis •*', there is little doubt that it was only one outcome of an 
ever-widening complex of British economic influence and strategic interests. 
Despite the enormous growth of imperial acreage between 1850 and 1914, 
at the outbreak of the First World War Britain still sold two-thirds of 
its exports outside the empire, took three-quarters of its imports from 
non-empire sources and sent three-fifths of its migrants and its foreign 
investments to foreign parts'". The empire's share of trade, investment 
and migration rose rapidly in the 1920s and again under the Ottawa 
preferential system after 1932: by 1937 it accounted for around 45 per 
cent of Britain's total overseas trade. However, this rising share occurred 
in a context where International trade and factor movement as a whole 
were much reduced by war and by global depression so that the empire's 
contribution to Britain's economy shrank in absolute terms compared with 
pre-1914. Ñor is there much doubt that, in an ideal world, British 
govemments preferred free trade cosmopolitanism to imperial strategies 
since they resorted to the latter only when the intemational economy broke 
down. 
It is precisely because empire was acquired as a bye-product of an 
internationalist policy that it remained, as O'Brien reminds us in invoking 
the famous words of Adam Smith about the thirteen American colonies, 
a «project of an empire» rather than a finished and fully articulated 
Gallagher and Robinson (1953-4). 
For this approach to imperial expansión, see Cain and Hopkins (1993a, 1993b). 
Cain (forthcoming). 
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system'^ Formal empire may, or may not, have provided Britain with 
benefits on the Edelstein calculus but its worth can only be fuUy assessed 
in this broader context taking into account the possibility of gains from 
informal empire and the fact that formal empire was acquired in pursuit 
of wider International goals. Highiighting Britain's far-reaching interests 
affects perceptions of costs as well as gains. Britain's defence costs were 
not incurred simply to defend an empire but to protect a global network 
of trade and communication: some historians have inferred from this that, 
even if the empire had not existed, Britain would have found it necessary 
to pay most of its actual level of defence expenditure, especially that for 
naval defence which were regarded as the key to its global security. On 
this reading, even if the benefits attributable to formal empire were small 
the costs were also low '^. This, however, is rather an extreme view and 
much further research and analysis is required before the share of defence 
costs directly attributable to empire can be assessed with any confídence '^. 
Besides recognising that many defence costs were independent of 
empire it is also important to assess the role of empire in war in order 
to arrive at a proper understanding of its valué to Britain. For example, 
Offer has denied that it is possible to capture the benefits brought by 
the empire unless its part in the 1914-18 war is taken into account. He 
claims that, whatever the verdict on the empire's place in Britain's economy 
before 1914, it is evident that between 1914-18 the contribution of the 
empire, and of the Dominions in particular, in terms of men and supplies 
helped provide Britain with a crucial margin of superiority over Germany. 
The empire provided one-fifth of the fighting forces and the troops were 
of a higher average quality. It was also a source of loans and of vital supplies: 
in 1917, for instance. Ganada provided between a quarter and a third 
of Britain's shell-fire on the westem front '^*. Moreover, Offer's argument 
" O'Brien (1988), p. 199. In a moment of exasperation, the protectionist imperialist, 
Joseph Chamberlain, once called the empire a «loóse bundle of sticks, bound together... 
by a thin tie of sentiment and sympathy». Boyd (1914), ü, pp. 295-6. 
" Porter (1988), pp. 693-5, and Offer (1993), pp. 232-4. 
" Edelstein is aware of the problem and suggests that roughly half of defence 
expenditure should be allocated to empire: Edelstein (1994a) p. 212. It is interesting to 
note that a Liberal Imperialist politician, Herbert Samuel, once argued that while the navy 
was necessary to preserve Britain's intemational position in general, a large part of the 
army bilí should be debited to empire. See Samuel (1902), pp. 302-3. O'Brien accepts 
that only half of defence costs might be attributable to empire but from his perspective 
even that is too high a figure. See O'Brien (1989), p. 198. 
'" Offer (1993), pp. 234-6. These insights aróse from Offer (1989). See also Edelstein 
(1994a), pp. 215-6. 
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can be extended to the Second World War when, for example, besides 
providing large numbers of fíghting troops, Canadá alone contributed 
$3.5bn. in unrequited exports and aid: the rest of the empire allowed Britain 
over $1 Ibn. of credits held in the form of sterling balances '^. 
From this perspective even if, as radical critics suggest, the empire 
was a «net loss» in peacetime it definitely paid in wartime, not only 
contributing vital resources but helping to preserve Britain's very existence 
as an independent nation. In assessing the contribution of the Dominions 
in particular, it may be the case that it was precisely because Britain had 
allowed them such independence during peacetime, leaving them to devise 
their own tariffs and allowing them a «free ride» on defence, that the 
«kith and kin» factor operated so powerfully in Britain's favour in wartime. 
Besides its influence in world wars, it could be argued that the empire 
was especially important to Britain in two other periods of crisis, the 
depression of the 1930s and the post-Second World War reconstruction 
phase. The Ottawa preference system had severe drawbacks: it was 
trade-diverting rather than trade-creating and did far more for the empire's 
exports to Britain than vice versa. Generous preferences for the empire 
were, however, essential to prevent debt defaults and to maintain 
confidence in sterling and in the emerging sterling área, thus helping British 
exports to recover more quickly and contributing to recovery '^. Similarly, 
a case could be made that the empire played a critical part in helping 
to fínance the dollar gap for Britain after the Second World War when 
the war-time sterling área controls were kept in place These arrangements 
allowed Britain to recycle dollar eamings made by South África and by 
the Malayan and West African colonies for its own purposes and thus 
helped the country to recover much more quickly after the war '^. 
The empire's contribution to Britain's economic and military crises 
needs to be kept in perspective. The total war expenditure of Britain in 
1914-18 is estimated at $43.8bn. while the whole of the empire contributed 
$5.8bn. The United States made a much bigger contribution to Britain's 
economy than the Dominions —its total war expenditure was $36.2bn.— 
and its military intervention in 1917 was probably decisive in bringing the 
war to an end quickly'^. In the second world war, the American 
Sayers(1956), ch. 11. 
Cain and Hopkins (1993b), pp. 83-93. 
Krosewski{1993). 
'" Hardach (1977), p. 153. OÍfer (1993), recognises that American intervention was 
significant but does not give it quite the weight it deserves (p. 235). It must of course 
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contribution was even more decisiva. It is diffícult to see how Britain could 
have carried on fighting without Lend-Lease after 1941 and the total 
amount of aid given by the USA ($30 bn.) was three times the level of 
support received from the empire ^'. Moreover, although the creation of 
an imperial system was important to Britain's well-being in the 1930s when 
there were no obvious altematives on offer, its extensión into the post-1945 
period was probably harmful since it committed Britain to international 
trading and financial structures that rapidly became outdated and delayed 
its commitment to the new Europe emerging in the 1950s ^ . 
These reflections on the political and geo-political ramifícations of the 
empire's wari:ime contribution suggest that a true perspective on its role 
can only be obtained by looking beyond the confines of the cost-benefít 
analysis usually adopted by economists and economic historians. Most of 
them recognise this to some extent. They are aware, for example, that 
the distribution of wealth and of income in Britain in this period favoured 
élites largely cut off from British industry and industrial culture for whom 
foreign and imperial investments were an ideal outlet for their savings and 
whose gains from their overseas connections helped to maintain their 
position in society. With an altemative distribution of wealth a different 
set of investment cholees involving different risk strategies could have been 
made ^'. However, such shifts in wealth holding would have meant not 
only the remodelling of economic institutions but would also have involved 
widespread social and political restructuring and marked changes in 
economic philosophy and policy. This is less well recognised. For example, 
as already noted, J. M. Hobson has claimed that if Britain had spent the 
same share of annual income on defence as that of leading Continental 
powers and had adopted a tariff it could have had an army of 1.3m. men 
in 1914. He does not, however, acknowledge that in creating such an army 
Britain would probably have had to abandon some cherished features of 
its liberal society in favour of a Kreigsverein which would also have had 
be remembered that if the empire's contribution was much smaller it was much more certain 
and immediate than that from the USA. 
" Sayers (1956), pp. 375, 529-31. 
** I would like to thank Larry Neal for reminding me of this. 
" O'Brien (1988), pp. 181-6, and Offer (1993), p. 222. 
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immense consequences for the empire and for the wider world. This implies 
that, to assess the valué of empire, it is necessary to place it in the context 
of the structure of the society in Britain which it supported and to measure 
that society's performance against altematives. In other words, rather than 
simply looking at the effects of possessing or relinquishing empire on the 
economic system per se, it would be more helpful to set up a broader 
counterfactual enquiry and to ask how a British society with a different 
distribution of income and wealth, and matching economic and political 
structures and strategies, might have coped with the imperial problem. 
This would take the debate back towards the more loosely structured 
discussion of alternatives and outcomes between the radicáis and the 
imperialists with which this paper began. In order to make the comparisons 
effective it is essential both to sketch in the main outlines of the system 
as it existed before 1914 (and which was stül broadly in place in 1939) 
and to set it against some plausible alternatives, that is those which were 
actively canvassed in Britain at the time. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain was a society 
in which a complex of non-industrial forces arising out of land, the 
professions, City finance and other services (which, for the sake of 
convenience, Tony Hopkins and I have labelled «gentlemanly capitalist») 
still had a prominent place in the economy and in positions of power ^^ . 
Both as what Veblen called «gentleman investors» ^^  and as governing élites 
they were leading beneficiarles of free trade cosmopoHtanism and of the 
imperial system which grew up within it. The system received powerful 
support from a broad phalanx of commercial interests and also from large 
sections of industry, including cotton textiles the most important export 
interest in the country, which supported free trade because of its raw 
material import needs and because it benefited from the special conditions 
which applied within the empire. For example, India, the most important 
market for textiles was forced to accept free trade; and the British 
government in many parts of the dependent empire used its influence to 
«buy British» ^ . Besides that, there was support from the majority of the 
working class for what we might cali the «open imperial economy» in that 
it provided jobs through export markets, cheap food and outlets for 
migration for those who found British society too constraining. It was this 
broad cross-class economic consensus arising out of the open imperial 
" See Cain and Hopkins (1993a, 1993b) for this argument. 
" Veblen(1994b), p. 249. 
" Edelstein(1994a),pp. 200-1. 
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economy which allowed traditional élites to survive and prosper and which 
made it possible for them to gain differential advantages from the 
possession of empire. 
Many long term consequences flowed from maintaining the open 
imperial economy. The return income from foreign investment boosted 
élite fortunes and also gave a fillip to the development of the service 
economy in the South of England and, in particular, to the City and financial 
services^^. At the same time, it probably slowed down the development 
of industry in Britain by providing easy markets for traditional staples while 
subjecting new industry to the disabling impact of unilateral free trade. 
It also reinforced the traditional dichotomy between industrial sources of 
finance in the provinces and City money, a dichotomy which may have 
been harmful to the development of new technology in Britain; and it 
perpetuated the power of goveming élites who knew little about industry 
and did not care to leam more ^ . The income and the careers made by 
gentlemanly capitalists in the empire gave them good reason to extend 
it and defend it vigorously: but there were also great constraints on these 
élites in matters of imperial and foreign policy and defence. The support 
for free trade, the hostility to big government which economic success 
had bred and the long acclimatisation to free markets experienced at all 
levéis of society in Britain, muted the militant side of imperialism as 
Schumpeter claimed at the time ^^ . It also put grave limits on state budgets 
which is why Britain spent comparatively little on defence, why it was not 
fully prepared to defend its place in the world and its empire against 
Germany in 1914 or 1939 and why appeasement had such large part to 
play in British foreign policy *^. Cobdenism may not have succeeded in 
Britain but it had a serious impact at this level: and, while gentlemanly 
capitalist imperialism aroused Germán hostility to Britain, the reluctance 
to spend on defence encouraged Germany to believe that it could win 
a war in 1914. On the other hand, the open imperial economy had a 
wide range of imperial resources to cali on when war broke out. Of greater 
significance was the fact that the liberal system Britain defended was 
attractive enough to bring in the United States on the AUied side in both 
wars despite the latter's distaste for colonialism. 
" The service sector has now begun to receive the attention it deserves. See Lee (1986). 
** PoUard (1989), ch. 4. Edelstein believes that one consequence of this was the neglect 
of scientific and technical education. See Edelstein (1994b), p. 196. However, Pollard (1989), 
ch. 3, disagrees. 
" Schumpeter (1991). 
** P. M. Kennedy (1983), chs. 1, 3. 
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Against this thumbnail sketch of the actualite there is only space to 
describe two alternatives, widely canvassed at the time: the radical policy 
of Cobdenism, or its later Hobsonian versión, which O'Brien has invoked; 
and the scheme of «social» or «constructive» imperialism associated with 
Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Milner which developed out of the Disraelian 
concern with the need to unite the empire against foreign rivals. In a 
Cobdenite Britain with less tax and much less economic privilege, economic 
resources would have been distributed more favourably to industry and 
this would have boosted industrial investment and growth especially since, 
in lieu of imperial outlets, the City would have been forced to adapt itself 
to domestic circumstances more readily. Technical and business education 
would have received more resources: yet there is still the possibility that, 
even without comfortable imperial markets to fall back on, industrial 
sclerosis might eventually have afflicted society since it did not disappear 
when empire was finally lost after 1950 ^'. Also, because Cobdenism meant 
dogmatic support for free trade the bad effects of unilateralism on industry 
after 1880, when foreign competition became a serious concern, would 
have been just as strongly felt. The coming of a Hobsonian govemment 
in Edwardian times would have boosted domestic demand and domestic 
industry: but the effects would have been undermined by its own 
determination to maintain free trade. Such a goverrmient would also have 
lacked flexibility in dealing with the crisis of the 1930s. Its welfare measures 
would have promoted education and social cohesión: in contrast, its tax 
regime and its regulation of industry would probably have discouraged 
entrepreneurial initiative. 
Under a radical govemment, less emigrants and capital would have 
gone to the white colonies and it is possible that Canadá would have been 
allowed to fall under the informal influence of the United States before 
1914 rather than after. However, it is doubtful if a radical government 
could have avoided some form of colonial empire. Cobdenism encouraged 
dependence on the intemational economy and this would have involved 
extensive trade and possibly investment links with underdeveloped parts 
of the world which might easily have led to imperialist control. Gladstone 
recognised in the 1870s that the economic dominance of the United States 
in the twentieth century was inevitable and did not want to speed up the 
process by assuming further imperial burdens ^°. Yet he was the leader 
" This important point is made by Offer (forthcoming). 
™ Gladstone (1878b), p. 204. 
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of the govemment which reluctantly occupied Egypt in 1882 and, once 
in, he found it impossible to get out ^'. With these diffículties in mind, 
J. A. Hobson hoped that a radical redistribution of income would not 
only boost domestic output and investment but would do away with the 
need for many foreign markets ^^ . Even allowing for the fact that there 
may have been underconsumption in Britain, this solution to the problem 
of imperialism was an unrealistic one and did not meet with the approval 
of other anti-imperial liberáis who referred back to Cobden's confidence 
in the International división of labour. Interestingly enough, J. A. Hobson 
himself later adopted a more Cobdenite position and, in doing so, also 
suggested that imperialism might be an inevitable phase, albeit a passing 
one, in the development of the world economy ^^ . In addition, and despite 
Cobden's deep misgivings, most liberáis were committed to the idea of 
imperial trusteeship and urged the better govemment of acquired territory 
rather than its abandonment. Many, J. A. Hobson included, were fervent 
supporter of the post-Versailles mándate system for colonies. Radicáis 
would have been imperialists, albeit reluctantly and on a smaller scale than 
the gentlemanly capitalists. 
Govemments of a radical persuasión would also have run into serious 
difficulties about paying for the defence of Britain's global network of 
trade. They would have been tempted into very low levéis of expenditure 
which might have exposed trade and investment to danger from foreign 
powers. They would have been less prepared to fight Germany in 1914 
and 1939: Cobdenism in a non-Cobdenite world was always problematic 
and may have encouraged aggression rather than deterred it. Moreover, 
since the rest of the world would have been less British, there would have 
been fewer resources to cali on from abroad during war. Support from 
the United States might be expected but greater reliance on them would 
have established American dominance over the world more rapidly than 
happened in practice. However, this hypothesis rests on the assumption 
that Germán aggression was a given factor. If, instead, we accept the 
argument that Germany was aggressive towards Britain because of the 
empire and believe that Britain's own hostility to Germany was determined 
" Caín and Hopkins (1993a), pp. 362-9. 
" J. A. Hobson (1988), Pt. I, ch. 2. 
" J. A. Hobson (1911). 
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by its imperial possessions and the need to defend them ^'^, then it is 
plausible to assume that a radical government would have given less offence 
in this regard and might have avoided war in 1914 and the knock-on effects 
which led to Hitler in the 1930s. In this case, American hegemony would 
have come more slowly than in fact occurred and, when it came, it would 
have been accepted without rancour. Radicáis had no interest in hegemony: 
a radical government would also have been more willing to look the 
European option in the face in the 1950s as a result. 
The other plausible alternative, most strongly urged after 1900, was 
that proposed by Joseph Chamberlain and Milner under the heading of 
«social imperialism» or «constructive imperialism» ^'. In their ideal world, 
the empire would have been the central concern of economic policy. Free 
trade would have been abolished and replaced by an imperial tariff unión, 
increasing domestic investment and encouraging a much greater proportion 
of overseas capital and migrants to go to the empire. More resources would 
have been devoted to developing the economic potential of the dependent 
empire with spin-off effects on British trade and industry. Tariff protection 
would have offered the chance to give infant industry support to new 
technology and to créate cartels with scale economies. Running counter 
to all this, the empire would have become an even bigger funk hole for 
the uncompetitive parts of British industry and tariffs would have been 
distributed through political power rather than for any ostensible scientific 
reason ^^ , with a stifling effect on growth: and, because of the imperative 
of empire unity, it is unlikely that tariffs would have been used effectively 
as bargaining devices to free up world trade. Moreover, the regime would 
have been designed to produce an anti-German (and anti-American) 
Kreigsverein with much greater emphasis on defence. Under a constructive 
imperialist government, an army big enough to match Germany's might 
have come about and a tariff would have helped to raise the revenue for 
it and for welfare reforms. This could have encouraged industry to some 
degree, depending upon where the increased tax borden for defence fell: 
but as a result, Britain would probably have become a less liberal and 
more aggressive society and would have begun in some ways to resemble 
''' For an argument that Britain found itself in opposition to Germany before 1914 
because this was the inevitable price to be paid for Britain's need to settle imperial quarrels 
with France and Russia who were «natural» enemies of Germany, see K. M. Wilson (1987). 
" See Oreen (1995) and Cain (1996). 
™ For a detailed account of the vain search by Tariff Reformers for a «scientific tariff» 
see Marrison (1996), pp. 33-7, 118-27, 140-71, 176-86, 194-207. 
370 
WAS rr WORTH HAVING? THE BRmSH EMPIRE 1850-1950 . f feí¿^Sr~Í ) M 35 
the Germany so vividly described by Veblen at the time''''. The chances 
that a war with Germany would have broken out sooner rather than later 
are pronounced, especially since in 1909 the Germán ambassador said that 
Germany would regard any imperial tariff as a castds helli *^; and, despite 
Chamberlain's own original pro-German sympathies, the tariff campaign 
developed a strong anti-German bias. Moreover an imperially aggressive 
Britain would have found it more difficult to forge alliances with Germany's 
other enemies. The resources of the empire could have been called on 
in war but the support of the United States —vital in 1917-18 and after 
1940— might not have been forthcoming and an imperially aggressive 
Britain might not have been able to agree with possible allies against 
Germany such as France and Russia. Constructive imperialism would have 
united the empire ^^  but it would not necessarily have done much for the 
economy and its defence and tax regimes could have been oppressive. 
Moreover, since even under a constructive imperialist regime the empire 
could not have been anywhere near self-sufficient, Britain would still have 
been heavily dependent on foreign trade while, because of its tariff and 
defence policies, having less friends to cali on in its hour of need. 
VI 
As we have seen, the question «was the empire economically beneficial 
to the nation?» is not easy to answer. However, there seems little doubt 
that empires provided benefits for goveming élites and this is as true of 
Britain between 1850 and 1950 as it was for Spain and Portugal in earlier 
times. In providing such benefits, empires thus served to perpetúate 
traditional élites, whether they were British gentíemanly capitalists or 
Iberian aristocracies. In so doing, they imdoubtedly slowed down the rate 
of social and political change. They may also have retarded economic 
progress to some degree though, as we have seen, this is a more contentious 
issue. To revert to the distinction with which the paper began, it seems 
that the neat Spencerian antithesis between «militant» and «industrial» 
societies is hard to sustain. Empire did indeed encourage the survival of 
militant elements in British society but it is not self-evident that this was 
• - • ' 4 * 
" Veblen (1994a). 
'* Hoffman (1964), pp. 290-1. 
" Though constructive imperialists persistently underrated the difficulties involved in 
forging a common economic policy with the Dominions. 
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harmñil to the industrial core within it. Neither the radical ñor the 
constructive imperialist alternatives would necessarily have produced a more 
vibrant economy, a more cohesive society or one more capable of defending 
itself against its enemies than the actual one presided over by gentlemanly 
capitalists before the 1950s. Both alternatives discussed are flawed in some 
major particulars, though the radical option appears to have greater 
possibilities for successful realisation than constructive imperialism. One 
thing, however, is certain: in steering a compromise course between these 
alternatives, Britain remained a stable society and survived the great 
economic and poHtical upheavals of the first part of the twentieth century 
relatively unscathed. Ernpire played its part in maintaining such a stable 
society and in preserving its independence. In that sense it «paid» 
handsomely *°. 
APPENDIX. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1937 
The calculation in the text is based on Edelstein's strong standard which 
assumes that Britain would have sent 70 per cent of its actual level of 
exports, re- exports, service (invisible) exports and foreign investment to 
free Dominions while the corresponding figure for a free dependent empire 
would be 25 per cent of exports, re-exports and service exports and 20 
per cent of foreign investment. 
i) TRADE AND SERVICES 
The Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom gives exports and 
re-exports to the empire as £264. Im. Trade with the Dominions was 
£131.1m. and with the dependent empire was £133m which, on the above 
assumptions, would produce income under the strong standard of 
£91.7m. -I- £33.3m. = £125m. Total income from service exports in 1937 
was £84m *'. The empire took 45.4 per cent of exports and re-exports 
in 1937 but the share of the empire in service exports was probably higher 
*" Whether it «paid» to be a member of this empire rather than its leader is, of course, 
an entirely different question. All we can say for sure here is that this is not a zero sum 
game: the fact that Britain benefited from empire does not necessarily mean that the rest 
of the empire lost and vice versa. 
*' Feinstein (1972a), Table 38. 
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given their financial dependence on Britain. Assuming that empire 
accounted for 50 per cent of service exports (£42m.) divided equally 
between Dominions and dependent empire gives an income on the strong 
standard of £!14.3m. + £5.3m. = £19.6m. Actual visible and invisible 
trade in 1937 was therefore £264.Im. + £42m. = £306.Im.: the same 
trade on the strong standard would be £125m. + 19.6m. + £144.6m. 
T h e g a i n f r o m t h e e m p i r e on t r a d e is t h e n 
£306.1m. - £144.6m. = £161.5m. This was 3.3 per cent of GNP which 
has been estimated at £4,193m. *^ . 
ü) FOREIGNINVESTMENT 
As in Edelstein's pre-1914 calculation, it is assumed that a fall in 
investment in the Dominions would be compensated by rises in interest 
rates so that the effects cancel out. Investment in the dependent empire 
is reported at £639m. in 1937 out of a total invested abroad of £3,240m. *' 
which, on the assumption of a 6 per cent annual retum ^, gives an income 
of £38m. Under strong standard assumptions, investments would be one 
fífth (£128m) but the retums would be twice as high (12 per cent) giving 
an income of £15.4m. The loss of actual income would be £38m. — £15.4m. 
or £22.6m. which was 0.54 per cent of GNP. As Balogh admitted, the 
reported figures do not account for a great deal of direct investment 
overseas. Assuming that total foreign investment in 1937 was about 
£5.1bn. *' rather than the 3.24bn. reported by Balogh, and that the share 
of the dependent empire was commensurately higher, total British 
investment there would have been £1020m. Assuming a 12 per cent retum, 
the investment gain from the dependent empire on this basis would have 
been 0.72 per cent of GNP and the overall benefits of both trade and 
investment with the empire would sum to approximately 4 per cent of 
GNP. It should be noted that, given the poor quality of the data on overseas 
investment, these figures are even more problematic than those for pre-1914 
discussed in the text. The statistics of British foreign investment in the 
1930s are in urgent need of the attention already applied to the pre-war 
period. 
^ National Income figures are from Mitchell (1988). 
" Balogh (1947), p. 254. 
^ Bames(1939),p.74. 
" Figures from Feinstein (1972b). 
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iii) DEFENCECOSTS 
In 1937 defence expenditure was: army and ordnance, £54,8m; navy, 
£81. Im; air forcé, £50. Im, giving a total of £186m or 3.8 per cent of 
GNP *^ 
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ITALY'S LATE AND UNPROFITABLE 
FORAYS INTO EMPIRE 
GIOVANNI FEDERICO 
Universiiy of Pisa 
1. INTRODUCnON: SOME fflSTORY 
Italy's colonial history is better known for its failures (notably the battle 
of Adwa, the major defeat of a Western power by an African army in 
the 19th century) than for its achievements. Italy succeeded in conquering 
a substantial «empire» only in the 20th century, when the traditional 
colonial powers were already in retreat ^ But this has not always been 
the case. The Venetian republic successfully ruled for many centuries the 
first «colonial» empire in Western Europe ^ . 
Venice's «colonial» expansión dates back to the llth century, when 
the «Serenissima» began to subdue other commercial (and pirating) centres 
along the Dalmatian coast as part of its successful effort to control the 
Adriatic Sea. Most of its empire was however acquired at the beginning 
of the 13th century, when the Fourth crusade was diverted from its mission 
in order to conquer Costantinople. As payment for the transportation of 
the army, Venice obtained part of the Eubean peninsula and other harbours 
on the Greek coast, Crete, and other islands in the Aegean Sea. Later 
it added Corfú (1386) and in 1489 Cyprus. In fact in the second half 
of the 15th century the tide had changed under the new aggressive policy 
of the Turks which materialised after the fall of the Byzantine Empire. 
As early as 1470 Venice lost all its possessions in mainiand Greece, and 
from then on it had to wage a costly defensive war for more than two 
centuries. The Venetian Empire was the first bulwark of Christian Europe 
against Turkish expansión on the sea, as the Austrian Empire was on land. 
* The author wishes to thank L. Pezzolo, M. Lenci, A. Baccini, the editors of the 
volume and all the participants to the Madrid pre-conference for the useful comments and 
suggestions. He is to be blamed for all the remaining shortcomings of the paper. 
' Del Boca (1985, 1986, 1988). 
^ Lañe (1973), Cozzi-Knapton (1986), Cozzi-Knapton-Scarabello (1992). Here I define 
«colony» as a territory managed —more or less loosely— from the mother country. This 
definition does not fit the case of Genoa, whose holdings in the Eastem Mediterranean 
and around the Black Sea in the Middle Ages were independen! setdements of merchants. 
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In the long run, the «Serenissima» lost almost all its colonies, despite 
episodes of heroic defence such as the siegas of Famagosta (Cyprus) in 
1570-71 and Candia (Crete) in a tweive years'war (1645-69), and occasional 
backlashes (such as the conquest of Peloponnesus in 1699-1714). Only 
the military decline of the Ottoman Empire allowed Venice to maintain 
the Greek isles of Corfú, Cefalonia and Zante until the demise of the 
republic in 1797 as relies of a bygone age. 
After the fall of Venice, no-one in the Italian península bothered about 
colonial expansión. The few Italians who cared for grand political strategies 
concentrated their efforts on the unification of the country, which was 
achieved in 1861. The new state faced so many problems that it could 
not pay much attention to the scramble for colonies, which other great 
powers were pursuing. As early as 1870 Italy purchased, using the navigation 
company «Rubattino» as a proxy, an área around Asáb, on the bank of 
the Red Sea. But this possession was left unoccupied until 1880 .^ Two 
years later, the thin veil of «prívate» property was removed and the área 
became Italy's fírst colony. In 1885 the colony (Erítrea) was extended, 
by occupying the much more important harbour of Meswa (Massaua). In 
the following decade Italy, especially under the Crispi govemments 
(1887-1889 and 1893-1896), pursued an aggressive expansionary policy 
in East Afríca. It established a foothold on the Southern Somalí coast 
by bríbing local chíefs and rentíng some ports from the Sultán of Zanzíbar 
with British approval. The área became an Italian protectorate in 1891. 
The State opted however for indírect rule, by prívate companíes - the 
«Societá Filonardí» from 1893 to 1896 and the «Societá del Benadir» 
from 1900 to 1905. Italian policy in the North was much less successful, 
as it had to deal with an (albeit loosely) organísed state, Ethíopia. Italy 
fírst tried to impose a protectorate on the new Negus, Menelík, and when 
he refused, waged an outríght war of conquest. The campaign ended with 
the dísaster of Adwa, which caused the fall of Crispi and díscredíted hís 
imperíalístic policy. Italy retained Erítrea (ín spite of some plans to sell 
it to Belgíum) and Somalia, which retumed definitively to state rule in 
1905, as the «Societá del Benadir» was unable to manage it properly. 
Yet the govemments díd not forget colonial expansión. As early as 1900-2 
Italy had its «ríght» to Trípolítanía and Cirenaica, stíll offícíally under 
Ottoman empire, recognísed by other major powers thanks to a skílful 
diplomacy''. That «ríght» was exercísed in 1911 by the Gíolittí goverrunent. 
' Doria (1990), pp. 129-140 and 209 ff. 
'' Italy also participated to the war against Boxers in 1901, gaining a minuscule concession 
in the town of Tien-tsin. 
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Italy's sovereignty on these lands (later christened Libya) was recognised 
by the treaty of Ouchy (1912), while the treaty of Sevres (1920) added 
isles in the Aegean sea which Italy had occupied during the war against 
Turkey. However, Italy's grip on Libya was restricted to the coastal áreas 
by the endemic revolt of the indigenous populations. This was not quelled 
until the late 1920s, after a long and bloody war, waged with aerial bombing 
and mass deportations. In the same years, Italy extended its colony in 
Somalia northwards, on territories ceded by the United Kingdom. But the 
big prize remained Ethiopia, which was then one of the two independent 
States in África. In October 1935, after forty years of peaceful reiations, 
Mussolini's government invaded Ethiopia. In a few months the Italian army 
won (in spite of sanctions by the League of Nations), thanks to its technical 
superiority and to the massive use of gas. The war ended officially in May 
1936, with the proclamation of Italy's king as Emperor of Ethiopia, but 
the guerrilla warfare went on until 1941. But eventually, Italy had a real 
colonial empire. Though much smaller than the British or French empires, 
it nevertheless was not negligible. In 1939, it extended over 3.5 millions 
of square kilometres (i.e. more than ten times the metropolitan territory), 
and contained about 13-15 millions inhabitants .^ It did not last for long. 
AU the colonies were lost in the first years of World War Two. Italy however 
was given by the United Nations a temporary mándate on Libya and 
Somalia. 
2. THE MOTIVES FOR IMPERIALISM 
The Venetian Stato da mar (maritime empire) differed radically from 
the 19th century empires. It consisted in «a string of tiny settlements» , 
scattered aU over the Mediterranean and the Levant. At its peak, in the 
1550s, it included perhaps 650,000 inhabitants, against 1.6 millions in the 
Véneto ''. Venice in the Middle Ages was fírst and foremost a trading 
nation, and she needed colonies to support her commerce and navigation. 
They were primarily bases for supplying galleys, which constituted the 
' According to 1936 census ihere were about 750000 inhabitants in Libya and 140000 
•n the Aegean islands, plus an estimated 12.1 millions in East África (Annuario 1939). This 
last figure may have been underestimated. The 1931 census had counted about one million 
People in Somalia, while according to Maddison (1995, tab., p. 116) the population of 
Ethiopia increased from 9 millions in 1913 to 18.5 in 1950. 
' Braudel(1973),p. 846. 
' Cozzi-Knapton (19??), p. 206. 
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backbone of Venetían fleet and could not stay at sea for long periods. 
Besides, the colonies on mainland were useful for trade with the 
surrounding natíves, and as entrepots at the end of longer trade routes 
(as in the Black Sea). Last but not least, the colonies and the interior 
provided oarsmen and sailors (very precious human capital in times of 
war). Colonies were thus really important for the prosperity of the Venetian 
republic in the Middle Ages, but it is impossible to assess whether or not 
they were absolutely indispensable. 
In the 16th and 17th centuries the role of the «Stato da mar» changed. 
Commercial gaUeys were abandoned, and navigation and trade lost some 
of their erstwhile importance for the Venetian economy. They provided 
a living to the members of the ruling aristocracy - first as feudal lords 
and later as state employees. And above all, they became more and more 
important as suppliers of agricultural goods - cereals, wine, salt *, oi l ' , 
etc. All these goods were officially reserved to Venetian commerce to be 
sold only in Venice. In spite of the extensive smuggling, the Venetian 
merchants were able to reap some nice rents, even if it is impossible to 
estimate how large. It is impossible as well to estímate the costs of empire. 
Officially the colonies were a net liability at least in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, as the costs of wars to defend them outstripped the direct 
revenue ^^. These latter however do not include the indirect proceeds such 
as the duties collected in Venice on the importation of colonial wares. 
It is likely that in its second period the Stato da mar was a net liability 
for Venice. However, in the very long run the contribution of the Empire 
might have positive. 
The same cannot be said of the 19th century imperialism. Italy was 
then still a backward country. Why did it want an empire? Economic 
motives in the strict sense do not seem to have played a major role. 
Investment of Italian capital in each colony before conquest was small 
if not negligible. The «Rubattino» company was interested only in gaining 
approval from the govemment in order to obtain subsidies for its main 
shipping business, and the Italian interest in Eritrea was limited to a handful 
of petty traders. In the late 1880s-1890s some Northern industrialists gave 
token support to colonial initiatives, but they dreamt of peaceful commercial 
expansión, not of military conquest '^ Surely «there never were prívate 
Hocquet(1990). 
Mattozzí (1980). 
° Pe22olo(1990). 
' Podestá(1996). 
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interests sufficiently strong to promote Italy's first colonial expansión»? '^. 
This statement holds tme for Libya in the 1910s and for Ethiopia in the 
1930s as well. In both cases, the commercial enterprises were undertaken 
more as a means of gaining political influence than for their economic 
worth. The Italian Foreign Office strongly encouraged and to some extent 
directed the investments of «Banco di Roma» (the fourth largest Italian 
bank) in Libya in the late 1900s ^'. And in the 1920s the govemment 
partitioned Ethiopia with France and the United Kingdom into spheres 
of economic influence well before Italian businessmen showed any sign 
of concrete interests in the área. 
Italian colonialism seems to have been driven mainly by domestic 
politics. Crispi in the 1890s needed to divert attention from the social 
unrest and from a banking and financial crisis. Giolitti used the conquest 
of Libya to secure support from the right for his coalition. Mussolini wanted 
to consolidate the growing consensus around his regime, by avenging Adwa 
and by boosting his personal image as a leader. However, these ploys would 
not have worked if the colonial issue had not struck chords with at least 
part of public opinión '"*. The ground had been prepared since the late 
1870s by the propaganda of a small but growing and vociferous bunch 
of nationalists ' ' . They insisted that a colonial empire was indispensable 
for any great power. This ideology was shared also by Crispi and Mussolini 
(who coined the famous slogan of a «place in the sun»), if not by the 
highly pragmatic Giolitti. 
It would be poindess to discuss all facets of this nationalistic rhetoric 
— the «civilising mission» of the Italian «race», the recall of the glorious 
Román past etc. It will suffice to remind its economic components. As 
usual in the 19th century, colonies were considered both as markets for 
industrial products and sources of raw materials, in conspicuously short 
supply in Italy '^ . But Italian colonial ideology added a further argument: 
the colonies were supposed to relieve overpopulation in Italy's 
countryside '^ . Estimates of the number of potential settlers look absolutely 
'^  Labanca (1993), p. 100. 
" De Rosa (1981), pp. 241-296. 
" One has to remind that until 1912 the voting rights were restricted to a (growing) 
niinority of males —so that colonialism might have been politically expedient even if 
unpopular among the public at large. 
" Miege (1968) and Are (1985). 
"" In the 1930s, it was also argued that the colonies couid eam foreign currency by 
running a trade surplus with other countries. 
" Podestá(1996). 
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fantastic. Those for Ethiopia ranged from a «modest» 1.5 million people 
to 5-6 or even 12 millions '*. Clearly, most of these «economic» arguments 
had more to do with politics than with the welfare of the Italians. The 
«independence» from imported raw materials was meaningless in an 
íntegrated world market, except in wartime. Even in this case the strategy 
was deeply flawed as the sea-borne transport of raw material was conditional 
on the goodwill of the Royal Navy. The emigration to colonies instead 
of to, say, the United States could have allowed Italians to retain cultural 
or political ties to the metrópolis, but would not have increased the welfare 
of emigrants. Indeed, it may well have reduced it, to the extent that they 
would have probably eamed more as industrial workers in Philadelphia 
than as farmers in Ethiopia. A reduction of emigrants' income would have 
hit Italy's economy, as their remittances were an important component 
o f theGNP. 
My paper will show that, in spite of all the propaganda, the empire 
was a net loss for Italy. A country can gain from its colonies (i.e. attain 
a higher level of welfare) either if it extracts a net contributors to the 
State coffers or if it succeeds in «exploiting» its colonies by using its political 
power. It has to turn the terms of colonial trade in its favour (forcing 
the colonies to pay more for imports and to receive less for exports than 
the world market price) and/or to derive retums on investments of its 
own capital higher than the normal competitive rates. In the case of Venice 
the gains from trade exploitation may have exceeded the costs for the 
State budget. Alas, the Italian colonies never became financially 
self-sufficient. While until the late 1930s trade and direct investments were 
negligible, and henee rents from exploitation could not have been 
substantial. My last, speculative, section discusses to what extent these 
outcomes were unavoidable. 
3. THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EMPIRE 
Italy never extracted a net income from its colonies. The so-called local 
revenues (which anyway included import duties and the proceeds from 
the taxation of the Italian business) were very small. On average, from 
1921-2 to 1929-30 they accounted for a mere 30% of total colonial 
expenditures ' ' . The balance came from Italy. The exact amount of these 
" Del Boca (1986), pp, 154-5 and 194. 
" Larebo(1993)tab. 2. 
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TABLEl 
Total expenditures for colantes 
1882 
1883 
1884 (Isem.) 
1884-85 
1885-86 
1886-87 
1887-88 
1888-89 
1889-90 
1890-91 
1891-92 
1892-93 
1893-94 
1894-95 
1895-96 
1896-97 
1897-98 
1898-99 
1899-00 
1900-01 
1901-02 
1902-03 
1903-04 
1904-05 
1905-06 
1906-07 
1907-08 
1908-09 
1909-10 
1910-11 
1911-12 
1912-13 
1913-14 
1914-15 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
RGS 
2 
33 
17 
26 
21 
17 
13 
10 
9 
83 
55 
32 
21 
9 
9 
19 
20 
13 
10 
21 
9 
9 
11 
14 
11 
68 
306 
196 
368 
390 
883 
215 
286 
Current pnces 
(millions Itre) 
Repací 
334 
498 
14 
170 
237 
149 
147 
168 
Tesoro 
0 
0 
9 
5 
9 
43 
19 
25 
22 
15 
9 
10 
14 
123 
49 
16 
10 
9 
9 
9 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
11 
11 
12 
13 
14 
170 
241 
154 
151 
175 
Constant pnces 
(millions of 1913 lire) 
RGS 
2 
41 
20 
30 
24 
20 
17 
13 
12 
107 
71 
41 
26 
11 
11 
23 
25 
16 
13 
26 
10 
10 
13 
16 
12 
69 
302 
200 
330 
250 
385 
63 
66 
Repaci 
337 
491 
14 
152 
152 
65 
43 
39 
Tesoro 
0 
0 
11 
6 
11 
54 
22 
29 
25 
18 
11 
13 
18 
158 
63 
21 
12 
11 
10 
10 
10 
10 
10 
14 
9 
9 
10 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
152 
154 
67 
44 
41 
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1919-20 
1920-21 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
RGS 
260 
263 
397 
336 
460 
295 
498 
745 
662 
560 
573 
495 
484 
481 
461 
1175 
11006 
13613 
12357 
9704 
9448 
Current pnces 
(millions lire) 
Repací 
225 
232 
282 
255 
414 
420 
406 
620 
638 
494 
526 
490 
441 
464 
456 
1422 
12387 
18537 
12040 
10229 
1975 
Tesoro 
239 
244 
300 
266 
432 
441 
433 
590 
648 
509 
531 
Constant prices 
(millions of 1913 lire) 
RGS 
50 
46 
73 
61 
84 
51 
80 
129 
128 
113 
125 
122 
132 
142 
145 
355 
2997 
3239 
2638 
1962 
1727 
Repaci 
43 
41 
52 
47 
76 
72 
65 
107 
123 
100 
115 
121 
120 
137 
143 
430 
3373 
4410 
2571 
2068 
361 
Tesoro 
46 
43 
55 
49 
79 
76 
70 
102 
125 
103 
116 
SouRCES: RGS: Ragionería, 1969; Repaci: Repaci, 1962; Tesoro: Ministero del Tesoro, 
1914 and 1931. 
transfers is however not so easy to ascertain (see Appendix A). Three major 
estimates on total expenditures are reported in table 1, in current and 
constant (1913) prices. The figures differ, especially in wartime, but they 
all show a great difference between «peace» and «war» (inclusive of the 
whole period of Fascist rule of Ethiopia). 
In «peaceful» years the Italian colonies were not expensive to run. 
They were comparatively small and the costs of administration and 
investments were kept to a minimum. As late as 1931 the total staff at 
the Ministry for Colonies at home and in the colonies- consisted of 7,025 
civilians (2,766 Italian and 4,259 natives) and 14,143 soldiers and 
offícers ^°. Table 3 reports some details on the composition of expenditure 
^ Annuario(1932). 
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in 1928-29, a year fairly representative of the early Fascist period. Two 
thirds of the total was spent for military purposes —i.e. the repression 
of the insurgency, which the source calis deceitfully «military pólice 
operations... to reorganise the defence of the territory» ^'. Italian parsimony 
denied the natives the only possible benefits from colonisatíon, an extensive 
modem civü service and large investments in infrastructures. Italy obtained 
the status of colonial power on the cheap. Even according to the highest 
estímate, before 1935 outlays did not exceed a 3% of total expenditures, 
much less than the expenses for growth-enhancing items, such education 
(8.5% on average from 1882 to 1939-40) or public works (15%)^^. A 
fortiori, the incidence on GDP was small (table 2). On average each Italian 
paid about 1.3 (1913) lire —i.e. roughly half the average daily wage of 
industrial workers on the eve of World War One ^'. The impact on the 
Italian economy was corresponding smaU if not negligible. 
On the other hand, the colonial wars were expensive, and increasingly 
so (table 2). The first Ethiopian war absorbed «only» 3-5% of state 
expenditures, the Libyan 10% to 15% (according to the estimates), while 
the conquest of Ethiopia swallowed up to half of total expenditure. The 
end of the war did not cause expenditures to fall back to the pre-war 
levéis. Mussolini's new empire needed a larger administration, so that in 
1938 the staff of the Ministry of Colonies had tripled to 25,292 plus 57,092 
permanent military personnel ^''. On top of this, the guerrilla war engaged 
an unknown but substantial number of so-called «metropolitan» soldiers 
on «temporary» assignment ^ .^ Furthermore, the Fascist govemment 
invested large sums in Ethiopia. In four years it built some 4000 km. of 
good roads (particularly useful for military purposes) and several modem 
public buildings^^. The Fascist Empire was, therefore, quite expensive. 
Before 1940, the expenditures never dropped below 15% the total 
expenditures. The annual cost per-capita soared to almost 60 (1913) lire 
—i.e. the equivalent of 20 days of pay for an average industrial worker. 
'^ Ministero del Tesoro (1931), p. 477. In that particular year the military expenditures 
slightly exceeded the transfers from Italy. In other words, the Eritreans and Somalis 
contributed towards the repression of Libyans. Local revenue paid for all other services 
—including the keeping of Itaüan staff. 
" Brosio-Marchese(1986). 
" The figure of the text is an average of the (fiscal) years 1886-7 to 1894-95, 1897-98 
to 1911-12 and 1917-18 to 1933-34. The average for the whole period 1886-87 to 1933-34 
was 2.10 lire. The wage data are from Zamagni 1976 and 1984. 
^* Annuario(1939). 
" DelBoca(1986), p. 316. 
'" Miege (1968), pp. 254-55. 
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TABLE2 
Expenditures for colonies: percentages 
On State expenditure On GDP 
1882 
1883 
1884 (1 sem.) 
1884-85 
1885-86 
1886-87 
1887-88 
1888-89 
1889-90 
1890-91 
1891-92 
1892-93 
1893-94 
1894-95 
1895-96 
1896-97 
1897-98 
1898-99 
1899-00 
1900-01 
1901-02 
1902-03 
1903-04 
1904-05 
1905-06 
1906-07 
1907-08 
1908-09 
1909-10 
1910-11 
1911-12 
1912-13 
1913-14 
1914-15 
1915-16 
1916-17 
1917-18 
1918-19 
1919-20 
RGS 
0.12 
1.72 
0.88 
1.35 
1.14 
0.92 
0.75 
0.58 
0.52 
4.65 
3.18 
1.91 
1.21 
0.52 
0.51 
1.08 
1.12 
0.71 
0.54 
0.93 
0.41 
0.43 
0.45 
0.56 
0.41 
2.34 
9.75 
6.36 
6.59 
3.59 
5.37 
0.94 
1.04 
1.24 
Repací 
13.41 
17.52 
0.50 
3.05 
2.21 
0.87 
0.58 
0.53 
0.98 
Tesoro 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.57 
0.33 
0.56 
2.26 
0.92 
1.38 
1.22 
0.89 
0.53 
0.54 
0.80 
7.00 
2.92 
0.97 
0.59 
0.52 
0.51 
0.47 
0.46 
0.44 
0.43 
0.47 
0.38 
0.36 
0.35 
0.44 
0.41 
0.43 
0.41 
0.51 
3.11 
2.26 
0.87 
0.50 
0.54 
1.03 
RGS 
0.02 
0.29 
0.15 
0.21 
0.16 
0.13 
0.11 
0.08 
0.07 
0.68 
0.46 
0.26 
0.16 
0.07 
0.06 
0.13 
0.14 
0.09 
0.07 
0.13 
0.05 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.05 
0.31 
1.33 
0.83 
1.40 
1.11 
1.82 
0.33 
0.36 
0.27 
Repací 
1.52 
2.16 
0.06 
0.65 
0.68 
0.31 
0.22 
0.21 
0.23 
Tesoro 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.05 
0.10 
0.46 
0.19 
0.24 
0.19 
0.14 
0.09 
0.11 
0.15 
1.30 
0.53 
0.17 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.09 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.58 
0.44 
0.14 
0.07 
0.05 
0.05 
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1920-21 
1921-22 
1922-23 
1923-24 
1924-25 
1925-26 
1926-27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
1930-31 
1931-32 
1932-33 
1933-34 
1934-35 
1935-36 
1936-37 
1937-38 
1938-39 
1939-40 
On 
RGS 
1.27 
1.56 
0.81 
1.50 
1.43 
2.51 
3.41 
2.83 
2.26 
2.71 
2.32 
2.13 
2.13 
1.89 
5.21 
31.23 
34.74 
31.22 
23.75 
17.36 
State expenditure 
Repací 
0.65 
0.82 
1.18 
2.01 
2.02 
1.89 
2.40 
2.47 
2.17 
2.30 
2.04 
1.67 
1.88 
1.67 
5.22 
48.61 
53.41 
27.87 
25.03 
4.71 
Tesoro 
0.67 
0.84 
1.20 
2.02 
2.18 
2.08 
2.81 
3.31 
2.59 
2.70 
RGS 
0.23 
0.33 
0.26 
0.34 
0.19 
0.28 
0.43 
0.40 
0.34 
0.36 
0.34 
0.36 
0.37 
0.36 
0.86 
7.30 
7.97 
6.45 
4.62 
3.94 
OnGDP 
Repací 
0.20 
0.23 
0.20 
0.30 
0.27 
0.23 
0.36 
0.39 
0.30 
0.33 
0.34 
0.33 
0.36 
0.36 
1.04 
8.22 
10.85 
6.28 
4.87 
0.82 
Tesoro 
0.04 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.08 
0.06 
0.07 
SouRCE; Colonial expenditures tab. 1 GDP Rossi, Sorgato Toniolo (interpolated back-
wards in 1886-1890 with Ercolani 1969 and average of two consecutive years). 
TABLE3 
Revenues and expenditures of lidian Colonies in 1928-29 
(millions ofcurrent lire) 
Military expenditures 
Staff 
Public works 
Economic improvement 
Other 
Railway building 
Total 604.0 135.0 739.8 
Uhya 
453.9 
41.4 
14.8 
27.7 
56.9 
10.0 
East 
África 
45.9 
31.7 
8.8 
6.5 
42.2 
0.0 
Total 
499.8 
73.1 
23.6 
34.2 
99.1 
10.0 
% 
67.6 
9.9 
3.2 
4.6 
13.4 
1.4 
SouRCE: Ministero del Tesoro, 1931, pp. 476-77. 
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The cost of colonial wars was met by increasing the budget déficit, 
as the State revenue/GDP ratio remained roughly constant in all periods. 
Throughout the whole period, the déficit was mainly financed with issues 
of bonds ^ .^ Therefore, the expenditures might have crowded out 
investments or boosted the economy, depending on the economic cycle. 
Neither effect could have been really substantial for the fírst two campaigns, 
as the sums were still small —a 1-1.5% of GDP (at the peak) for the 
first Ethiopian war and a 2% for the conquest of Libya—. The conquest 
of Ethiopia was of a different order of magnitude. The budget déficit soared 
fi-om a modest 2.5% of GDP in the early 1930s to 7% from 1935-36 
to 1938-9. All the increment was due entirely to colonial expenditures. 
Without them, the déficit would have decreased from 2.2% to a mere 
0.4% of GDP. One could argüe that the conquest of Ethiopia was 
instrumental in supporting the aggregate demand, and henee in helping 
Italy out of the Great Depression *^. It was anyway the worst possible 
type of support, apart from its moral implications. A substantial part of 
the colonial expenditures was spent abroad, and therefore did not increase 
the welfare of the Italian population. 
4. THE MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TRADE 
AND COLONISATION 
Did Italy get anything in exchange for its money? Was it able to 
«exploit» its colonies? An exhaustive reply would rely on a detailed analysis 
of colonial trade (pnces, quality of the goods etc.) and of investments 
in the colonies. It may be diffícult to gather the necessary evidence, but 
such research is largely unnecessary. The colonial trade has been very small 
until the 1930s (tab. 4). Before 1895, it was so small that the statistical 
office did not bother to register the colonies as a sepárate entry in the 
trade statistics. In the early 1900s the trade grew somewhat, but it still 
remained negÜgible before the conquest of Libya, which triggered a 
short-lived boom in exports to the colonies. Imports from colonies increased 
as well, but they remained far smaller than exports. Both imports and 
exports increased remarkably throughout the 1920s, albeit not steadily. 
On the eve of Great Crisis, the trade with the colonies was six or seven 
" Spinelli-Fratíanni (1991), Ministero del Tesoro (1988), Salvemini-Zamagni (1993), 
tab. 2.2, and Maione (1979). 
2« Toniolo (1980), pp. 336-37. 
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1895 
1896 
1897 
1898 
1899 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
TABLE4 
Trade with colonies 
Valué (milliom 1913 lire) 
Exports 
2.38 
1.04 
0.99 
1.29 
1.42 
2.17 
2.15 
2.53 
2.17 
2.80 
5.01 
8.04 
7.54 
5.77 
8.99 
9.63 
38.00 
111.86 
93.85 
80.41 
73.80 
49.46 
35.56 
18.22 
30.76 
32.58 
22.68 
23.71 
32.32 
46.86 
46.94 
47.95 
62.25 
64.23 
77.68 
64.87 
65.65 
69.65 
74.18 
Imports 
0.29 
0.89 
0.28 
0.25 
0.22 
0.42 
1.20 
1.29 
0.82 
4.98 
3.46 
5.19 
4.25 
4.14 
4.37 
2.13 
4.09 
11.31 
11.36 
10.76 
21.18 
15.80 
13.03 
16.58 
42.31 
22.72 
6.25 
7.63 
7.76 
14.69 
23.11 
23.20 
18.80 
23.34 
22.16 
18.75 
20.38 
17.85 
24.56 
Percentages 
Exports 
0.18 
0.08 
0.07 
0.08 
0.08 
0.14 
0.13 
0.14 
0.11 
0.14 
0.24 
0.35 
0.35 
0.29 
0.42 
0.41 
1.64 
4.80 
3.74 
3.49 
3.71 
2.96 
2.95 
2.25 
2.28 
1.63 
1.48 
1.39 
1.60 
1.78 
1.57 
1.61 
2.09 
2.24 
2.53 
2.32 
2.43 
3.61 
3.99 
on total 
Imports 
0.02 
0.06 
0.02 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
0.06 
0.06 
0.04 
0.20 
0.14 
0.17 
0.13 
0.12 
0.12 
0.06 
0.11 
0.31 
0.31 
0.35 
0.57 
0.35 
0.26 
0.43 
1.15 
0.50 
0.21 
0.26 
0.25 
0.41 
0.54 
0.56 
0.48 
0.56 
0.50 
0.47 
0.66 
0.76 
1.06 
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Malue (millions 1913 lire) Percentages on total 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Exports 
82.26 
216.44 
442.63 
570.15 
505.74 
465.54 
Imports 
29.60 
36.86 
40.33 
77.32 
43.16 
54.65 
Exports 
4.96 
14.31 
30.96 
24.73 
23.32 
21.72 
Imports 
1.21 
1.64 
2.59 
2.51 
1.85 
2.68 
SouRCE: Ministero delle finanze, ad annum. 
times greater than it had been in the late 1900s, but it still accounted 
for only 2.5% of Italian exports and 0.5% of imports. The Great Crisis, 
and the conquest of Ethiopia, drastically changed the situation. From 1929 
to 1937, while overall trade was falling because of autarkic policy at home 
and of the spread of protectionism abroad, imports from the colonies 
increased 3.5 times and exports 7.3. An increase in colonial trade was 
hardly an Italian peculiarity, as many countries resorted to imperial 
preferences and captive markets to dispose of their exports. Italy, however, 
stands out for the extent of the change and the size of the surplus on 
its balance of colonial trade. In fact, even at their all-time peak, in 1937, 
imports from colonies still did not exceed 3% of total imports. On the 
other hand, the empire became the most important destination of Italian 
exports. On average, from 1936 to 1939 it accounted for a quarter of 
the total (Germany ranked second with about 15%). The colonies' needs 
however exceeded Italy's resources, and therefore they had to resort to 
imports from other countries. In 1937, Guarneri, the Minister for Foreign 
Exchange, in a very worried memo to Mussolini, stated that the outflow 
was the main cause of the difficulties of the Italian balance of payments ^^ . 
The small scale of the colonial commerce (apart from the late 1930s) 
contrasted with the rosy propaganda of the nationalists, but it is hardly 
surprising. The Italian colonies could not be a major outlet for Italian 
products because like the rest of África they were extremely poor and 
economically backward. Exports from Italy either consisted of 
procurements for the govemment or were consumed by the Italian 
population, mostly on the official payroll. In other words, the exports to 
" (1994), pp. 759-61. 
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TABLE 5a 
Exports to colonies aspercentage of total exports, selected products 
Macaroni 
Cotton fabric 
Cotton yam 
Manufactures of artificial fibres 
Machinery and tools 
Agricultura! machinery and tools 
Scientific instruments 
Cameras 
Telegraphic and phone equipment 
Radio equipment 
Computing machines 
Cars and lorries 
Motorcycles and bicycles 
Phosphatic fertüisers 
Nitrogenous fertüisers 
Potassic fertilisers 
Glass sheets 
Furniture and wooden manufactures 
Paper 
Cardboard 
Paper manufactures 
Shoes 
Bulbs 
Electric wires 
1929 
14.6 
3.3 
2.3 
n.a. 
7.6 
8.6 
n.a. 
19.9 
10.3 
31.4 
13.4 
13.4 
9.1 
4.4 
1.8 
100 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
21.3 
3.8 
n.a. 
1936 
85.4 
35.5 
22.6 
14.1 
58.1 
90.0 
69.1 
94.5 
61.3 
84.5 
84.8 
84.8 
84.2 
83.9 
67.0 
113 
11.% 
63.8 
48.0 
83.0 
71.2 
83.7 
78.6 
85.0 
1938 
84.0 
22.6 
26.3 
26.8 
50.7 
79.4 
48.2 
25.5 
81.2 
59.1 
75.4 
75.4 
36.7 
90.4 
93.7 
52.0 
69.5 
57.8 
37.3 
44.0 
65.1 
69.1 
55.5 
16.8 
colonies were ultimately paid for by state transfers. This feature became 
olear in the late 1930s. Guarneri remarked that «all the economy of the 
Empire thrived in an artificial climate which was only nourished by the 
transfer of goods and money that the mother-country gave with the largess 
of a great lady» ^°. Italy supplied her colonies with almost everything, 
including foodstuffs (in 1938 the single largest export was flour). Colonies 
were indeed the main or the solé export market for «advanced» industry, 
such as chemicals or engineering (table 5a), but these goods accounted 
only for a third of total exports (table 6). On the other hand, the colonial 
market was relatively unimportant for almost all industries. As shown by 
(1994), p. 749. 
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TABLE 5b 
Importsfrom colonies as percentage 
of total imports, selected products 
Hemp and Unen 
Wheat 
Tropical fruit 
Cotton 
Raw hides 
1929 
1.2 
0.2 
100.0 
0.4 
7.8 
1936 
0.0 
5.2 
100.0 
1.5 
26.8 
19)8 
8.3 
4.9 
100.0 
1.6 
25.5 
SouRCE; Paradisi, 1978, tab. 7a. 
TABLEÓ 
Compoútion of exports to colonies, 1938 
Food 28.62 
Textiles and clothing 22.26 
Building material, glass, earthenware 5.79 
Wood and miscellaneous consumer goods * 6.05 
Metallurgy and engineering 27.39 
Chemicals, oü products and artificial fibers 5.13 
Rubber and rubber shoes 4.77 
* Includes jewelry, paperware, haijerdashery, electrical material. 
SouRCE: Ministero delle finanze, 1938. 
the (not totally accurate) data of table 7, exports to colonies exceeded 
10% of total sales only for the production of rubber goods, beer and perhaps 
machinery. 
Imports from colonies were low simply because the ItaÜan colonies 
were poorly endowed with natural resources. There were practically no 
valuable deposits of minarais apart some gold in Ethiopia and the Libyan 
oilfields, which, unfortvanately, were discovered only after the war. Ñor 
was land abundant. Libya and Somalia consisted mosdy of desert. Ethiopia 
did have a lot of good land, suitable for the production of coffee and 
cotton, for forestry and for cattle-raising, but it was not free as the Italian 
authorities assumed. The native population justly resented all attempts by 
Italians to expropriate land and/or to forcé peasants to specialise in the 
production of cash crops. 
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TABLE7 
Exports to colonies as percentage of total sales, 
selected producís c. 1938 
Rubber shoes 
Beer 
Machinery 
Mineral water 
Rubber manufactures 
Cement and lime 
Profumes 
Earthenware 
Spirits 
Fabrics 
Fumiture and wooden manufactures 
Jewelry 
Tobacco 
Steel goods 
Textile manufactures (other than fabrics) 
Brushes 
Bricks 
Prepared fruit and legumes 
Wood 
Paints and colours 
Vehicles 
Bulbs 
Glasswares 
Scientific Instruments 
Drugs 
Leather shoes 
Petroleum products 
Paper manufactures 
Cotton yam 
Soaps 
Paper and cardboard 
Hats 
Electrical wires 
Flour 
Artificial fibers 
Films 
Asphalt 
Communication equipment 
Fertilizers 
33.0 
22.2 
12.7 
11.4 
10.8 
9.9 
8.9 
7.2 
6.6 
6.3 
6.1 
5.3 
4.6 
4.4 
4.3 
4.0 
3.6 
3.4 
3.3 
3.3 
3.3 
3.0 
2.9 
2.9 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
2.1 
2.0 
1.9 
1.9 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
0.9 
0.3 
0.3 
SouRCES: Exports Ministero delle finanze, 1938; Sales Censimento, 
1937-39. 
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The Italians realised slowly that prospects were so unappeaüng. Since 
the 1890s, the myth of the colonial riches attracted many adventurers and 
also few respectable businessmen. They put forward many fantastic plans 
for the exploitation («valorizzazione») of the colonies, most of which relied 
on State subsidies ^'. Few of these plans were ever realised. Possibly the 
only success-story was the establishment of plantations in Somalia in the 
1920s, which grew sugarcane, cotton and especially bananas ^^ . From 1932 
to 1940 the output of bananas soared from 1600 to 40000 tons and they 
constituted the second largest item of colonial exports, after raw hides 
(table 5b). However, the Italian population paid dearly for this success. 
Somali cost twice as much as Central American bananas ^^ , and since 1935 
the ItaHans were forced to buy them by the monopoly of the «Regia Azienda 
monopoli banane» ^'*. The outcome of other development initiatives was 
even worse, or perhaps one should say no better for Italians' welfare. The 
most striking case was the production of cotton. It was the largest item 
in Italian imports, and therefore the development of domestic production 
was a top priority in autarkic policy. The target was to produce up to 
one million quintáis (about two thirds of the consumption). The govemment 
set up a marketing board, the «Ente per il cotone dell'África Italiana» ^ .^ 
Its task was to oversee the production of cotton by local peasants (giving 
technical assistance, distributing improved seeds etc.), purchasing output 
from peasants (at pnces lower than the market prices) and distributing 
cotton to Italian spinning firms. Unlike the Dutch Java system, the ItaHan 
never worked. Ethiopian cotton accounted for a mere 2% of Italian imports, 
and it was anyway more expensive and qualitatively worse than American 
cotton. 
It is highly unlikely that the investments in colonial enterprises yielded 
large rents before the 1930s. Italy had very litde capital to export (actually 
it was a net importer of capital throughout the whole period), and big 
investors anyway seemed to prefer the Balkans to the colonies '^. Data 
on investments in the colonies are scarce, but all the evidence suggests 
that, in spite of the ambitious plans, the sums invested were puny. For 
instance the «Societá del Benadir», whose board sported big ñames from 
" Labanca (1993), pp. 162 ff.; Larebo (1994), p. 11; Podestá (1996), pp. 205 ff., 
and Grassi (1976). 
" Hess (1966), pp. 121 ff. and 163 ff. Del Boca (1986), pp. 80-83. 
" Hess (1966), p. 167. 
'' DelBoca(1986), p. 215. 
" Miege, p. 255; Del Boca (1986), p. 187, and Larebo (1994), pp. 259 ff 
"• Webster (1975). 
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industry and the aristocracy, had a capital of one million lite, of which 
only a third was paid-up ^^ . It survived thanks to an annual subsidy from 
the Italian government. The plantations in Somalia in the 1920s entailed 
an investment of about 100 millions lire, equivalent to 26-27 millions at 
1913 prices *^. Again Ethiopia fell into another order of magnitude. The 
Fascist government devised a complete plan for investments in several 
activities, which was to be implemented by large monopolies '^. Even if 
most of the plan remained on paper, the official figures were rather 
impressive '"^ . In 1940 the paid-up capital of the industrial and commercial 
firms in the whole of Italian East África amounted to 3.8 billions lire i.e. 
about as much as 7% of the total capital of joint-stock companies in Italy. 
Most were, however, mere commercial outposts for metropolitan 
companies. Only 400 (out of 4007) industrial and 650 (out of 4785) 
commercial companies had some local business, especiaUy in state-financed 
undertakings such as road building and public works. Interestingly, the 
national business élite remained deeply sceptical about the economic 
viability of the empire ''^ 
Last but not least, the colonies never absorbed the mass of Italian 
peasants in the number that populationist propaganda had promised. The 
prospects never aroused much enthusiasm among would-be emigrants, and 
the military estabÜshment which ruled Eritrea in the 1880s and 1890s 
actively discouraged free immigration ^^. And it did not support an official 
scheme for organised colonisation, which failed in 1893-96 '*^. From 1885 
to 1896 only 2000 Italians arrived in Eritrea, against a total of 1.3-1.4 
millions emigrants from Italy'*''. Very few Italians settled in the colonies 
in the next years, and hardly anyone cultivated the land. In the late 1920s, 
the Fascist government stepped up its efforts to support emigration of 
whole peasant families, the so-called «demographic» colonisation'". At 
first, it relied on private initiative, distributing generous subsidies to 
would-be settlers. The results were, however, poor. In the early 1930s the 
" Grassi (1976) and Podestá (1996), pp. 296 ff. 
'» Hess (1966), p. 167. 
" Del Boca (1986), p. 188. 
*> Larebo(1994),pp. 61-62. 
'^ De Feüce (1996), pp. 785-78. 
"^  Labanca(1994), p. 153. 
'^ Labanca (1994), p. 293; Larebo (1994), pp. 13 ff., and Podesta (1996), pp. 262-4. 
"" Fenoaltea(1988), tab. 2. 
•" The establishment of large faims managed by Italians with native workers was called 
«capitalistic» or «industrial» colonisation, according to the destination of the output —the 
colonial market or the exports. 
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TABLE8 
Italian population and agricultural colonisation *,ca. 1939 
Somalia 
Eritrea 
Libya 
Ethiopia 
Acreage 
granted 
64,900 
364,700 
350,000 
(Ha.) 
cultivated 
33,600 
6,000 
224,000 
100,000 
Farmers 
n.a. 
n.a. 
29,876 
2,500-4,000 
Total 
Italians 
15,000 
72,500 
120,000 
93,500 
* Inclusive of «capitalistic» and «industrial». 
SouRCES: Somalia, Eritrea, Libya, Larebo, 1994; Ethiopia, Del Boca, 1986, 
pp. 208 and 213; total italians (november 1939), Miege, 1968, p. 250. 
Italian population in the whole empire numbered about 70,000, only 5000 
of which cultivated the land '*^. Tlierefore the regime switched to the direct 
organisation of the migration •*', setting up elabórate and much publicised 
schemes in Libya ''* and in Ethiopia'". Only few thousands of colons 
settled, and they always remained a tiny minority of the growing Italian 
population in the empire (table 8). As shown by the detailed analysis by 
Larebo (1994) the implementation of the plans in Ethiopia was ridden 
by inefficiency, ignorance of the local conditíons, racism and poor selection 
of the applicants. But even if perfecdy implemented, the idea was 
impractical. A massive settlement would have entailed a largescale 
expropriation of the natíve land, with unbearable political costs. In Ethiopia 
the original estímate of the cost of settiement was 50,000 lire per 
household-farm but the real cost ranged between 80,000 and 140,000'". 
The colonisation of Libya was even more expensive as the living conditíons 
of the setders were decidedly better — an average of 170,000-180,000 
lire per household " . Even the limited number of setders cost about one 
billion lire '^. The official target of one million of families could, therefore, 
have cost up to 150 to 200 billion lire (including the infrastructures), roughly 
as much as the whole Italian GDP. Furthermore, new farms were not 
«• Persegani (1981), p. 582; Miege (1968), p. 196, and Ipsen (1997), p. 175. 
'^ Ipsen (1997). 
'« Del Boca (1988) and Persegani (1981). 
'^ Del Boca (1986) and Larebo (1994). 
» DelBoca(1986), p. 209. 
" Persegani (1981), pp. 582-583. 
" Ipsen (1997), p. 182. 
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likely to survive without large state subsidies. In other words, the policy 
of diverting emigration from foreign lands was a dream. 
5. CONCLUSIÓN: SOME SPECULATIONS 
Before 1935 the conquest of Italian colonies was fairly expensive, but 
their administration was cheap, and they yielded almost nothing. On the 
whole, they were probably a net liability, but small enough to be negligible. 
The Fascist conquest of Ethiopia broke with this tradition. It was extremely 
expensive, accounting for three quarters of total expenditures upon colonies 
in the whole period from 1886-7 to 1939-40. This entailed a really serious 
misallocation of resources, which bore no fruit for the mother-country as 
a whole (even if it enriched several individuáis and companies). The resort 
to colonial trade, and the whole autarkic policy, severely damaged Italian 
welfare. However, the consequences on the Italian economy were small 
because the Fascist colonial empire only lasted for five years. On the whole 
colonialism had very little impact on Italian long-run growth. Without it, 
very little would have changed. Can this conclusión be changed? Could 
colonies have been relevant for the Italian development? The question 
depends on the implicit counterfactual. Two possibiÜties come to mind '^. 
First, one could muse about the effects of a victory at Adwa. Let's 
assume that the victorious Italian army had conquered Ethiopia in 1896-98. 
Liberal Italy could not have afforded to manage the colony, at least on 
Fascist scale. The average yearly outlay in 1935-1941 (3100 millions 1913 
lire) was 10% more than the total state expenditures in 1912-13 (pre-war 
peak) and about half the average expenditure during World War One. 
On the other hand, it is highly doubtful that Italy would have needed 
an increase in aggregate demand as in the 1930s. In the late 1890s and 
early 1900s, its economy was booming, and possibly was experiencing 
supply-side constraints especially in the production of capital goods. 
As an altemative, one could hypothesise that Italy had not entered 
World War 11 and henee had retained its empire. The effect would have 
depended on the policy in the 1950s. If Italy had followed the English 
example of gradual de-colonisation, the effect would have been small. On 
the contrary, the result could have been very negative for the «Italian 
" One should quote a third altemative scenario - that oil was discovered in Libya 
in the 1920s. Surely, this would have improved Italy's trade balance, even if oil was not 
yet the major energy source for Italy. 
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miracle» of the 1950s-1960s had Italy pursued the Fascist policy of 
exploitation and repression of the natives' insurgence along the lines 
followed by France and Portugal. 
One might therefore want to qualify somewhat the previous assessment. 
Imperiaüsm was more irrelevant than harmful largely because at first it 
was a military and political failure and because the Fascist period was 
so short. Furthermore, the focus on its economic effects should not make 
US neglect wider negative consequences of colonialism. It poisoned Italian 
politics and society for about fifty years. At the end of the World War 
One, the failure to obtain the colonial compensation at Versailles, which 
had been ambiguously promised by the Allies in the treaty of London 
(the myth of the «vittoria mutilata»), facilitated Mussolini's seizure of 
power. Later, the Fascist colonial policy set Italy on a path diverging from 
the Western democracies and was a proximate cause of the alliance with 
Nazi Germany. Italy's Ethiopian campaign was one of the major steps 
towards World War Two. One can argüe that colonialism was one of the 
major scourges of Italian history in the 20th century. But of course not 
for Italy alone. 
A P P E N D K A 
A NOTE ON THE COLONIAL EXPENDITURE 
Estimating the total colonial expenditure is quite diffícult. Before 1912 
there was no central agency in charge of the colonies and the expenditures 
were scattered among different ministries (most notably those of War and 
Foreign Affairs). It was thus easy to conceal the colonial expenditures by 
registering them under some other headings of the state budget '•*. 
Govemments wished to minimise the apparent costs of colonies, in order 
to undermine the main argument of the opposition, which was loath to 
oppose colonialism as such, but argued that Italy could not yet afford it. 
After 1914-15, all the outlays should have been registered in the budget 
of the Ministry for Colonies, but it is not sure that concealing had ceased 
totally. Furthermore, the fundas for the colonial wars were usually allocated 
out of the budget in ad hoc laws, and this procedure entailed a lot of 
'^  Labanca(1993), pp. 145-147. 
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creative accounting, Italian style. Finally, the original budget data, published 
yearly in the Rendiconti, were compiled with different and changing criteria. 
Long-term series of expenditures with homogenous criteria have been 
provided by the Ministero del Tesoro in 1914 and 1931 ^', by Repací (1962) 
and again by the Ministero del Tesoro in the 1960s '^. The figures differ 
quite markedly, both for total expenditures ^^  and for each category, such 
as the expenditure for colonies. Unfortunately the sources are extremely 
parsimonious in disclosing the criteria they have used. A glance at the 
data provides some clues. First, one can discard Repaci, who has simply 
copied the data from the Ministero del Tesoro, deducting the investments 
in railways and those in public buildings in the Aegean islands. Before 
the (fiscal) year 1907-08 the difference between the three «offícial» series 
depends on the definition of expenditures. The Ministero del Tesoro (1914 
and 1931) refer to the «impegni» (the commitments to spend), while the 
later work of the Ministero '* refers to the actual expenditures (59). It 
is impossible to pinpoint the causes of the discrepancies after 1908-9. 
The main problem arises in dealing with the financing of the conquest 
of Libya. The money was advanced by semi-autonomous financial 
institutions (such as the «Cassa Depositi e Prestiti») which were later 
reimbursed by the state. In this way, the burden was distributed in many 
years instead of being imputed in the year of disbursement. The Ministero 
Tesoro omits these expenditures altogether, while Repaci and the 
Ragioneria follow different criteria. The former estimates the actual time 
distribution of the expenditures, while the Ragioneria register the outlays 
from the budget. In principie, the Repaci approach seems more sound, 
as wartime inflation caused the real valué of the expenditures to faU 
substantially (shifting the burden from the state coffers to the lending 
institutions)''. On the other hand, Repaci seems to have omitted a further 
389.2 millions allocated in 1914 ^ . The Ragioneria does not explicitly quote 
this sum, but it is likely to have considered it. In fact the estímate of 
" Ragioneria genérale dello Stato 1914 and Ministero del Tesoro 1931. 
"• Ragioneria (1969). 
" Baccini(1993). 
" Ragioneria (1969). 
" There are two minor sources of discrepancy, the expenditures for the China war 
(included in the Ragioneria series but not in those of the Ministero Tesoro) and the rounding 
procedure. The data of the Ministero Tesoro are rounded by omitting all the decimals, 
so that 8.9 millions became 8 millions instead of 9 as in the usual rounding procedure. 
"• The Italian economy as a whole was decidedly worse off, as the «Cassa depositi 
e prestiti» should have used its funds to finance the construction of public building. 
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total colonial expenditure over the years 1911-12 to 1916-17 (2211 millions 
in current prices) is much higher than Repaci's figures (1402 millions). 
On the whole, the series of the Ragioneria seem to be the best, and 
they have been used in the text. They are the longest ones (from 1886-7 
onwards) and they take into account the actual expenditures, even if 
allocations through time are not precise. They will be therefore used in 
the historical analysis. Anyway, the choice does not change the results: 
over the whole period fi-om 1911-12 to 1939-40 the cumulated difference 
between the Ragioneria and Repaci is a mere 1.2%. 
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